THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIME “TYPE” AND CIVIC EDUCATION: THE CASES OF THREE CHINESE SOCIETIES

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The Relationship between Regime “Type” and Civic Education: The Cases of Three Chinese Societies

By

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I, LI, HUI, hereby declare that I am the sole author of the thesis and the material presented in this thesis in my original work except those indicated in the acknowledgment. I further declare that I have followed the Institute’s policies and regulations on Academic Honesty, Copyright and Plagiarism in writing the thesis and no material in this thesis has been published or submitted for a degree in this or other Universities.

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ABSTRACT

The Relationship between Regime “Type” and Civic Education: The Cases of Three Chinese Societies

By

LI HUI

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the Hong Kong Institute of Education

Using a comparative qualitative methodology, this thesis takes three Chinese societies, Taiwan Hong Kong, and Mainland China, as specific cases of democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes, and focuses on the concept of ‘good citizen’ in these three regime contexts. It explores how these concepts are reflected in civic education and perceived by students in the three societies.

The results show that there is a close continuity and congruence between regime “type” and civic education, especially in non-democratic societies such as authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Mainland China, characterized in this study as an authoritarian regime, requires a self-contradictory citizen and the concept was directly reflected in a fixed and precisely defined civic education. Hong Kong was characterized as a hybrid regime in which democratic and authoritarian forces have competed and struggled to gain public
support even under Chinese sovereignty. This has resulted in a contested concept of ‘good citizen’ and competing views of civic education proposed to support different political claims. Taiwan provided the example of a democratic regime. It has witnessed changing conceptions of its ‘good citizen’ directly related to the progress of democratization and attitudes to state sovereignty. Moving through phases, there was an initial emphasis highlighting Chinese citizenship that eventually was replaced with Taiwanese citizenship and finally a dual concept of Taiwanese citizenship with Chinese cultural identity. These phases were also reflected in Taiwan’s civic education that changed from a China-centered curriculum to a Taiwan-centered curriculum to an integrated curriculum.

As for students, the results within each regime were mostly consistent but in all regimes there was some variation, especially in Taiwan’s democracy. Mainland Chinese students shared a unique conception of ‘good citizen’ which basically fulfills the expectations of the authoritarian regime and its civic education. Hong Kong students formed a mixed conception of ‘good citizen’ influenced by the debate of democracy and authoritarianism. Taiwan students’ perception of ‘good citizen’, however, went beyond to the expectations of its civic education.

The ‘good citizen’ required by the regimes was directly reflected in civics curriculum irrespective of regime “type”. Students as the recipient of civic education, however, responded differently in each regime. It seems to suggest regime capacity was the key element in whether a regime could be assured of producing its required ‘good citizen’. This capacity was seen to be linked to the capacity of the state, and Sorensen’s three models of state theory indicated that state capacity varied among democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Thus it seems that while regime “type” strongly influences forms of civic education and the attributes of a ‘good citizen’, it is a state’s capacity to support
regime objectives that determines the effectiveness of a regime’s efforts to mould and shape the kind of citizens it requires.

The thesis further argued that state capacity supporting regimes most likely accounts for the level of resistance by students to adopting the qualities of a regime’s desired “good citizen”. This resistance appeared less in Mainland China where the state’s capacity supporting the regime was strongest. Student attitudes in Hong Kong reflected the hybrid nature of the regime despite the state’s capacity supporting the pro-China view. In democratic Taiwan students appeared much more resistant to the regime’s views and the state’s capacity to moderate this resistance was limited. These comparative results provide the foundation for further work to be carried out on civic education in non-democratic contexts.

**Key words:** regime “type”, ‘good citizen’, civic education, Chinese societies
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Special Administrative Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVED</td>
<td>Civic Education Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCS</td>
<td>International Civic and Citizenship Education Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRCMOE</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Curriculum Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuo Min Tang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>New Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>People First Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>Taiwan Solidarity Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMOE</td>
<td>Taiwan Ministry of Education</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the main problems identified by the study, the research questions
addressed, the research design, the main arguments advanced and finally describes the
organization of the thesis.

The chapter can be divided into five sections: Section 1.2 introduces the purpose of the
study. Section 1.3 identifies the research questions that were addressed. Section 1.4
presents the research design that was applied. Section 1.5 sets out main arguments and
values advanced. Section 1.5 outlines the organization of the thesis.

1.2 Purpose of the Study
The assumption of most western literature on civic education is that its purposes are
largely linked to the democratic regimes and their maintenance. One of the earliest
discussions of civic education explicitly indicated that it would be best applicable in a
democracy, “in the other constitutions it may be applicable, but it need not necessarily be
so” (Aristotle, 1962, p.170). In modern times, the discourse of civic education has been
focused largely around the discourse of liberal democracy, and civic education is
described as creating a citizenry that supports an effective democratic society that
encompasses these values and procedures (Kennedy, Lee & Grossman, 2012). Some
scholars have even insisted that “the issue of civic education must be discussed in the
context of a democratic social and political order” (Williams, 1987, p.12). Therefore, in
most cases, civic education is called “democratic civic education” and is usually
understood to mean “education for democratic citizenship”.

- 1 -
Yet global experience has witnessed the emergence and development of civic education in many non-democratic societies. In these societies, with the development of the economy and the spread of democratic and liberal ideas, people’s self-awareness is often awakened and they are no longer willing to be obedient subjects. Governments and policy-makers in these societies are increasingly aware that these ideas may destabilize their society and threaten their rule. Thus they have begun to seriously reflect upon the fundamental nature of citizens, the concept of citizenship, civil society, and civic values and then to develop their own civic education. It is noted that civic education in these societies has been changed and it general “plays a role of social control and political socialization” which differs from the democratic tradition (Cogan & Morris, 2001, p.2). In most cases it may not be called civic education in these contexts; it may be called or means “moral education”, “political education”, or “national education”.

Take Mainland China, Pakistan and Vietnam for example, as authoritarian regimes that include civic education in their curriculum system. In Mainland China, although the concept of civic education has been introduced in school curriculum recently, it is often used interchangeably or together with moral education, ideological and political education, and more emphasizes on morality and political values (Tan, 2007; Yu & Feng, 2010; Wang, 2011; Ding, 2012; Li & Qin, 2012). In Pakistan, Ahmad (2008, p. 104) has pointed out that “it is evident from the national curriculum guidelines that the overarching theme of the curriculum on citizenship education…is Islamic ideology”. He concluded that the Islamic model of citizenship education has neither taken into consideration the needs of a developing society nor presented Islamic civilization as a progressive alternative. And in Vietnam, civic education in the form of moral education and taught as independent subject at all levels of the education system. The focus of moral education in primary schools is character and personality building. While in secondary schools, the syllabuses focus on citizenship education, emphasizing the notion
of developing a socialist citizen (Doan, 2005). Malaysia and Singapore provides another example. Its democracy is often regarded as a “soft authoritarianism” (Roy, 1994, p.232) or semi-democracy. In Malaysia, a new curriculum entitled “civics education and citizenship” was implemented in primary and secondary school in 2005. The objective and contents of the curriculum as identified by the teachers, educationists and opinion leaders reinforce the goals of civil society, Malaysian nationhood and patriotism (Bajunid, 2008). Moral education in Singapore was replaced by civic education after the education reform in 1990, but it still based on the moral education, and has also introduced national education and multicultural education (Wei, 1994).

The above experiences seems to suggest that civic education does not always have to be identical with Western liberal democracy and it is much a part of non-democratic societies as well as in democratic societies. Recent research has also provided rich empirical and theoretical evidences to indicate civic education plays a different role in democratic and non-democratic societies (Parker, 1996; Cogan & Morris, 2001; Leung &Yuen, 2011; Shively, 2011; Kennedy, Lee & Grossman, 2012). This raises the question of the impact of regime “type” on patterns of civic education. If non-democratic regimes view citizen preparation as important, what kind of ‘good citizen’ do they aim to produce? In what ways is it different from democratic civic education? That is, what is the logic and rationale of non-democratic civic education?

Given these above questions, the purpose of this study is to investigate how civic education is influenced by the political system in which it is embedded and the social goals and purposes that construct such systems. It focuses on notions of the ‘good citizen’ in different political systems and how these notions are reflected in civic education. Three Chinese societies have been chosen as the focus of the study: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. These societies represent different regime types (democracy, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime) but are similar in terms of their
cultural, ethnic and historical backgrounds. These similarities will help to highlight the significance of any possible variations as a result of the differing political systems.

1.3 Key Research Questions Addressed in the Study

This is a study of the influence of regime “type” on civic education. It is based on the assumption that regime “type” will lead to different types and patterns of civic education. Yet such an assumption is a hypothesis to be explored since the impact of different regimes on citizenship education may be influential or it may be inconsequential. Civic education, for example, may have generic characteristics irrespective of regime “type” and ideology. Existing literature has not addressed this issue largely because of an underlying assumption that that civic education is a primary tool of liberal democracies. There are a number of related questions:

RQ1: Do theories of the state embedded in specific regime “type” articulate specific roles for citizens and do they indicate conceptions of a ‘good citizen’?

RQ2: To what extent are regime “type” theories and characteristics reflected in education policies and the school curriculum?

RQ3: What is the lived experience of students as ‘good citizen’ living under different regime types?

1.4 Research Design for the Study

A comparative research design will be used because the above research questions are addressed in three distinctive contexts: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. Bray and Thomas (1995) outlined the importance of different levels of comparison and these are relevant to the current study. This study focuses on three levels of comparison to ensure that all relevant issues can be identified:

Level 1: Regime type;
Level 2: Civic Curriculum and policy formulations;
Level 3: Student personal experience
Within each of these levels Phillips and Schweisfurth’s (2007, p.99) stages of comparative inquiry will be used:

- Conceptualization
- Contextualization
- Isolation of differences
- Explanation
- Recombentualization
- Application

This framework provides a 3 x 6 matrix to explore major issues in the study as shown in Table 1)

Table 1:

*The Research Framework of the Study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The levels of comparative inquiry</th>
<th>Regime type (x3)</th>
<th>Curriculum policy (x3)</th>
<th>Student experience of citizenship (10 students in each of 3 regimes)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualization</td>
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<td>Contextualization</td>
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<td>Application</td>
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1.5 **Main Arguments and Value of the Study**

There are four aspects related to the main argument and values of the study. First, it can
provide some insight into the theories of civic education not linked to mainstream western ideas. Civic education has come to be so much associated with liberal democracy society, and the current theories of civic education, either liberal or republican, are both western democratic theories of civic education. Many countries around the world are concerned about civic education and also want to construct their own domestic model of civic education within their own cultural and political backgrounds. It is clear that not all of these societies can be characterized as “democratic”, though democratic elements might be found in their respective systems (Grossman, 2012). In this situation democratic theory will not be the best way to try and understand these forms of civic education (Lee, 2004, 2009). This study, therefore, can enrich the theoretical underpinnings of civic education in contexts other than liberal democracy.

Second, the multilevel nature of the study will focus on three levels of comparison to ensure that all relevant issues can be identified: Level 1: Regime “type”; Level 2: Curriculum and policy formulations; Level 3: Student personal experience. These three levels are linked with each other and form a continuous process of civic education implementation. But the current study on civic education in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China focus on just one level of civic education in isolation. Some researchers, for example highlight the level of regime and the ideology underlying civic education (Aristotle, 1962; Fairbrother, 2003). Others focus on the influence of regime transition on civic education curriculum (Kwong, 1985; Li, 1990; Fok, 1997; Liu, 1999, 2000, 2001; Tse, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2011). And still others are concerned with students’ experience as citizen under the different regime types (Tsang, 1996; Chiodo & Martin, 2005; Lai & Byram, 2012). These studies help us to deeply understand one level of civic education, but they ignore the continuity and link between these three levels, and the possible variations from first level to second and third. Therefore, the current study focuses on the three levels of civic education and can help to provide a holistic view of the relationship between regime “type” and civic education.
Third, the study can make an important contribution to the comparative study of civic education. Currently, most of the cross-countries studies on civic education are more concerned with liberal democratic civic education in different cultural contexts and they compare differences or similarities across these contexts. There has been little researches paying attention to political contexts (Almond & Verba, 1989; Hahn, 1998; Kennedy & Fairbrother, 2004; Lee, 2009; Leung & Yuen, 2011). Recent literature has shown that civic education can develop in the Eastern cultural contexts just as well as in the West, and it is firmly rooted in its cultural background forming its own character. The biggest obstacle to understanding civic education in non-western society may not be its cultural heritage. Rather, as will be investigated in this study, it may be the way different regimes, influenced by their political and social purposes, construct civic education to produce citizens supportive of key regime characteristics.

Finally, this study can provide some insights on the way civic education is developed in non-democratic societies and particularly Chinese societies. The three Chinese societies, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China, are chosen as cases in this study. These three societies share a common Chinese culture but have different regime type. Civic education in these three societies is situated at different development stages. Taiwan has successfully finished the process of democratization and its related civic educational reform (Liu, 1999, 2000), and the current civic education in Taiwan has become an important support for the effective work of democracy. In one sense, Taiwan’s democratization and civic education might be seen to reflect western values but the extent to which this is the case will be the subject of investigation in this study. Hong Kong, a former British colony that is now a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, has never been “a nation-state or a democratic polity. Civic education thus displays distinctive features which deviate from a conventional unitary model of national citizenship” (Tse, 2007, p.161). Under the policy of “one county, two systems” Hong Kong’s political system contains some democratic elements but its governance is firmly under the control of the Chinese national government. Recent attempts to impose
national education in Hong Kong indicate how the tension are very much part of Hong Kong’s political structure. Chinese civic education, more often referred to as ideological, political and moral education, has been a feature of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. Yet it has not taken the same form during that time. The issues for this study are whether different forms of civic education reflect the social and political purposes of the non-democratic and democratic state, the extent to which these purposes are reflected in policy and curriculum and their impact on young citizens. Across the three societies, there is the unexplored issue of how ‘good citizen’ are defined and how they are expected to act. These issues will be explored in some depth in this study.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This introductory chapter has outlined the main problem and questions that the study addressed, outlines the comparative research design and research questions proposed.

Chapter 2 provides the literature review of civic education across countries in the past two decades. This will help to shed light on the comparative nature of civic education in different contexts and identify the research gap relating to civic education in different regime type. And then key theoretical issues relating to the main ideas in the present study will also be discussed. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and methods used to collect and analyze data to address. Chapter 4 to 6 present the results and finding in the study. Chapter 7 discusses the finding in the study. Chapter 8 summarizes the main points and concludes the study with its contributions and limitations.

This chapter has outlined the main problem and questions that are addressed by the study, how the study is conducted, its potential arguments and contribution to the field, and the organization of the thesis. Chapter 2 will review literature on the case study of civic education cross countries in the past two decades.
2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the key issues on which this thesis is based, set out the significance of the study, the research questions and organization of the thesis. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to review cross-country studies of civic education to identify the key issues in the field and the major gaps in the literature. This review will provide the foundations for defining the conceptual basis of the present study and identifying key theoretical issues on which thesis is based.

This chapter is divided into five sections: Section 2.2 reviews four kinds of cross-country case studies of civic education and makes an assessment of their main concerns. Section 2.3 analyzes three key terms to be used in the study - regime “type”, civic education, and ‘good citizen’—to provide a clear conceptual basis for the study. Section 2.4, based on the definitions arrived at in the previous section, proposes a hypothetical relationship between regime “type”, civic education and the “production” of ‘good citizen’.

2.2 Literature Review

Cross country case studies of civic education have been a dominant form of research in the field in the past two decades and Hahn (2010) has encouraged this development in comparative education. Such studies help to shed light on the comparative nature of civic education in different contexts. Yet such studies have taken different forms showing the diversity within the field: large-scale studies involving 10 or more countries, cross regional and cultural cases studies, within regional and cultural cases studies and cross

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
regimes studies. Each of these will be discussed below.

**Large-Scale Studies**

The most notable large-scale study of civic education was conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The first IEA civic education study took place in 1975 and involved nine countries. It found that not all countries approached teaching civic-related values in a formal way. It also provided inconclusive data about the impact of schooling on students’ knowledge and civic attitudes (Torney, 1977). The second IEA Civic Education Study (CIVED) was conducted in 1999. It was a two phase study. The purpose of the first phase was to track the changing social, economic and political circumstances in the twenty-four participating countries and corresponding civic education policies and practices. The researchers in the study acknowledged the impact of these changes on civic education. Therefore, they felt it necessary to obtain information on the changing contexts that would provide information for the design of instrumentation in the second-phase large-scale quantitative survey (Torney-Purta et al, 1999). The second phase surveyed the civic knowledge, engagement, and attitudes of 14-year-old students in 28 countries and societies. The results indicated that knowledge of civic and political processes and concepts by itself is insufficient to ensure young students’ participation (Torney-Purta et al, 2001). The third IEA study was the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS 2009) that built on the previous CIVED. The studies have a similar purpose, to investigate the ways in which lower secondary school students are prepared to undertake their roles as citizens in a range of countries. The initial result showed that the participating countries used different approaches to provide civic education largely due to their national contexts. Also the range of countries in this study covered only a limited number of geographic regions and types of education system. The findings showed that, the majority of students knew about the main civic institutions and understood the interconnectedness of institutions and processes, but a substantial minority of students in all countries had limited civic knowledge (Schulz et al, 2010). The results also...
highlighted significant differences in the nature of students’ civic knowledge across different countries (Schulz et al, 2010; Kerr et al, 2010; Schulz et al, 2011).

Kerr (1999) conducted an international comparative study of civic education focusing on policies rather than students’ achievement. The study involved sixteen European countries, and examined six key aspects of civic education: curriculum, teaching and learning approach, teacher specialization and teacher training, teaching materials (textbooks and other sources), assessment, and current and future development. He indicated that a number of broad contextual factors influence the definition and approach to civic education. The main contextual factors were “historical tradition, geographical position, social-political structure, economic system, and global trend” (p.3-4). Regarding the social-political structure, he argued that “changes in social-political structure have had, and continue to have, a profound effect on civic education” (p.4).

**Cross Regional and Cultural Cases Studies**

A number of major case studies have focused on the comparison of civic education across different regional or cultural backgrounds. An area that has been highlighted is the difference between Eastern and Western views of civic education. Kennedy and Fairbrother (2004) raised the basic question as to “whether there truly exists an Asian-Western dichotomy or whether rather than being distinct and exclusive, Asian and Western conceptions of citizenship education are compatible and share commonalities” (p.290). They argued that there is little doubt that in Asian societies, there is distinctiveness about citizenship education that marks it apart from Western versions. Yet it cannot be said there is a single “Asian” perspective. There are Asian perspectives mediated by culture, religion, national identity, social context and political values. These perspectives can often be traced back to deep cultural roots within different Asian societies. Lee (2009) insisted that Asian civic education was different from Western versions. Compared with much of West, there are several features of civic education in
Asia: “First, rather than talking about politics, civic education in East Asia talks about morality. ‘Civic’ always goes with ‘morals’ in the East; thus civic and moral education is a term more common than civic education or citizenship education in Asian countries. Second, many Asian countries tend to focus on the development of individuality (as far as self is concerned) and relations (as far as the society is concerned) in citizenship education” (p.12). Leung & Yuen (2011) argued that there are both similarities and differences between Asian civic education and certain Western. Generally speaking, most Western civic education is based on liberalism emphasizing rights and freedom from restrictions. This is different from emphases in many Asian countries. Yet some Western civic education is based on communitarianism so that civic education in this tradition emphasizes cultural diversity and moral responsibility and this has some commonalities with Asian civic education.

Within-Region and Cultural Cases Studies
The third major type of comparative cases studies is concerned with civic education in one region or similar social-political or cultural context. Many scholars have studied civic and citizenship education in liberal democratic societies. Hahn (1998) studied students’ political attitudes and beliefs in five Western democratic societies. This study started in 1985 and ended in 1996, and covered a range of topics, including adolescent political attitudes and behaviours, gender and political attitudes, freedom of expression and civic tolerance, classroom climates, and teaching. One of the major findings was that of diversity and differences within Western democracies. “yet, even among these Western democracies with many shared experiences and values relevant to this study, there are considerable differences in the ways that they prepare their young people to participate as citizens…I am now more convinced than ever that the forms education takes reflect the distinct set of values of a particular culture and for that reason ‘what works’ in one cultural context cannot be simply adopted in another setting with different traditions, values, and meanings”(p.viii).
In a similar way, Almond and Verba (1989) studied civic culture through people’s political attitudes in five democracies as early as 1963—the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. In their study, political culture was firstly divided into three classifications—parochial, subject and participant, and they assumed that a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure, and a democratic political culture. They found, however, that even “in well-established and stable democracies, the imperfections of the processes of political socialization, personal preferences, and limitations in intelligence or in opportunities to learn will continue to produce subjects and parochials” (p.342).

There is also an extensive literature on civic education (citizenship education, moral education, ideological and political education) in Chinese societies. Most of these studies draw attention to the changes in the political situation and its influence on civic education. Liu (1999; 2000; 2001) compared Taiwan’s civic education curriculum in the old and new periods to conclude that civic values promoted in the civics curriculum and school implementation in authoritarian and democratic period were obviously different. In Hong Kong, scholars were concerned about the impact of the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China on the civics curriculum. Morris (1988), for example, conducted an analysis of curriculum changes since 1972 demonstrating that the impending return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China had a marked effect on the curriculum of secondary schools. Fok (1997) indicated that after the return to China civic education in Hong Kong would take three new directions: patriotism, developing a new identity, education for political literacy and education for citizenship. Tse (2004, 2006, and 2007) reviewed the socio-political situation and the development of civic education curriculum policy in Hong Kong over the recent decades. He found that the socio-political transitions have significantly influenced the shaping of civic education. While in Mainland China, Kwong
(1985) drew attention to the shifts of two similar civics textbooks in their content related
to changing political leadership, political philosophy, and political cultural during and
after the cultural revolution. Li (1990) conducted an analysis of moral education in
Mainland China from 1949 to 1989. He showed that moral education in China was
basically the expressed thoughts of political leaders, which intruded into other branches
of education, although the exact content and degree varies. Tse (2011, p.161) compared
two versions of civics textbooks published in 1997 and 2005. He found that:

The new textbooks soften the presentation and packaging of ideological
content and also adopt a stance of greater reconciliation with human rights
and global citizenship. … Young citizens are still expected to shoulder the
mission of national revival and socialist modernization—very much derived
from official policies (p.161).

The most recent case is Kennedy, Fairbrother and Zhao (2013, p.230) who found that:

Chinese academics do not believe that citizenship education should be turned
into another version of political-ideological or moral education. Rather, they
insisted that citizenship education must take a unique contribution to
preparing young citizens to engage in the public sphere, re-examine the
values transmitted into the state-run schools, and form a new social
consensus through the communication of ideas across different social
problems.

In addition to these case studies of civic education within Chinese societies there have
been several studies across different Chinese societies. Fairbrother (2003a; 2003b; 2008)
studied civic/political education in Greater China after 1990. He found that in Chinese
societies (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China) national goals and ideologies have
always been reflected in civics curriculum and presented to students in textbooks.
Through surveys and interviews with university students in Hong Kong and Mainland
China, he found a number of students held attitudes that appear contrary to the ideal
intended goals of the state. Li (2001) chose two Chinese societies, Taiwan and Mainland
China, as cases to study the relationship between moral education and ideology. Through
analysis of syllabus and textbooks, he found that in Taiwan the purpose of moral
education was established within the framework of Three Principles of the People and
that the content of curriculum reflected this orientation of politics. Compared to Taiwan, the relationship between moral education and political ideology in Mainland China was also apparent. Ideology education, political and moral education were included in the conception of moral education. The purpose of moral education showed features of communism and socialism.

Case Studies across Regimes

The last set of case studies are those that compared civic education across different regimes, although the number is small. Shively (2011, p.114) used regime theory to link regime type to types of citizens. He proposed two kinds of citizen: “Enthusiastic citizen” and “Democratic citizen”. In his overview, non-democratic states, especially the totalitarian states, try to generate “enthusiastic citizens” to support the government (Shively, 2011):

An example is Hitler—through his pageantry, his rallies, and his network of youth organizations, sports clubs, and so on—tried to generate enthusiastic support for Nazis, that would help him to build a powerful German military force more rapidly (p.114).

The Soviet Union and other former communist countries also tried to build enthusiastic support through rallies, discussion groups, parades, and strenuous campaigning, even when their elections were restricted to a single party. In a democracy, on the other hand, it is hoped not only that people will obey the laws and be “enthusiastic citizens” but that they will also and at the same time be critical “democratic citizens”: “Democratic citizens” are expected to walk a difficult line by supporting enthusiastically the authority of their government leaders but, at the same time, are critical enough of those leaders that they might readily vote them out of office at the next election. These two kinds of citizens are theoretical constructs and have not been verified empirically.

Janoski (1998, P.137-139) proposed a framework of rights and obligations in liberal, traditional, and social democratic regimes. At first he summed up the discussion of rights
and obligation in the three political theories, and then attempted to demonstrate it in three representative regime types—the United State as liberal, Germany as traditional, and Sweden as social democratic. He was surprised to find that the framework of rights and obligations in specific countries differed from the discussion of the theories embedded in different regimes.

Based on the above literature review of comparative civic education studies, it seems an important focus has been on cultural contexts in either single countries or within regions. Comparisons of Western and Asian approaches to civic education have received a great deal of attention. By focusing on cultural issues, it often seems that the political system has been ignored, except in the case of China where politics has been shown to be very important. For the majority of cases the assumption seems to have been that civic education has its basis in only one type of political context – liberal democracies. China, of course, is the exception to this general approach. This means the political system is held as a constant in most comparative studies. Yet as the case of China so clearly demonstrates, the political system or “regime type” plays a fundamental role. The Chinese contributors to Kennedy, Fairbrother & Zhao (2013) made it very clear that their work in civic education does not stand above politics. The lack of attention to case studies of civic education within and across different regime types, therefore, is a significant gap in the literature as is attention to politics. At the same time, there is often the assumption that regimes are in transition (Bray & Lee, 1993, 1997; Fok, 1997). The assumption of these Hong Kong studies was that the transition would eventually result in a democratically-oriented society. This focus again misses the point that not all regimes are in transition and therefore there is a need to understand better how regimes other than democracies use civic education to meet their purposes. It is this gap in the literature that the present study aims to fill.

### 2.3 The Definition of Key Terms used in This Study

This thesis will focus on civic education in different political regimes. This section,
therefore, analyzes three key terms to be used in the study—regime “type”, civic education, and ‘good citizen’ to provide a clear conceptual basis for the study.

2.3.1. Regime “Type”
After the Second World War, many political scientists divided regimes into three types: democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian. The division was generally accepted due to its broad and somewhat vague criteria (Linz, 1975; Zhao, 1994; Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 1999). With the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the end of communism signaled major changes in Europe but this did not mean the end of totalitarian regimes. Democracy has often been used as a dichotomous concept to define political systems—democratic or non-democratic. Yet it seems more reasonable and accurate to suggest that democracy is a continuous concept, “with the possibility of varying degrees of democracy” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, p.1). The most common reference points for comparative assessment of democracy have been proposed by the Freedom House organization, Diamond and the Economist Intelligence Unit (Behrendt, 2011).

From 1972 to 2014 Freedom House assessed the situation of global democracy, and annually published the survey ratings and narrative reports on almost all countries and related or disputed territories in the world. Based on the minimalist definition of democracy—civil liberties and political rights, the assessment divided the participating country into three types: free, partly free, and not free. In the report for 2014, “free” is very high, at 88 countries, 59 countries are related as “partly free”, and the remaining 48 countries in this report are “not free” (Puddington, 2014, p.7). This result and trend has no significant changes from 2000 to 2014: the numbers of free countries always varies from 85 to 88, and accounts for about 45% of the participating countries; The average number of partly free countries is about 58, and accounts for about 30%; the remaining 47 not free countries account for 24% (Freedom House, 2012, Puddington, 2014). The division has been used in some empirical research, but opponents argued that it is not
reliable because this index only reflects the state of political freedoms and civil liberties, “they do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is or its quality” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, p.2).

Diamond (2002) proposed six types of regime based on “whether elections have been free and fair, both in the ability of opposition parties and candidates to campaign and in the casting and counting of the votes” (p.28). He identified six regime types: (1) Liberal Democracy; (2) Electoral Democracy; (3) Ambiguous Regime; (4) Competitive Authoritarian; (5) Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian; (6) Politically Closed Authoritarian and these are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime types</th>
<th>Countries over one million population N (%)</th>
<th>Countries under one million population N (%)</th>
<th>All countries No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>45(30)</td>
<td>28(66.7)</td>
<td>73(38.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>29(19.3)</td>
<td>2(4.8)</td>
<td>31(16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous Regime</td>
<td>14(9.3)</td>
<td>3(7.1)</td>
<td>17(8.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Authoritarian</td>
<td>19(12.7)</td>
<td>2(4.8)</td>
<td>21(10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>22(14.7)</td>
<td>3(7.1)</td>
<td>25(13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Closed Authoritarian</td>
<td>21(14)</td>
<td>4(9.5)</td>
<td>25(13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150(100)</td>
<td>42(100)</td>
<td>192(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Diamond (2002) identified 104 democracies in the world at the end of 2001, about seven in ten democracies were considered as liberal democracies. Another thirty one democracies were electoral but not liberal. Seventeen regimes were “ambiguous” in the sense that they fell on the boundary between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism. Twenty one regimes can be considered as competitive electoral authoritarian, and another twenty five regimes were electoral authoritarian but in a more hegemonic way. Finally, “twenty five regimes do not have any of the architecture of political competition and pluralism. These remain politically closed regimes” (Diamond, 2002, p.26).

The Economist Intelligence Unit updated the work of Freedom House and added three categories (electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, and political participation) to measure the degree of democracy. It has published six reports about democracy index since 2007: the first one published in 2007, measured the state of democracy in 2006; the second edition covered the situation towards the end of 2008; the third one published in 2010; the fourth and fifth at the end of 2011, 2012, and the latest is published in the 2013 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). “The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world’s independent states” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010, p.1). Each category has a rating on a 0-10 scale, and the overall index of regime is the simple average of the five category indexes. The index values are used to divide countries into four types of regime Economist Intelligence Unit (2010):

- Full democracies--scores of 8-10;
- Flawed democracies—scores of 6-7.9;
- Hybrid regimes--scores of 4-5.9;
- Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4

According to the report of Economist Intelligence Unit in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, “full democracies” and “flawed democracies” are usually referred to as democracies, and it always accounts for almost one-half of the world’s countries (47.6%) from 2006 to 2013(2006:49.1%, 2008:47.9%, 2010:47.3%, 2011: 46.7%, 2012:47.3%, 2013:46.8%).
and 2013: 47.4%). More than one-third of the world’s countries (31.3%) are ruled by authoritarianism (2006: 32.3%, 2008: 30.5%, 2010: 32.9%, 2011: 31.1%; 2012: 30.0% and 2013: 31.1%), and slightly less than one-third of the world’s countries (20.9%) are hybrid regimes (2006: 18.0%, 2008: 21.6%, 2010: 19.8%, 2011: 22.2%, 2012: 22.2%, and 2013: 21.5%).

In order to use a common definition, this study will combine the above three indices of regime type and identified three broad types: “democratic regimes”, “hybrid regimes”, and “authoritarian regimes”. Although “regime” is divided into three types such as free, partly free, and not free by the Freedom House, the terms free and democracy are usually used interchangeably, and the results of assessment after 2000, especially the numbers of country and its percentage, is roughly the same according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s. Using Diamond’s typology of regime, types (1) and (2) are democracy, (4), (5), and some or all of (3), are hybrid regimes—that is, except for democracies and what can be considered “political closed authoritarian” regimes (Type 6) (Wang, 2006, p.120). This study will pay attention to regime types from 2000 to 2013, since there has been no significant transition of regimes since 2000. At the end of 2013, according to the index of Economist Intelligence Unit (2013), one-half of the world’s population lives in a democracy of some sort. More than one-third of the world’s population still lives under authoritarian rule. Although hybrid regimes account for just 16% of the world’s population, slightly less than one-third of world’s countries can be considered as hybrid regime. Table 3 provides a summary.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Types at the end of 2013</th>
<th>No. of countries</th>
<th>% of countries</th>
<th>% of world population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracies</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid regimes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most scholars and observers agree that: “democracy” as a type of regime means “a political system in which the principal positions of power are filled through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Diamond, 2002, p.21). By this conception, the characteristics of a democracy include: (1) Pluralistic politics as the foundation of democracy. (2) Popular accountability of government, the policymakers must obtain the support of majority or a plurality of votes cast. (3) Political participation. (4) Civil liberties, in order to guarantee the citizen’s political participation, civil liberties are special respected in a democracy. (5) Developed civic culture and civil society (Huszar, 1968; Lv, 1995; Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 1999; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011).

“Hybrid regime” exists in parts of Latin America, Eastern European, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia. The concept of “hybrid” refers to a political system in which democratic and authoritarian features operate alongside one another in a stable combination (Heywood, 2002). The democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law, but in practice the government can be manipulated by an historic oligarchy. In contrast to the authoritarian regime and democracy, hybrid regimes usually reflect a transitional period of politics that “may trip back into authoritarianism or lurch ahead into democracy”. In that sense it is sometimes referred to as semi-democracy or quasi-democracy (Diamond, 2002; Case, 2005, p.217).

“Authoritarian regime” refer to political systems where power is concentrated in the hands of a non-elected or pseudo-elected elite/bureaucracy (a party, or dictator, or the army) acting with no or little regards for rule of law or individual rights of any kind (Macridis, 1985; Roskin et al, 1999; Jerzy & Klaus, 2006; Slater, 2006). Despite different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authoritarian regime</th>
<th>52</th>
<th>31.1</th>
<th>37.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Note: “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, p.2).
forms of authoritarianism across the region, there is one characteristic that applies to all authoritarian regimes: the control of the institutions of the state is limited to a single party, an individual or the military. There is no separation of powers, no pluralism and limited encouragement for participation in government decision making although “there are some limited freedoms in authoritarian regimes (for example in economic and cultural development) but not to the extent that the control of the regime will be undermined” (Roskin et al, 1999, p.84-85).

2.3.2 Civic Education

Civic education is an “essentially contested concept” (Beck, 1998, p.102), and there are many definitions and explanations.

Civic education in the context of Western democracies refers to developing knowledge of how government and other institutions in any given state work, the rights and duties of citizens with respect to the state and to the society as a whole and development of a sense of national identity (Cogan & Derricott, 1998; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). This is what Parker (1996) called “traditional” conceptions of civic education. Others emphasize the processes of democracy, active participation, and the engagement of people in civil society or use it as a generic term that incorporates a set of more specific features (Cogan et al, 2002). The Center for Civic Education (1991, p.3), for example, indicated that “civic education in a democracy is education in self-government. Self-government means active participation in self-governance, not passive acquiescence in the actions of others”. Still others define civic education as a preparatory process: preparing young people in the essential areas of knowledge, values and skill to be an informed, responsible and participative citizen of their respective communities (Kerr, 2000; Cogan & Morris, 2001; Cogan et al, 2002). Hahn & Alviar-Martin (2008, p.84) summed up the Western context by identifying three dimensions of civic education: social and moral responsibility, community involvement, and political literacy.
By contrast, in many Asian countries civic education can usually be defined from three dimensions: approaches, content and goals. On the approaches dimension, civic education can be defined in both a “broad sense” and “narrow sense”. In the broad sense, civic education is perceived as relevant to the entire education process; when defined in the narrow sense, civic education includes instruction in specific subjects related to the nature of civic education. The content of civics courses focus on the knowledge, skills and dispositions that citizen requires for living in a society (Liu, 2000; Ji, 2008). On the content dimension, civic education is always linked with civic awareness (civic rights and responsibilities), moral, parotic, national identity, and law education. Moral education is especially a focus in Asia (Li & Zhong, 2002; Tan, 2010). Lee (2009, p.12) argued that civic education in the Asia:

- First, rather than taking about politics, civic education in the East Asia talks about morality. ‘Civic’ always goes with ‘morals’ in the East; thus civic and moral education is a term more common than civic education or citizenship education in Asian countries.

On the goal dimension, civic education refers to an education to prepare young people to be a “good citizen”, to coordinate the relationship between citizen and others, society, nation, and government, and to politicization, moralization, and socialization of citizen (Zhao, 2009, p.60).

Comparing approaches in the East and the West, civic education in the West is more defined as a process preparing young people with the civic knowledge, civic values and participatory skills required by democracy. In the Asian context, however, civic education refers to or includes moral and political education. Its purpose is to develop citizens desired by the state and society. Because this study will be based on civic education in the Asian contexts, it will be defined as a specific component of the school curriculum (“civics”, “social studies”, “moral and national identity”, “ideology and moral education”, and so on) and its purpose is to prepare young people in the essential areas of knowledge, values and skill to be a ‘good” citizen’ of their respective communities.
2.3.3 ‘Good Citizen’

‘Good citizen’ is a contested and debated concept, and it can be defined and interpreted differently in Western democratic and Eastern non-democratic societies (Kennedy, 2010).

In the context of Western democratic societies, there exist three two main theoretical citizenship traditions: republicanism, liberalism, and communitarianism. The republican theory of citizenship usually expects ‘good citizen’ to possess particular civic virtues and has obligations for the community of which they are members (Kennedy, 1997). The earliest and most classic is Plato’s definition, “…the happiest people, and those who reach the best destination, are the ones who have cultivated the goodness of an ordinary citizen – what is called self-control and integrity – which is acquired by habit and practice, without the help of philosophy and reason” (Heater, 1999, p.192). Aristotle continued Plato’s view of virtues, and further proposed that ‘good citizens’ have obligations to participate actively in the public life of the city-state and live in harmony with the constitution (Heater, 1990). The Roman philosopher, Cicero, concluded that “a respectable and brave citizen, and the people qualified with government manager, would like to avoid and hate (conflict, disturbance and civil war), and completely devotes himself to the public affairs rather than chase his own wealth and power. He would like to put the whole community into his heart, and wouldn’t neglect any part of it……He would rather die than do something immoral” (Heater, 1999, p.35). In recent studies Galston (1988) argued that virtues are required to be a ‘good citizen’, and he divided virtues into four kinds: (1) general virtue; (2) social virtues (3) economic virtues: (4) political virtues. These four kinds of virtues are actually what citizens should be and do in their daily, social, economic, and political life. Heater (2004) defined ‘good citizen’ in terms of loyalty, responsibility and respect for political and social procedural values. Bens (2001, p.194-197) believed that a ‘good citizen’ should be “well informed, civic- engaging, accountable, meeting family and neighbor needs, attentive to health, showing civic behavior, showing environmental concern, showing moral and ethical behavior, being open to new things”. Uslaner (2003) proposed four obligations of the ‘good
citizen’: (1) the obligation of obeying the law and paying tax; (2) participate in the public and political affairs. (3) Deliberation; (4) the responsibility for each other. Kennedy (2010, p.121-123), based on an analysis of CIVED data, proposed three kinds of obligation for the ‘good citizen’: political obligations, civil obligations and patriotic obligations. Political obligations were more related with politics and law, such as voting and obeying the law. Civil obligations refer to participating actively and being involved in civil society. Patriotic obligations involve understanding and loving the country.

Liberal theories of citizenship place emphasis on the citizen’s individual rights and political participation. Marshall (1992) is the important representative of a contemporary liberal theory of citizenship, arguing that citizenship is a status which entitles members of the society to share equal rights and obligations. Citizenship can be divided to three dimensions: civil rights, political rights and social rights. Excepting individual rights, there is a strong tendency to value the popular participation of citizens in the political process in the Western liberal tradition. It is generally assumed that ‘good citizens’ contribute to the healthy development of society through active participation in society affairs, and they should have “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perception, and the like, that support participation” (Lo & Man, 1996, p.xvii). Banks (2008) further proposed four kinds of ‘good citizen’ according to the political participation: Legal citizen, minimal citizen, active citizen, and transformative citizen. Legal citizen refers to a politically inactive legal member of the community with rights and obligations. Minimal citizen means legal citizens who vote in elections for conventional candidates and issues. Active citizen means taking actions beyond voting within the conventional authority. Transformative citizen like those who take actions designed to actualize values and moral principles and ideas beyond those of authorities and conventions.

A communitarian theory of citizenship emerged in reaction to liberalism, and proposed that identity and sense of belonging to a community and civic virtues is the core reason for ‘good citizen’ to participate in democratic life (Zhang, 1998). As Nelson and Kerr
(2006, p.5) indicated “communitarian citizenship is a practice, it arises from a sense of belonging to a community, and wishing to work with others to achieve the common good”. It emphasis obligations, duties, shared values, norms and common good, empathy, cooperation, sharing, mutuality, participation, as well as the cultural and traditional attachments. Communitarianism cherishes virtues like voluntary work and services and views them as the way to nurture community spirits (Tse, 2006, p.299). In the current studies, communitarian citizenship tradition has a deep influence on the definition of ‘good citizen’. Uslaner (2003) lists four possible criteria for being a ‘good citizen’: (1) the contract between citizen and the state. (2) participate in the public and political affairs; (3) deliberation; (4) the responsibility to each other. The ongoing IEA study has identified national identity as one of three domains of civic education (Liu, 2000). Ricci (2004) identifies that when citizenship refers to a legal status, ‘good citizen’ means the one who obeys the country’s laws, defends and preserves the local populace. When citizenship is understood as an active sort of belonging with political participation as its hallmark, ‘good citizen’ should not only obey the country’s law, but also help others. In his third perspective, the ‘good citizen’ also should have virtues.

In non-democratic societies, the ‘good citizen’ is always linked with patriotism, nationality, morality, and relationship. In ancient Chinese society, for example, five types of inter-personal relationship proposed by Confucius were considered characteristics differentiating human beings from animals. These five types of interpersonal relationships were those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between the old and the young, and last but not least, between friend. The latter is subordinate to the former, namely so called “loyalty, filial piety, tolerance, final finality, love and respect one's elder brother, goodness”. Among the five, the relationship between sovereign and minister comes first. Chinese people have been taught to be loyal to their emperor. A son should be obedient and filial towards parents, a wife should be subject to husband, and the young people should respect the elders (Yu & Kwan, 2008). There were no “citizens” in ancient Chinese society, the
five types of inter-personal relationship were the standards for being a subject.

When the Western term of “citizen” was first introduced into China in the late Qing dynasty, it was regarded as a means for changing the subjugated situation and establishing China’s nation-state (Harris, 2002). In introducing the term to China, Liang Qichao translated “citizen” into “guomin”, which meant the combination of “guo” (state, nation, country) and “min” (people, populace, individual). By putting “guo” before “min” and by emphasizing the former his basic intention was that Chinese people would gradually understand, love and contribute to their country, and by this way, China would gradually become a modern state. Liang generalized the meaning of “guo” into fifteen categories: social morality, state consciousness, spirit of adventure and progress, thought of rights, freedom, autonomy, self-esteem, cooperation, benefit producing and profit-sharing, perseverance, though of obligation, warrior, personal morality, civic ethos, and political ability (Tan, 2011, p.122; Guo, 2014). In the early years of the Republic of China, intellectuals translated citizen from the perspective of “individualism”, which aimed to build a more liberal nation-state by cultivating people’s consciousness of individuality and utilitarianism. (Tan, 2011). Cai Yuanpei proposed the idea of “five educations” to nurture young in moral, intellectual, physical, aesthetics and global view (Tan, 2011, p.127). During the Anti-Japanese War, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) government emphasized young people’s spirit of obedience, patriotism, solidarity and military, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put a focus on socialist ideology education (Tan, 2011, p.140-143).

In recent studies, Keane (2001) indicated that in China “the make-up of a ‘good citizen’ is in a state of flux, having shifted from the ideological to the pragmatic, from the collective and altruistic ‘Lei Feng spirit’ [“雷锋精神”] to the productive and individualized energy of the entrepreneur” (p.5). In Hong Kong, Tse (2007) argued that the Central and the SAR governments advocated the ‘good citizen’ with the duties and obligations of the individual to society. These are virtues associated with traditional
Chinese culture and values, and have a strong flavor of ethno-cultural nationalism. The concept of ‘good citizen’ in Singapore was linked to the principle of harmony, characterized by collectivism and a strong interventionist government (Tan, 2008). Lee (2009) indicated that citizens in Eastern societies tend to be relational, rather than focusing on state-individual (and political) rights and responsibilities as in Western society. In Eastern society one has to be a ‘good person’ in order to be a ‘good citizen’. “The distinction between public virtue and private virtues is often not clear-cut in discussions of citizenship in many Asian and Pacific societies” (Lee, 2009, p.5).

Based on the above review, it is clear that ‘good citizen’ is interpreted and defined differently in Western democratic and Eastern non-democratic societies (Kennelly, 2009). In Western democracy, virtues, obligations for community and active political participation are usually mentioned as the important quality for being a ‘good citizen’. While in Eastern non-democratic societies ‘good citizens’ are always linked with state, morality and relationship.

2.4 The Theoretical Basis for the Study

Based on the above review, civic education in the study is defined as the specific subjects related to civic education (“civics”, “social studies”, “moral and national identity”, “ideology and moral education”, and so on) and its purpose is to prepare young people in the essential areas of knowledge, values and skill to be a ‘good citizen’ of their respective communities. The debated and contested nature of the concept of ‘good citizen’ leads to a broad range of interpretations in different contexts (Kerr, 1999; Fernández & Sundstro¨m, 2011). These different interpretations mean that there are many different ways in which civic education can be defined and approached. Galston (2001, p1) argued that “a well-ordered polity requires the citizen with appropriate knowledge, skills, and traits of character” to support its rule. Any regime, of course, does not have a neutral position concerning the ‘good citizen’ it requires (Janoski, 1998). Yet the idea of a ‘good citizen’ will vary from regime to regime. Producing the ‘good citizen’ is an important
task of civic education so that civic education may be viewed the mediator between regime type and the production of the ‘good citizen’.

A successful democracy “requires democratic citizens, whose specific knowledge, competence, and character would not be as well suited to non-democratic politics” (Gaslton, 2001, p.217). They should know democratic things, have democratic values, and do democratic things necessary for the smooth operation of a democratic regime (Parker, 1996; Shively, 2011). Firstly, they should have enough knowledge about the political, “what the citizenry collectively wants, evaluate alternative procedures for making decisions, and arrive at the best judgment” (Williams, 1987, p.2). As Halstead (2006, p.203) pointed out “participation in a democracy is irresponsible if it is not informed”. Besides these, they need to know what they entitled to from the public agencies and the rights which the state guarantees to its citizen the corresponding obligations which it demands. Secondly, tolerance is the core values in the democracy. That is because every individual and group could hold different and even oppositional opinions with others and government in a democratic society. “Tolerance is guaranteed for the working of a competitive party system, civic liberties, and healthy civic society” (Heywood, 2002, p.33). In most cases it highlights respect, such as respect for other citizens’ rights and respect for diversity. Thirdly, political participation is not a sufficient condition for political effectiveness, but it is certainly necessary in democracy (Galston, 2001, p.220).

Authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes are different from democracies—either in the political structure or values and norms, and this requires a particular ‘good citizen’ to support its rule (Hobbes, 1962; Almond & Verba, 1989; Heywood, 2002; Banks, 2008). In an authoritarian regime the ‘good citizen’ is in the first place expected to be obedient and subject to authority rather than to be informed about politics and actively participate in political affairs. That is because the process of political decision making in authoritarian regimes is severely restricted by the ruler and there is little access for
Ordinary citizens to participate in the political input process to preserve their power and privileges (Almond & Verba, 1989). Ordinary citizens can only get political information in one way, from the state to the citizen, and this information has been only heavily defined and remade by the ruler (Almond & Verba, 1989). Citizens are expected to accept and implement political policies and laws. Secondly, the appearance of most authoritarian regimes is largely because people urgently desire to recover social order and solve a the crisis of nation state (Huntington, 1991), which led to a protective relationship between state and citizen: “The obligation of subjects to then sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them” (Hobbes, 1962, p.167). The authoritarian regimes’ government enhances the ties that exist between themselves and the citizen by emphasizing leaders’ past accomplishments (their historic role) or the religious or ethnic similarity between the government leaders and the people (Shively, 2011, p.112), sense of belonging to the nation-state and loyalty, and responsibilities to nation, family members and other social members by various ways. Lastly, authoritarian regimes are not like totalitarian regimes enthusiastically mobilizing the public to participate in social and political movements. They are not like democracies requiring and encouraging the public to participate actively in the process of democracy. Political mobilization is limited under authoritarianism, and the participation of citizens is limited and passive (Roskin et al, 1999, p.84). The ‘good citizen’, apart from being obedient may have some opportunities to participate in social service and a few activities supporting and maintaining but not to challenge-existing social and political structures (Banks, 2008).

Hybrid regimes in this study are defined by political systems that are in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic. Therefore, it requires democratic citizens with an interest in political affairs, having enough knowledge about how governments works and their own rights and responsibilities, actively participating in political and social affairs and supporting the state with a rational critical attitude, and to promote democracy in the society. Yet because of a long-term influence by authoritarianism and
lack of civic rights, hybrid regimes often form a subject civic culture that is not easy to change in a short time (Heywood, 2002). Therefore the government or elites expect citizens to accept the “right information” that they convey, rather than raising any objections. Meanwhile the government hopes citizen will vote in elections for conventional candidates, and allows them take action beyond voting to actualize existing laws and conventions. Citizens can even participate in protest demonstrations or make public speeches regarding conventional issues and reforms. Yet the actions of citizen are expected to support and maintain but not to challenge-existing social and political structures (Banks, 2008).

Based on the above theoretical discussion, it can be said that democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes require and expect different kinds of ‘good citizen’ to support their rule and legitimacy, and these different requirements and interpretations may have implications for defining the goals of civic education and for formulating civic education programs (Lee, 1987; Kerr, 1999; Haste, 2004; Fernández & Sundstro¨m, 2011). This hypothesis, however, needs to be explored empirically since the impact of different regimes on civic education may be influential or it may be inconsequential. Civic education, for example, may have generic characteristics irrespective of regime type and ideology. Numbers of theoretical and empirical studies have indicated that social-political structure has had, and continues to have, a profound effect on civic education in both Asia and elsewhere (Kerr, 1999; Fairbrother, 2003a, 2003b; Kennedy & Li, 2013). Given the importance of political structures reflected in regimes, the questions remains as to how different regimes or regime types influence civic education and in turn how such civic education is designed to influence the development of the ‘good citizen’ (Lee, 1987; Kerr, 1999; Haste, 2004; Fernández & Sundstro¨m, 2011). This issue leads to a number of research questions that will be the focus of the research reported in this thesis:

RQ1: Do theories of the state embedded in specific regime “type” articulate specific roles for citizens and do they indicate conceptions of a ‘good citizen’?

RQ2: To what extent are regime “type” theories and characteristics reflected in
RQ3: What is the personal experience of students as citizens under different regime types?

2.5 Summary

This chapter has provided the conceptual and theoretical basis for the study to be reported in this thesis. It provided definitions of key terms: regime “type”, civic education and ‘good citizen’. It showed that while there has been an exploration of the theoretical literature relating to regime types there have been few empirical studies with a specific focus on civic education. The research to be reported here will fill this gap. The chapter concluded by identifying the research questions to be pursued in this study. The following chapter will describe the research design and methods used in the study.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the literature that has informed this study and identified the research questions to be pursued. The purpose of the present chapter is to describe and explain the research methodology and methods used in the study.

This chapter is divided into six sections including this introduction, section 3.1. Section 3.2 is an overview of the research design used in the study. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 outlines the methods of data collection and analysis. Section 3.5 refers to the ethical issues related to this study. Section 3.6 points out limitations of the study in terms of the research methods that have been used.

3.2 Research Design

The purpose of this study is to explore the influence of regime “type” on civic education in three Chinese societies. Following White (2008), who studied European citizenship, a qualitative comparative methodology has been used. The following sections will explain this broad methodological approach and the specific research methods that were used.

3.2.1 Comparative Study

In this study three related research questions are addressed:
RQ1: Do theories of the state embedded in specific regime “type” articulate specific roles for citizens and do they indicate conceptions of a ‘good citizen’?
RQ2: To what extent are regime “type” theories and characteristics reflected in education policies and the school curriculum?
RQ3: What is the personal experience of students as citizens under different regime types?

A qualitative comparative methodology allowed these questions to be addressed in three distinctive contexts (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China). The comparative dimension involved “the search for similarity and difference” (White, 2008, p.3) while a qualitative approach enabled the study to explore and seek to understand “the web of meanings in the context in which human action takes place” (White, 2008, p. 2). It is not expected that this research will produce simple cause and effect understandings of the main issues under discussion. Rather, the research reported will explore the broad contexts that influence civic education across three different societies. It seeks to understand how such contexts influence policy and civic education and how in turn students are affected both by the context in which they live and the civic education they experience. The study does exactly what Bereday suggested by comparing general structures on which all systems are built (Bereday, 1964).

Bray and Thomas (1995) suggested the importance of identifying the level at which comparisons are made and this is relevant to the current study. While this study focuses on three Chinese societies and therefore is a comparison at the society level, explicit comparisons will made at three different levels within those societies:

- Level 1: Regime “type”
- Level 2: Curriculum and policy formulations;
- Level 3: Students’ personal experience.

Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis (2006, p.8) refer to these levels as “the central units of variation…. which imply the theoretical relations under review and direct as well the units of observation”. Selecting Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China as the three cases in this study systematically varies regime type across the three societies. Understanding this variation and what it means will be the subject of discussion throughout this thesis. Whether Levels 2 and 3 also systematically vary across these
societies and whether any variation can be attributed to regime type is the important empirical question for this study. Thus the levels identified here, “the central units of variation”, signal the comparative focus of the study and the theoretical framework that guides the research questions.

Within each of these levels Phillips and Schweisfurth’s (2007) stages of comparative inquiry have used:

- Conceptualization
- Contextualization
- Isolation of differences
- Explanation
- Reconceptualization
- Application

This framework can guarantee all the research questions are addressed in the six stages, and then to make a comparative analysis to achieve the research purpose. The first stage “conceptualization” “represents the essential attempts in any investigation to identify the research questions and to ‘neutralize’ them from any particular context” (Phillips & Schweisfurth, 2007, p.99). In the study a neutralized question, how civic education is influence by the regime ‘type”, is to be addressed. The second stage is to detailed description of issues against local background. In the study, three Chinese societies are the specific local contexts in which the three research questions are detailed addressed. The third stage “involves an attempt to isolate differences through direct comparison of the phenomena observed or the data collected” (Phillips & Schweisfurth, 2007, p.99). The discussion chapter of the study compares the concept of ‘good citizen’ and civic education across authoritarian China, hybrid Hong Kong, and democratic Taiwan at regime types, civics curriculum and student levels to explore the influence of regime type on civic education. The purpose of the stage fourth is to develop a hypotheses to explain
the differences/similarities of stage third. “The fifth and final stage then considers the applicability of the finding to other situations” (Phillips & Schweisfurth, 2007, p.101). This framework provides a 3 x 6 matrix to explore major issues in the study as shown in Table 1.

Table 1:
The Research Framework of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The levels of comparative inquiry</th>
<th>Regime type (x3)</th>
<th>Curriculum Policy (x3)</th>
<th>Student experience of citizenship (10 students in each of 3 regimes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextualization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of differences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconceptualization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 Multi Site Qualitative Case Studies

Within the comparative framework outlined above, multisite qualitative case studies are the means by which data will be assembled for each society. Case study research has specific characteristics as outlined by Creswell (2007, p.73):

Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) overtime, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information(e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents), and reports a case description and case-based theme.

In this study the “bounded systems” are the three societies: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Mainland China. From a comparative perspective these systems display both similarity and variation. They are similar in terms of their cultural, ethnic and historical backgrounds. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, however, different historical experiences started to differentiate these societies and by mid twentieth century they respectively formed three entirely different regime types: democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian. These regime types have remained consistent from 2000 to the present (Liu, 2001; Case, 2008; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Freedom House, 2012). Thus both as cases and sites for comparison the chosen sites are seen to be potentially rich and informative. The distinctions between them are spelled out clearly and explicitly providing insights into the social and political context of each society.

Merriam (2009) has pointed out that in qualitative research the researcher is the main “instrument” of data collection. This places a considerable responsibility on the researcher to ensure that data is subjected to in-depth analysis and reflection enabling potential and even unexpected themes to emerge and be highlighted as part of the process of data analysis. This means in particular that the researcher must be aware of her biases to eliminate distortion and bias from the results. The advantages of qualitative approaches in the current study are that they help to explore a complex problem embedded in social and political processes. It may not always be possible to understand these processes completely but multi-site qualitative cases constructed within an explicit comparative framework would contribute towards the unraveling many of the complexities likely to be encountered in this study.

3.3 Data Collection
Creswell (1994, p.148) has argued that “the idea of qualitative research is to purposefully select informants (or documents or visual material) that will best answer the research question”. Therefore, in this study, the data is collected based on the three research questions.
In order to answer RQ1, literature review methods were used to identify literature that shed light on theories of the state underlying democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In particular, the ways in which these theories pictured their ‘good citizen’ was investigated and the implications for civic education were explored. A particular focus of the review was to identify the processes of regime formation – how democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China respectively developed over time. An important focus in each case was to identify the concept of ‘good citizen’ reflected in the theories of state underlying Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China.

For RQ2, document analysis was used to as the means to understand civics curriculum and policy formation in each of the societies. A qualitative analysis of themes related to ‘good citizen’ was undertaken in the official civics policy documents. These documents were in the form of syllabuses, guidelines, covering not only the objectives, goals and topics for teaching and learning, but also defining the normative expectations, appropriate knowledge, attitudes, values and behavior of a ‘good citizen’.

For Taiwan, *General Guidelines of Grades 1-9 Curriculum for Elementary and Junior High School Education* were chosen as the data source. This Guidelines was released by the Taiwan Ministry of Education in 2003 (revised in 2008). It divided the school curriculum into seven major learning areas. Civic Education fell into Social Learning. This is the basic curriculum guideline for implementing civic education in Taiwan’s school. In Hong Kong, there are five documents related to current civic education: the 1985 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools*, the 1996 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools*, the 2001 *The Way Forwards in Curriculum Development: Learning to Learn*, the 2012 Moral and National Education Curriculum *Guide (Primary 1 to secondary 6)*, and the 2012 *Civic Education Guidelines from Civil Society*. For Mainland China, after 2000, the Chinese government published three curriculum guidelines related to civic

For RQ3, focus group interviews were used to collect the views of students on issues related to ‘good citizen’. The reason for using focus groups was that the study was interested in students’ individual lived experiences as potential citizens. Rabiee (2004, p.655) pointed that the focus group is “a technique in involving the use of in-depth group interviews in which participants are selected because they are a purposive, although not necessarily representative, sampling of a specific population, this group being ‘focused’ on a given topic’”. The uniqueness of the method is its ability to generate deeper and richer data though the social interaction of the group than those obtained from one-to-one interviews.

Richardson and Rabiee (2001, p.4) indicated that “participants in a focus group are selected on the criteria that they would have something to say on the topic, are within the age-age, have similar socio-characteristics and would be comfortable talking to the intervener and each other”. In this study, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China’s Grade Eight students, whose average age is 14 years old, are chosen as research sample. The reason for selecting this age group captures both the compulsory years of schooling in each society and ensures all students have been exposed to civic education. Although it is understood that this is not the first time students receive civic education concepts, skills, and values, this level is the first time in which students are introduced to a specific course of study in civic education (Cogan, Morris & Print, 2002). Further international studies, such as the current third IEA Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) also focus on this age group since it is the point just prior to what is considered the compulsory years of schooling in most countries.
In Taipei, Hong Kong, and Beijing (Beijing is the capital and the most representative city of Mainland China. As the political and economic center, Taipei is most representative of Taiwan), 10 Grade Eight students (5 girls and 5 boys) with an average age of 14 were respectively interviewed in 2 focus groups - one in a government school and the other in a private school, and asked about various aspects of citizenship (see Table 4). The total sample size was thirty. Purposeful sampling was applied to ensure information-rich cases were selected. When entering a school, the interviewee asked the class teacher to recommend “a ‘good’ informant (i.e. one who is articulate, reflective, and willing to share with the interviewer)” for the interview (Morse, 1991, p.127).

Table 4:
Targeted Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School type</th>
<th>Intended sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (Taipei)</td>
<td>Governmental/Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong (Hong Kong)</td>
<td>Pro-Beijing/right wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland China (Beijing)</td>
<td>Governmental/Private</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 30

The interviews were semi-structured in nature so that specific questions were asked and space was allowed for the interviewees to express their own ideas in their own way (Blee & Taylor, 2002). The initial interview questions were derived from the results of the first two phases of the study. This is in accord with Kraus (2000, para 4.1) suggestion that interviewees need to be confronted with “information from other spheres or with contradictions during the interview by focused inquiries.” Students were encouraged to express their ideas openly so that their own narratives could emerge as the interview proceeded. Each interview was one hour long based on an interview guide (See
Appendix A). After each interview, the transcript was reviewed and a subsequent interview was arranged to follow up on important issues.

3.4 Data Analysis

Much of the data collected to answer RQ1 and RQ2 were from documents—either primary or secondary sources as indicated above. Therefore, document analysis and thematic analysis were used. Document analysis includes content, textual and linguistic analysis (Wharton, 2006). Thematic analysis was used to identify patterns and develop themes from what was a significant amount of data (Boyatzis, 1998). The purpose was to identify key issues relating to citizens and expectations of them underlying regime types and the extent to which these become embedded in subsequent policy and curriculum documents. The themes developed from the first level analysis of citizenship principles underlying regime types fed directly into RQ2 concerned with the analysis of policy and curriculum documents. Therefore the methods outlined for RQ1 were also applied to RQ2.

For RQ3, the purpose was to understand from students’ perspective their experience of citizenship and how it is influenced by the regimes in which they live. An open coding system and Mile and Huberman (1994) qualitative analysis approach will used. According to this process, the interview data will analyzed following by four steps:

First step, interviews will be conducted, transcribed verbatim and processed as text in Chinese. Second step will be data reduction. This refers to the process of selecting, focusing, sampling and transforming the raw date in transcription. More specifically, “data reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such way that ‘final’ conclusions can be drawn and verified” (Mile & Huberman, 1994, p.10). In this study, interview qualitative data will be reduced through selection, summary, and paraphrase based on the research question, and then relevant quotations will be translated into English. Third, an open coding system will employed to identify useful pieces of information to form comprehensible text segments (Tesch, 1990). The segments with similar meanings will
collected and tagged so that some key themes can be identified. The fourth step was data
display. It means to “seek meaning on a limited part of the data” (Folkestad, 2008, p.7).
Graphs and charts will be used to organize students’ experience of citizenship under different
regime types into a more compact form.

3.5 Ethical Issues

Focus group interviews were used as one of the data collection methods in this study.
“The in-depth nature of the interviews lies in the intention of the interviewer to uncover
details of the interviewee’s experience that would be undisclosed” (Allmark, etc., 2009,
p.48), that raises a number of general ethical issues researchers need to consider. The
most important ethical issue to consider is to respect interviewee’s rights and protect their
personal privacy (Creswell, 1994). That means that the researcher using focus group
interviews should gain the consent of interviewees and “guarantee the confidentiality and
anonymity of interviewee” (Mason, 2002, p.80).

First, this study gained the informed consent of interviewees. The interviewees in this
study were Grade Eight students and their average age was 14. When the interviews were
discussed with the Principals and teachers, a written informed consent form was sent to
all students asking them to sign their name before engaging in the interview. The
informed consent form contained a brief introduction setting out the purpose of the study,
how the data will be used and a statement of interviewee’s rights and the potential risks
(see Appendix B). Secondly, in order to protect the interviewee’s personal privacy, the
study has make best effort to keep the confidentiality of each respondent by using
pseudonym and not directly mentioning his or her exact information such as school,
grade, and address when reporting data. But as we know, data can usually be recognized
by the interviewee whether or not you attach the interviewee’s name to them, and also
they may recognizable to other people. So, the study clearly and honestly to explain the
risks to the respondents before the interviews and tries its best to protect them. The study
has gained approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Hong Kong
3.6 Limitation of the Study

The study seeks to understand the effect of regime “type” on civic education. It has chosen one example of each regime type within a particular geographic and cultural area of Asia. Therefore its findings will not be generalizable outside of the specific contexts in which the data is collected.

The student sample size within societies was very small and non-representative. This has been justified in terms of the nature of qualitative research and but it is also a reflection of the resources available to this study. This means that the results are not generalizable within each society even though they will provide a better understanding of the lived experience of citizenship across regime types than is currently the case.

This chapter provided a research methodology for the study, the following chapter 4, 5 and 6 used the methodology to study the influence of regime “type” on civic education in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan respectively. The next chapter will explore the ‘good citizen’ and civic education in Chinese authoritarian regime.
CHAPTER 4

THE ‘GOOD CITIZEN’ AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: THE CASE OF MAINLAND CHINA

4.1 Introduction

Mainland China is usually described as an authoritarian regime (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros& Jones, 1999; Feng, 2011, Li, 2012; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013; Puddington, 2014). Wang (2006, p.122), however, has argued, using Diamond’s (2002) framework of regime types, that “preliminary elections at the local level, the growing features of constitutionalism, rule of law, and a rising civil society, suggest in a minimalist way that Mainland China should be categorized as an hybrid regime”. Yet as Li (2012, p.598) indicated “the CCP’s resilient authoritarianism refers to a one-party political system that is able to enhance the capacity of the state to govern effectively through institutional adaptations and policy adjustments”. Therefore, this study proposes that Mainland China today is a “self-contradictory” authoritarian regime characterized by a liberal market economy and authoritarian politics dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Nathan, 2003).

China’s current regime as described, has identified the need for a new citizen who could “meet the new situation” (CCP Central Committee, 1999) that differs from the “subject [臣民] under traditional feudalism, and also distinguishing between the “people” [人民] and “nationals” [國民] advocated by Mao’s totalitarianism (Heberer, 2009). In this chapter, the development of the “self-contradictory” regime in Mainland China and its characteristics will first be explored to identify the transformation of the concept of citizenship and the ‘good citizen’ that is required and expected by the Chinese
The concept of the ‘good citizen’ as represented in the civic education curriculum to identify the extent to which the Chinese regime and its characteristics are reflected in civic education. Section 4.3 presents the results of the interview with Chinese students exploring their perceptions of being a ‘good citizen’ in China and whether the purposes of Chinese civic education are reflected in the students’ responses.

4.2 Regime Development in Mainland China

Many in the West have assumed that, “economic liberation, wherever it occurs, would lead inevitably to political liberation and, eventually, democracy” (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005, p.77). It is obvious that the prediction cannot be applied to Mainland China. In the past three decades, three generations of Chinese leadership have combined a liberal market economic system with a one-party state dominated by the CCP (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 1999; Feng, 2011; Li, 2012; Kuan, 2013). The leadership has been seeking to resolve the conflict between liberal economics and one-party domination (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005; Heberer & Schubert, 2006; Wang, 2006). As a result, unlike so many post-Communist countries, Mainland China did not fall into a classic authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly stable” (Nathan, 2003, p.16). This transition is important to understand and will be discussed in the following section.

4.2.1 Regime Transitional Period (1978 to 1992)

With the end of Mao’s totalitarian rule, Deng Xiaoping in 1980s, proposed “reform and opening” to reform the planned economic system, but left the totalitarian political system untouched (Hildebrandt, 2013; Pei, 2002). He believed that “economic work is the biggest politics in the current China, economic issues have precedence over all political issues. We should place importance on the economic development in the current and future” (Deng, 1983, p.194). Hence, Deng proposed to combine the liberal market economy with a socialist planned economy to advance Chinese economic growth (Zhao,
Zhou (2006, p.63) indicated that “the economic system not only requires freedom and equality to be the principle of market, but also expects freedom and equality to be the common rule of civil society that is a fundamental support for the market economy”. Thus economic reform took off in Mainland China and the state’s role in economic decision making has declined. This was a conscious decision by the reformers to replace the central government’s direct involvement in economic affairs with more indirect levers of macroeconomic control and with more local decision making (Zhao, 1994).

In the political arena, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China also conducted a set of political reforms such as “to separate the party and government, to further decentralize power, to simplify government agencies, to reform the cadre personal system, to establish the system of social consultancy and dialogues, to perfect some institutions of socialist democratic politics, to strengthen socialist legal system” (Xiao, 2011, p.8). These reforms were designed to redress and modify the political mistakes of the 1960s and 1970s, and to evade any pressure to relax the one-party political control (Dickson, 2008). Deng Xiaoping (1993, p.195) insisted that “China should walk its own road, should not be Westernized, and there is no Western system can be copied in total…politically, we should not to adapt capitalist ‘multiple-party competition’, ‘separation of the three powers’ and ‘bicameralism’”. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping’s reform did not lead to the Chinese regime’s transition into democratization as many Chinese academics and even some democrats within the CCP had hoped (Feng, 2008). Yet it is noted that Deng’s reform was a turning point for Mainland China’s “regime transition” from a totalitarianism that was infatuated with class struggle and personal centralization to an authoritarian regime obsessed by economic growth and collective leadership” (Pei, 2002; Gilley, 2003; Nathan, 2003; Cabestan, 2004; Perry, 2007).
4.2.2 Authoritarian Regime Consolidation Period (1992 to 2002)

Jiang Zemin became China’s President and Secretary of the CCP in 1992 following a tumultuous period in China’s modern history. It was a period when political liberalism was extinguished and the ‘transition to democracy’ thesis finally disproven.

Jiang and his collective leadership (1992-2002) inherited Deng’s idea of “centering on economic development” and continued to develop the Chinese socialist market economic system. At the same time, he conducted a set of political reforms to consolidate and regain the authority of the CCP to control the liberalization of Mainland China (Dittmer, 2003; Cabestan, 2004). Compared to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform, Jiang Zemin emphasized “the role of central government apparatus in regulating and managing the reform. The decentralization of authority initiated under Deng was arrested and to some extent reversed” (Dittmer, 2003, p.906). In the realm of politics, Jiang and his supporters acknowledged that Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform had promoted Chinese economic development. Yet it had been accompanied by only limited political reforms and lacked a legal and regulatory framework which gave rise to bouts of rampant corruption, growing social and regional unrest, serious moral and environment issue, which had actually undermined the authority of Communist Party (Goldman & MacFarquhar, 1999; Lewis & Xue, 2003). Therefore, Jiang and his supporters proposed a slogan of “stability over all”, to conduct a set of political structural reforms that “focused on efficiency-enhancing rather than democratization” (Dittmer, 2003, p.909).

These reforms included the enhancement of “inner-party democracy” because Jiang Zemin (2006) believed that “inner-party democracy” was a basic guarantee for developing socialist democratic politics and maintaining the CCP’s authority. Jiang’s leadership introduced “elite democracy” into the Chinese political system, inducting “trustworthy experts” from a broader cross-section of society into the top echelons, recruiting officials into the mid-ranking bureaucratic levels through “public exams” and other such adjustments. While Jiang obviously considered that the ideology is a useful
mechanism for legitimating one-party monopoly of the Communist Party. Thus he proposed “three representations” and “three-talk education” in the inside of the CCP to improve the capacity of ruling elites; and advocated the so-called “construction of spiritual civilization” and patriotism education in the social public to relieve the belief crisis of Marxist-Leninist ideology. By 2000, the accomplishment of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) marked Mainland China’s entry into a stable market economic system and an authoritarian regime (Jiang, 2006).

4.2.3 Authoritarian Regime Development Period (2002 to Present)

After 2000, the Chinese political and economic system entered a steady period of development. In this period, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, as the third generation of leadership, attempted to balance further the market economy and the CCP’s monopoly.

Firstly, their policies “became more people-centered with populist gestures combined with attempts to tighten control over state and society in the name of preserving social stability as the key foundation for continued economic growth” (Saich, 2011, p.5). Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao recognized that an exclusive focused economic growth and liberation of market alone was insufficient, and would lead to a numbers of social issues, such as environmental disruption, gaps between rich and poor, Party members and cadres’ corruption… Therefore, they begun to shift the Chinese development mode of the 1990s that concentrated more exclusively on economic growth to focusing more on sustainability and social equality under the catchphrases of “Building a Harmonious Society” (Fewsmith, 2005; Kuan, 2013). In Wen Jiabao’s report to the National People’s Congress in February 2005, he explained that the main feature of a “harmonious society” is democracy, the rule of law, justice, sincerity and solid social balance. Hu Jintao further argued that in the June 2005 that a “harmonious society” encompasses the construction of “ideology and morality”, a correct treatment of the contradictions within the people, reinforcing the ecological and environmental build-up, good governances and social stability (Heberer & Schubert, 2006; Miller, 2007).
Secondly, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiao seemed to put democratization on the Chinese political agenda, but actually they were not prepared to embrace liberal democracy and to shift the Communist Party’s monopoly of power, and even were considered to be more orthodox in the political realm than Jiang (Miller, 2007; Fewsmith, 2005). On the one hand, there appeared be some democratic signs. For example, the term “democracy”, although usually prefaced by the word “socialist”, was mentioned round 60 times in Hu’s report to the Seventh Party Congress. He listed “democracy and the rule of law” at the top of the six criteria of “harmonious society” (Hu, 2007). And Wen Jiaobao (2007) at a press conference on March 2007 declared that:

> The recent article of mine expounded the argument that socialism is not in conflict with democracy and the rule of law. I said democracy, the rule of law, freedom, human right, equality, and fraternity are not something particular to capitalism. They are the common achievements of civilization of the whole world during its long historical process and the common values pursued by the mankind.

Yet there was very little detail about any concrete measures to implement democracy. The White Paper, *Construction of Democratic Politic in China*, issued by the Information Office of the State Council in 2005, clearly indicated that “democracy in China is democracy under the leadership of CCP, democracy in China is a democracy protected by the people’s democratic dictatorship…Democracy in China is democracy based on the organizational principle of democratic centralism”. On the other hand, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiaobao emphasized improving the CCP’s ability to rule. In 2004, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee published *A Decision on Strengthening the Construction of Governing Capability of Party* (CCP Central Committee, 2004). The document requested CCP to govern in a “scientific and democratic fashion and in accordance with the law”, and its attention was directed at how party mechanisms—including cadre selection and decision making—could be improved. It still did not allow the development of an extra-party social force that might be used to curtail abuses of power (Fewsmith, 2005). Thirdly, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocated a “socialist core
value system” and “socialist sense of honor and disgrace” as the “moral and ideological foundation” to relax the tension between the liberal market economy and a one-party monopoly (Heberer & Schubert, 2006).

This brief review of the development of the Chinese regime over the past three decades has indicated that three generations of Chinese leadership have been quite successful in combining two conflicting factors together: the market economy system that required more freedom and democracy and an authoritarian one-party dictatorship. A stable and specific authoritarian regime was established in Mainland China displaying a “self-contradictory” nature.

First, limited freedom is allowed in the realm of economy, but not to the extent that the control of the CCP will be undermined. After Deng Xiaoping, successive leaderships continually reformed the socialist planned economic system. “The CCP’s power for intervening in economic affairs was limited so that the government no longer directly controlled economic administration. The power of government and its economic sector was delegated to lower levels” (Goodman, 2002, p.120). But the three generations of leadership always attempted to control the speed and scope of market reform (Heberer & Schubert, 2006) to ensure liberalization was limited to the economic area. The supreme authority of economic reform always resided in the hands of the CCP, “upholding leadership by the CCP” remains a Chinese constant theme.

Second, in spite of economic liberalization, politically Mainland China remained firmly committed to maintaining a “one party state” (Li, 2015). “Yet conventional wisdom held that economic liberation and growth would lead to the public’s desire for more freedom and democracy” (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005, p.77). This situation indeed occurred in Mainland China during the 1980s: Increasing market liberation led to many people, even democrats within the CCP requesting the “abandonment of one-party rule for liberal democracy with all its standards features such as general elections, multi-party
competition, safeguards of human rights, and checks and balances of power between legislative, executive and judiciary braches” (Feng, 2008, p.676) Yet these voices endangered the CCP’s monopoly and legitimacy (Pei, 2002). Facing these challenges, Chinese leaders “have consistently adopted the view that China will never follow a ‘western’ model of democracy” (Saich, 2011, p.6). No matter how the political and economic systems are reformed, the CCP insists that, “is very unlikely to compromise on its monopoly of power and leadership over the army, government, the law-enforcement apparatus, the nation people’s congress, and the court of law” (Kuan, 2013, p.9). The leadership undertook a set of political reforms to improve CCP’s ability of ruling effectively to prolong and maintaining the single-part monopoly of the CCP and forestalling a democratic transition (Heberer & Schubert, 2006; Feng, 2008).

Thirdly, patriotism, nationalism and Chinese traditional values were employed as a “soft” method to ease the conflict between the limited freedom in the economy and the one-party autocracy of the CCP (Su, 2011). Since the 1980s, with the development and liberation of the economy, the ideological foundation of CCP’s dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism, was increasingly in crisis (Fairbrother, 2003) leading the CCP gradually to lose its spiritual control of citizens. Facing the challenge, China advocated nationalism, patriotism and Chinese traditional values as the Chinese mainstream values instead of Marxism-Leninism ideology to support the one-party monopoly of CCP (Ding, 2006). Deng Xiaoping proposed pragmatic consideration of “Centering on the Economic Development” as the main goals of the nation, to shift the public’s focus from political issue to economic development. Jiang Zemin conducted a series of patriotic campaigns (Ding, 2006), to call for “three loves”: love the party, love socialism, and love the motherland”. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao appealed to revived Chinese traditional values, and proposed “building socialist core value system” and “eight honors and disgraces” (Fewsmith, 2005). These pragmatic considerations not only differentiated the Chinese authoritarian regime from its predecessor totalitarian regime, but also showed the CCP’s intention to maintain control.
Under the “self-contradictory” regime, Chinese leaders had clear goals: while Chinese society developed very well with unprecedented economic growth and liberation, the state remained immobile, unruffled and impassive, firmly maintaining a monopoly of political power in the hands of the CCP (Kuan, 2013). This new context implied a changing concept of citizenship, and required a new kind of ‘good citizen’ who can promote economic development while remaining subject to the CCP (Yu & Feng, 2010). Sections 4.3 and 4.4 will discuss the re-emergence of the concept of citizen within the “self-contradictory” regime that valued economic liberalization but opposed political liberalization. The focus will be on identifying the ‘good citizen’ expected of the Chinese ‘self-contradictory’ regime.

4.3 The Re-emergence of “Citizen” in China

The use of the term “citizen” [公民] in Mainland China depended on the social and political orientation of different regimes. The term was first introduced in the later years of the Qing dynasty and the early Republic of China and its purpose was to replace “subject” [臣民] in the old feudal society (Guo, 2014). After the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, however, the term “citizen” “was rarely used except in formal, legal, and propagandistic documents” under the Mao’s totalitarian rule (1949-1980s) (Tang, 1986, p.276). Since the 1980s, along with the transformation of Chinese regime type from totalitarian to authoritarian, the term “citizen” reappeared in Mainland China.

In Mao’s totalitarian era, “citizen” was a sensitive term and the emphasis was almost exclusively placed upon “nationals” [國民] and “people” [人民]. For instance, The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference enacted in September 1949, which served as the temporary constitution for Mainland China, mentioned only “nationals” and “people” (Keane, 2001). “Nationals” is a legal concept that can be understood as a member of the country. The CCP proposed “five loves” as the
fundamental standard for the “good nationals”: a “good national” should love the motherland, love the people, love labor, love science, and take good care of public property. “People” was articulated as a political community and appears vis-a-vis “enemy” (Ye, 2011). It illustrates a certain sorting out between progressive and class enemies: “During the anti-Japan war (1937-45), those who were committed to resisting Japanese invasion were referred to as the ‘people’. Notable exclusions were evident during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the five categories, landlords, rich peasants, anti-revolutionaries, evildoers and rightists were considered as ‘antagonistic’, and excluded from the ‘people’” (Keane, 2001, p.6). Mao Zedong proposed a standard for the “people”: “serving the people with heart and soul”, which claimed that “the people” should to be noble, genuine, moral, chaste, selfless and whole-hearted in their service (Kuan, 2013). Under the concept of the “people” and “nationals”, ideological and political education in Mainland China “focused on collectivism, patriotism, and taught young people how to submit to the collective and the state, as well as how to fulfill their obligations, with less reference to the citizen’s self-consciousness and individual rights” (Yu & Feng, 2010, p.297).

Since the 1980s, the attention of CCP leaders in Mainland China shifted from the political campaigns and planned economy to the liberal market-based economy (Su, 2011). The “class struggle” between the “people” and “enemy” was discarded. As a consequence, the concept of “people”, standing for a common person, lost its special political significance. Instead the term “citizen” started to reappear in official discourse. Deng Xiaoping (2002, p.408) in the forum of the Central Military Commission proposed that: “all people of China should be brought up as good citizens with self-discipline and sense of responsibility, with knowledge and skills, with good mental and physical healthy and motivated by the noble ideals of socialism”. Since then, the “four haves”, lofty ideals, moral integrity, general education, and a sense of discipline, were set up as the official standard for being a Chinese ‘good citizen’ (Ding, 2006). Subsequently, A Citizen Manual was published in 1988 consisting of themes related to “citizen” such as
democracy, the legal system, obligations, rights, social morality, and discipline. The handbook was very well accepted by Chinese authorities, and became the sole blueprint for designing civic education programs in school (Chen & Reid, 2002). By 1997, the term “citizen” had been given considerable attention by the Chinese government. Jiang Zemin (1997) mentioned the “four haves” citizen twice in the report of the 15th CCP Party Congress. He indicated that Chinese socialist modernization required citizens with lofty ideals, moral integrity, better education and good sense of discipline. In response to the demand of new regime type for the “four haves” citizen, the Chinese authorities have made great efforts since the early 1980s to launch a nationwide campaign, “Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization” (Ding, 2006). A Decision on the Guideline of Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization and A New Five-Year Plan of Social and Economic Developments for the Twenty-First Century clearly pointed out that the task of spiritual civilization is “to foster a socialist citizen with a lofty ideal of socialism and morality, a good range of knowledge and skills and sense of discipline, thereby upgrading the whole nation’s standards in science, culture and morality” (CCP Central Committee, 1986, article 2; CCP Central Committee, 1995, article 6).

After 2000, the “four haves” citizen is still often mentioned in the official documents, but now the citizen’s morality is given unprecedented attention. The CCP Central Committee in 2001 further promulgated The Implementation Outline on Morality Building for Citizens, in which the terms “citizen” and civic education formally appeared in official document accepted by Chinese authorities (Tan, 2011). The document proposed ten virtues of a ‘good citizen’: patriotism, law-abiding, courtesy, integrity, solidarity, friendship, diligence and frugality, self-improvement, devotion to career, and contribution (Lee & Ho, 2005). In 2004, the CCP Central Committee issued Some Opinions on Further Strengthening Adolescents’ Morality Building, which proposed strengthening and improving young people’s education on patriotism, socialist beliefs, and moral norms. In 2006, Hu Jintao laid out “eight honors and disgraces” as the foundation of civic morality: love the country, do it no harm; serve the people, do not
disservice; follow the science, discard ignorance; act with diligence, not with indolence; be united, help each other, make no gains at other’s expense; be honest and trustworthy, do not spend ethics for profits; be disciplined and law-abiding, not chaotic and lawless; live plainly, struggle hard, do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures. The report to the 17th National Congress of CCP further clearly indicated that there is need to improve civic awareness education. In 2010, *The Guideline of the National Program for Medium and Long-Term Educational Reform and Development* (2010-2020) confirmed “moral education comes first,” and placed great emphasis on citizens’ morality.

In summary, the above analysis has shown the concept of “citizen” in Mainland China after the establishment of the PRC. There were no “citizens” in Mao’s totalitarian regime, but the term appeared again and was accepted by Chinese authorities in the post-Mao period. At the beginning of this Deng Xiaoping proposed the concept of the “four haves” citizen, and confirmed “four haves”, lofty ideals, moral integrity, general education, and a sense of discipline, as the standard to be a ‘good citizen’ in Mainland China. After 2000, citizens’ morality was given considerable emphasis and became the first principle of being a ‘good citizen’ in Mainland China. The next section will analyze the ‘good citizen’ expected by China’s “self-contradictory” regime.

**4.4 ‘Good Citizen’ under China’s Authoritarian Regime: A Patriotic, Moral and Market oriented Citizen**

With the construction of the authoritarian regime in Mainland China, the term “citizen” reappeared, “new soil has been created for the evolution of a new kind” of ‘good citizen’ (Kuan, 2013, p.37): a patriotic, moral and market oriented citizen desired and proposed by the authoritarian regime, closely linked with the characteristics of regime and the one who can respond to the needs of regime.
4.4.1 Politicized and Obligatory Patriotism

Since the 1980s, with regime transition from totalitarian to authoritarian, the ideological foundation of the CCP, Marxism-Leninism, fell into crisis. The new authoritarian regime put great effort instead on patriotism (Ding, 2006; Fairbrother, 2003). In October 1982, the Central Party organs embarked on a long-run undertaking called “three loves”: love the party, love socialism, and love the motherland”. In 1983, a comprehensive action program for patriotic campaigns was announced, and under the slogan of “patriotic education”, schools were called upon to implement educational programs in support of the doctrine, which was codified in 1994 with the publication of the “Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” (Fairbrother, 2003). These “top-down” campaigns and slogans confirmed patriotism as the new “official ideology” of the CCP to justify its rule, and since then patriotism has become the first standard for being a Chinese ‘good citizen’. Although patriotism is a pervasive condition for being a ‘good citizen’ worldwide such as loving the country’s culture and a positive national identity, patriotism promoted by the Chinese leadership had its own character.

First, patriotism was not only the means to show loyalty to the Chinese nation-state but also to love and support the CCP. Ding (2006) indicated that the Communist ruling elite tried to make patriotism to be an intermediate value and apply it to motivate citizens’ support for the one-party regime. In the official patriotic appeal, emphasis thus was placed on the concord of loving the motherland and loving the party-state and socialism. It was insisted that Communists are the most devoted patriots and the CCP was the best representative of the nation’s interest; socialism was portrayed as the only road by which China can become a first-class world power. Deng Xiaoping, at the opening ceremony of 12th Party Congress, indicated that: “not Chiang Kai-Shek, but the Chinese Communist Party brought China to stand up”. The Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education indicated that “the CCP’s great contribution and successful experiences after 1978 as the important content of patriotic education” (CCP Center Committee, 1994).
Jiang Zemin’s “three representations” further more clearly indicated “the importance of the Communist Party in modernizing the nation – representing the demands for the development of advanced social productive forces, the direction of advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the people.” (Holbig, 2006, p. 17).

Second, patriotism meant the citizen should put national, collective, and social interest first. Under the authoritarian regime, liberal market economy brought intense competition and individualism, potentially intensifying the conflict between individual and nation, collective and society. In this case, the Chinese authorities allowed citizens to pursue their own interests. At the same time they advocated that the citizens kept the overall picture in mind, and put national, collective, social interest in the first place, and sacrifice when national and public security is in the danger. Concerning the relationship between individual and nation, collective and society, The Decision on Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Level of Culture and Ideology Socialist (CCP Central Committee, 1986) in 1986 indicated that:

China is and will be under the primary stage of socialism, it should implement the basic economic system in which public ownership is dominant and various kinds of ownership develop jointly must select diverse distribution systems with distribution according to work as. Under the economic system, the difference in people’s income and benefit are allowed, but also encouraging people to carry forward the spirit of socialist collectivism to pay attention to the interests of the whole, honesty and trustworthiness, and help each other.

Similarly, Some Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Moral Education Work in School (CCP Central Committee, 1994) proposed that: “the construction of a socialist market economy system still needs to advocate collectivism to deal with the interest relationship between individual, collective, and nation”.

Lastly, patriotism required citizens to be responsible for a set of national obligations and duties to accelerate national and social development. In Mainland China, patriotism not
only means a kind of love and belonging to Chinese culture and history but also taking on a set of legal and moral responsibilities. This differs from Western democracy that emphasizes ‘good citizen’ contributing to the healthy development of society and nation through active participation in society and national affairs (Lo & Man, 1996). A *Handbook for Chinese Citizen* (Guangming Daily, 1995, pxix) detailed a variety of obligations that a ‘good citizen’ should fulfill:

Most of these obligations were related to country, such as defending the unification of the country and national solidarity, upholding the Constitution and to obeying the law, protecting state secrets, respecting public properties, complying with labor discipline, observing public order, abiding by social ethics, defending the security, honors, and interests of the country, serving in the armed forces and militia as required by law, paying taxes as required by law, and to practicing birth control.

Lo and Man (1996) indicated that if certain people are considered Chinese and therefore Chinese citizens, then it is imperative that they also be a loyal citizen of the nation-state of China. Patriotism required by Chinese authorities was totally different from the “responsible patriotism” in democratic society, that rejects “obedience to the state” to embrace “allegiance to a state with constitutional procedures of citizen participation, political dissent, and multiculturalism” (Janoski, 1998, p.74). Patriotism in authoritarian China requests citizens to love the ruling party, to support the socialist road, to put the national, collective and social interests first of all and be responsible for a set of legal and moral obligations and duties. This kind of patriotism is a politicized and obligatory patriotism, which actually emphasize the citizens’ obedience and support to Party and regime.

4.4.2 Moralization of Interpersonal Relationships

Under the Chinese authoritarian regime, the traditional acquaintance society was broken and was gradually replaced by a market and public society. In the market and public society everyone is linked with each other through the market and the relationship between individuals and others is not limited to family members, relatives, and friends. The citizen needs to deal more with social relationships, especially relations with
strangers. The Chinese traditional values system, however, places more emphasis on individual character, self-cultivation, and more interest in deal with acquaintance relationship such as family member, neighbor, friends (Chen, 2012). The ideology of Marxism-Leninism under the totalitarian regime was more concerned with political values than the relation between individual and nation, collective, and society. Hence, it is unable to assist citizens to deal with the relationship between others. This led to a perceived serious social and moral crisis in Mainland China (Li, 1994; Li & Xiong, 2013), and led to the public’s discontent and distrust of the CCP (Ci, 2009). Facing the crisis, Chinese authorities proposed a new moral system as the principle for the citizen to deal with the relationship with others.

The first principle for citizens to get along with others is “courtesy and integrity”, “solidarity and friendship” proposed by the Implementation Outline on Morality Building for Citizens (CCP Central Committee, 2001). The former means citizens should be polite and honest. It aims at the issue of confidence between people such as dishonesty, to cheat others, and the excessive pursuit of personal interest brought by the development of the market economic system. The latter “solidarity and friendship” requests citizens to be a good family member respecting the aged and caring for the young, keeping an harmonious relationship between husband and wife, and friendship with neighbors; to be a good worker who devoted to the job, courtesy and integrity, and making contribution to the public and society; and to be a good citizen who is politeness to people, willingness to help others, protecting public property, maintaining an ecological balance, and obeying the laws.

The second principle for citizens to deal with the relationship with others was the “eight honors and disgraces” proposed by Hu Jintao. These standards were further elaborated by an authoritative set of “opinions” formulated by the Central Committee’s Committee for Guiding the Building of Socialist Spiritual Civilization (Miller, 2007). It provided a standard to judge right from wrong, and tell citizens what should to be done, what should
not to be done. Items five, six and seven especially were the rules for citizens to deal with relations with other: be united and help each other, make no gains at other’s expense; Be honest and trustworthy, do not spend ethics for profits; be disciplined and law-abiding, not chaotic and lawless (Gao, 2006).

4.4.3 Market-orientated Individual Psychological Quality

Chinese authorities also proposed a new requirement for the qualities expected of individuals. On the one hand, they expected citizens to have some psychological qualities to adjust to the liberal market economy, such as self-dependence and work struggle, sense of competition and efficiency, creative and progressing spirit. Some Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Moral Education Work in School (CCP Central Committee, 1994) indicated that it is the most important mission for school to develop students’ spirit of self-dependence and working struggle to promote the economic development. The Guideline of the National Program for Medium and Long-Term Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020) sought to strengthen civic awareness education to improve students’ consciousness of democracy, law-abidingness, freedom and equality, and justice. On the other hand, it requested citizens to improve individual self-cultivation, and to use Chinese traditional moral principles to deal with economic relations. Jiang Zemin (2006) emphasized that it was of great significance to advocate working hard and being thrifty as well as to oppose extravagance and waste.

Through analyzing the requirements of the ‘good citizen’ under the Chinese authoritarian regime, it can be seen that there was a clear definition of that citizen. Deng Xiaoping’s “four haves”, the ten virtues of a citizen proposed by Jiang Zemin, to Hu Jintao’s “eight honors and disgraces”, all put forward the definition and expectation of a ‘good citizen’ by the Chinese authorities. They emphasized what citizens should do for the nation and society, how to get along well with others and requested citizen to improve their inner cultivation. The Chinese authorities proposed these standards for the ‘good citizen’ in the form of official documents and attempted to turn these standards into the rules for
citizens. It was a top-down approach seeking to influence education and the social mainstream. Therefore, the next section, will explore the extent to which the ‘good citizen’ desired by Chinese regime was reflected in civic education policy and school curriculum.

4.5 The ‘Good Citizen’ Reflected in Chinese Civics Curriculum

The purpose of this section is, first, to review briefly the development of the civic education curriculum after 1980s, and then to examine the concept of ‘good citizen’ in the civic education curriculum. Doing so will identify the extent to which a regime’s desired ‘good citizen’ is reflected in civic education policies and the school curriculum.

4.5.1 Brief overview of Chinese Civics Curriculum at the Junior High School Level

The Chinese civics curriculum at the junior high school level was characterized by two different approaches during and after the 1980s: ideology and politics, and ideology and morality.

The form of civic education representing the Ideology and Politics period was implemented in junior high schools from 1992 to 2003. Two versions of the official curriculum guidelines were produced during that time: the first trial version, Curriculum guidelines for nine-year compulsory ideology and morality education in primary school and ideology and politics education in junior secondary school, was published in 1997, and the revised version, Curriculum guidelines for nine-year compulsory ideology and morality education in primary school and ideology and politics education in junior secondary school, was published in 2001. The 1997 Guidelines clearly stipulated that schools must implement mental health education in Grade Seven, legal education in Grade Eight, and National Conditions Education in Grade Nine, which follows phases of students’ physical and psychological development (PRCMOE, 1997). There was little change in the framework of civic education in the 2001 Guideline, but moral education,
national security, and national policy education were respectively added into the curriculum content in Grade Seven, Grade Eight, and Grade Nine in order to adjust to the requirement of the new curriculum reform (PRCMOE, 2001).

In 2003, a new curriculum Guidelines, *Curriculum guidelines for ideology and morality in full-time compulsory education*, was issued (PRCMOE, 2003). Moral education became the focus and the name of the junior high school curriculum, “Ideology and Politics” was changed to “Ideology and Morality”. The other feature of the Guideline 2003 was its emphasis on civic education. Although the Guidelines do not directly mention civic or citizenship education, terms such as “citizen,” “good citizen,” “responsible citizen,” “civic rights and duties,” and “Chinese citizen” appear repeatedly. The Guideline clearly indicated that the purpose of the curriculum is to “prepare students to be a ‘good citizen’ with ideals, morality, culture, and discipline.” Based on the students’ ages and related adaptions to social life and moral development, three main characteristics of social development: the growing self, relations between self and others, and relations between self, collectives, state and society, are integrated with the four areas of “Ideology and Morality”: mental health, morality, legal, and national conditions and policies education (PRCMOE, 2003). In 2011, the, Ministry of Education issued the latest Guidelines for civic education *Curriculum Guidelines for Ideology and Morality in Compulsory Education*. The framework of this version has no significant changes from the Guideline 2003, but there were some modifications in expression, including a greater emphasis on the term “responsible citizen” and “civic awareness”. This version of the Guidelines is currently in use in China’s junior high schools (PRCMOE, 2011).

4.5.2 The ‘Good Citizen’ Defined by Chinese Civics Curriculum
Of the four curriculum Guidelines detailed above, the first two were named “Ideology and Politics” and the latter two were named “Ideology and Morality.” The names reflected a differing curricular framework and content in accordance with the contemporary social, economic, and political background. Despite these differences, the

**Individual and State: Ideological Patriotism and Obligatory Law-abiding**

In the Chinese civics curriculum, patriotic and law education are among the most important themes. In the latest 2011 Guidelines, patriotism education permeates the whole teaching process from Grades Seven to Grade Nine and is the core content of National Conditions Education in Grade Nine. The core aim of patriotism education is to promote students’ national identity and loyalty to the country, as well as to develop their understanding of socialism and strengthen their awareness of social responsibility (PRCMOE, 2011). In the Chinese civic education guidelines, patriotism is always linked with love for the Party and socialism. In the four versions of the Guidelines, patriotism education is put into National Conditions and Policy Education; however, the latter placed more emphasis upon socialist theories and current national polices and less emphasis upon Chinese history and culture. For example, the Guidelines 1997 required that civic education curricula be revised to incorporate Deng Xiaoping’s theory of economic reform. The revised version in 2001 focused on the CCP’s role in the PRC’s socialist modernization and advocates Jiang Zemin’s theory of “three represents” (Law, 2006). Hu Jintao’s “socialist core value” was added in the Guidelines 2011. It can be said that patriotism in China is equated with love for the Party and socialism so the essential purpose of patriotic education expected by Chinese authorities is to strengthen the socialist regime.

In the latest two versions of the curriculum Guidelines, legal education is given unprecedented attention and occupies about one-third of the curriculum content. The purpose of legal education is to encourage students to obey the rules and regulations in public life in the future. Therefore, it is first necessary for students to know the features and functions of the legal system, especially specific protections for minors, violation of
laws, criminals, and the relationship between rights and obligations. After developing an understanding of the legal system, the curriculum guides students to apply their knowledge to protect themselves against crime (PRCMOE, 2003; 2011).

**Moral Education is emphasised**

Since *The Implementation Outline on Morality Building for Citizens* was published in 2001, the most important purpose of civic education has been to promote the overall moral quality of citizens (Lee & Ho, 2005). The proportion of moral education in the curriculum has gradually increased from the Guidelines 1997 to the Guidelines 2011. The whole civic education curriculum from Grades Seven to Nine attempts to promote students’ moral quality. The Grade Seven curriculum aims to develop in students a value and love of life, self-esteem, independence, self-encouragement, the ability to distinguish right from wrong, and the process of taking responsibility for one’s own behavior. The Grade Eight curriculum develops morality related to others. The student should learn love for their parents, to treat people honestly and equally, and to respect and tolerate others. The Grade Nine curriculum emphasized students’ collective morality related to state and society. Its intention was to develop in students a collective identity, love for the nation-state and devotion and self-sacrifice for society (PRCMOE, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2011).

**A Healthy Psychological Quality**

As one of four areas of civic education, the development of a healthy psychological quality was the core content in Grade Seven prior to 2003. Mental health education now permeated the whole curriculum from Grade Seven to Nine. Its purpose is to enable students to develop a healthy personality and good character to adjust to the changing circumstances of modern social life. Twelve objectives of mental health education are specifically outlined in the curriculum: students are to be able to evaluate themselves objectively; to accept both physiological and psychological changes happily; to overcome the pressure of study and life appropriately; to maintain positive attitudes when
facing difficulties and adversity in social life; to form good study, work and life skills; to establish good relationships with classmates and friends; to learn to communicate with parents; to understand viewpoints that differ from those of their parents; to understand the nature of teachers’ work; to communicate with the teachers positively; to treat the teachers’ praise and criticism in a balanced way; and to be friendly with teachers (PRCMOE, 2011, p.8-10).

The above analysis suggested that the main purpose of civic education in junior high school is to develop student to be a ‘good citizen’ having socialist and patriotic ideas, high moral quality, and healthy psychology and obeying the law. These purposes are in accordance with the expectations of Chinese authorities as revealed in the earlier sections on regime characteristics and the regime’s requirements for ‘good citizen’.

The next section will report on the results of interviews with a sample of Chinese students. Its purpose is to assess whether regime requirements for the ‘good citizen’, especially as revealed in the civics curriculum, are also reflected in students’ own perceptions of being a ‘good citizen’.

4.6 Students’ Perceptions of Being a ‘Good Citizen’

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have suggested that the Chinese authoritarian regime has a clear definition of the ‘good citizen’ it required, and that this conception is directly reflected in official civic education curriculum guidelines. The issue to be pursued below is whether students have responded to regime priorities that have formed part of their school education directed at citizen preparation.

4.6.1 What is meant by “Citizen”? 

As mentioned previously, the term “citizen” has a relatively short history in China (Ye, 2011), but since 2001 it has been accepted by Chinese authorities, and has appeared in guidelines and textbooks of civic education (Tan, 2011). Yet the student interview data indicated that most of them could not completely and rightly define the term of “citizen”,
although they have recognized that the “citizen” is a specific concept and it differed from the “people” and “nationals”.

**The definition of “citizen”**

Students came up with three different definitions of “citizen”. First, almost all students believed that a citizen is an ordinary person without privilege. When referring to the term “citizen”, students immediately thought of “all of us” [我們大家], “common people” [普通人], and “the masses” [群眾] who are opposed to the officials. One student C2(c) put it this way:

> I think that citizen is the common person except government officials and criminals....People in the country can been divided into three kinds: citizen [公民], government officials [公務員] and the criminals [罪犯].

Another student C2 (e) said that:

> Citizens are the common people or ordinary persons, including all of us.... The premier and other governmental officials are also citizens, but they have a higher status than common people.

A second view expressed was that “all Chinese are citizens” [所有中國人都是公民] or all people in the country. In their view, if someone lives in the China, no matter who he (she) is, he (she) is a Chinese citizen. Students C1 (d) and C1 (e) said that:

> (Citizens are) the people who live here. For example, Chinese citizen certainly live in China. ....I think that the nationality is not necessary for becoming a citizen.

Finally, a few students proposed that “citizen” is a legal concept referring to the individual who has one nationality, protected by the national law, and living in the country legally. One student C1 (b) said that:
Citizens should be the people who live in the country legally....they have the Resident Identity Cards ...I feel that Chinese legal citizens should have Chinese nationality, and be protected by the Chinese laws.

“Citizen” differing from the “people” and “nationals”

Although students expressed different views about the meaning of “citizen”, they did seem to recognize that there was a difference between the “citizen”, “people” and “nationals”.

First of all, “citizen” was seen as a formal term, and often used in official and legal documents, the “people” and “nationals” were more popularized and colloquial. One student C2 (d) indicated that:

   It is different. I think the term of “citizen” is more formal.... The “people” is a kind of spoken language. You can see the term of “citizen” in the law-related articles, and you can use the “people” at any place...I think the “people” can be used in parallel with the “masses”, but the “citizen” cannot. So, in my opinion, the “people” is more close to our life.

Secondly, the “citizen”, “people” and “nationals” had a different scope, and students formed four different kinds of views. These discussions have been summarized in Table 5.

Table 5:

Students’ Perceptions of the Difference between the “Citizen” “People” and “Nationals“

<table>
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<th>Kinds</th>
<th>Scope</th>
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- 67 -
1. People > Citizen > Nationals  
   The “people” are all Chinese people. This is a more popularized term than “citizen”. In reality, nearly all the “people” are “citizens”. But some “people” are seen as nominal citizens; they are still in the edge of being a “citizen” and have not substantive rights. “Nationals” are those who have power and the right to make decisions in the country.

2. People > Nationals > Citizen  
   The “people” is broader than the “nationals” and “citizen”, but “citizen” is less than the “nationals”. The “people” is all of people in the world, the “nationals” is the member of a country, and “citizen” is always link with a government and regime.

3. Citizen > People and Nationals  
   “Citizen” are all the members of the country, the “people” and “nationals” are the people who doing different work in the country making contributions to the country.

Students grappled with these different terms such as student C1 (a) who said that:

> If I need to sort these three terms, I think the “people” is broader and includes more persons than ‘citizen’, and the “nationals” encompass the fewest group of people. But I do not know what is missing. It is just my feeling... All Chinese belong to the “people”. When you talk about ‘citizen’, I immediately thought of a circle, the “people” have the biggest circle...If you ask me to compare the “citizen” and “people”, I think that the cleaners in the Beijing Street are
“citizens”, but they are at the edge of “citizen” circle. Some people belong to both “citizen” and “people”, but other people are at the place of edge... Leaders, officials, or Beijing urban residents who have household registration are at the core place of “citizen”... (“Nationals”) I feel it is very holy, and have a higher status than “citizen”. Only leaders belong the “nationals”. The richer is “citizen”, but they are not the “nationals”. Only the ones who are able to make a difference in the society can be called the “nationals”.

Yet there was no agreement about the scope of the terms. Compare the views of another student, C1(c) with the view expressed above:

I think that the “people” could be bigger, and be able to mean all people in the world. The “nationals” refers to a member of the country. “Citizen” belongs to a government, and is link with a regime. A people who leaded by a regime is the citizen... all people in the word can be called as the “people”, but the “nationals” belongs to different country. You are the “nationals” of one country as well as you are not belonging to others. “Citizen”, for example, you are Beijing citizen, and you are not Shanghai citizen.

There was a third view different again from those above as expressed by Student C2 (b):

For all I know is that “citizen” is associated with the country, no matter where they live. The “people” refer to the ones who made contribution for the country. For those who have been deprived of political rights do not belong to the “people”, but they are still Chinese citizens.

C2 (a) added that citizen is anyone in the country, if you are Chinese, you are Chinese citizen. Concerning the “people”, he said:

The “people” can be divided into different kinds, such as, students in the education domain, and workers in the work domain.
To sum up, students had realized that “citizen” is a specific concept, and it differs from the “people” and “nationals”. Yet they could not define it precisely. They know that a citizen is a person, a member of the nation, the community, or the world. They could only give one or two features of a citizen. They were not aware that a citizen is more than just a person or identity who is entitled to rights and responsibilities.

4.6.2 What Does Mean To Be A ‘Good Citizen’?

Compared to defining the term of “citizen”, Chinese students were more interested in the question of “what does mean to be a ‘good citizen’”. In their eyes, patriotism was the first principle for being a good Chinese citizen, but they did not believe that love country means love the Party socialism and government. Morality was considered to be important to deal with relationships. Lastly, a few students mentioned a powerful psychology is necessary for being a ‘good citizen’

Patriotism is the first Principle, but love country does not mean love party, socialism and government

There was little disagreement among students that one of the key characteristics of the ‘good citizen’ was being patriotic, but there were multiple ways of interpreting patriotism. As student C1 (a) said:

Patriotism is an abstract concept. How to love the country? Be honest, you cannot fight for it since there is no war in contemporary China. So I feel we need to start from something trivial around us, just be ourselves. For example, offering help to others, being nice to the classmates, keep the classroom clean...if we do these things, the country will become better and better.

Obeying the law and not criticizing or being against the country and country’s leaders were also mentioned by the students as an important aspect of patriotism in China. They believed that patriotism means “abide by the law and behave oneself”, “do not make trouble”. Student C1(c) for example, argued that:
(Loving the country is) obeying the law and not making trouble for the country...The citizens can make objections and petition, but must not make trouble for the country. The social order should not be disturbed and the authority of the country should not be threatened. This kind of person will not be popular in the country.

Some students argued that if you love country, it is not right to criticize the country and the country’s leaders as happens in other countries. For example, Student C1 (d) proposed that:

Though sometimes the President and political leaders made wrong decisions, as Chinese citizens, we should not freely criticize or condemn them as people in other countries do. While hearing that someone criticizes my country, I will say ‘do not say that’. Because this is my country, I have responsibility to protect it...Maybe we can criticize our leaders, but we cannot tolerate criticism by foreigners.

In addition to making a contribution to the country and obeying the national law, students considered that maintaining national dignity was also an embodiment of patriotism. Student C1(c) said that:

I feel we should love our country and respect our country, no matter how poor she is...I think the state’s laws protect citizens, so citizens should also love country. [What we shall do] is first do not lose Chinese face when you meet a foreigner; and second do not always admire everything in the foreign countries. We should love the things in our own country.

Another theme that emerged was that love country does not mean loving the CCP and socialism. Students seemed to have a clear understanding of the differences between the country and the CCP – between loving the country as a place and a people while regarding the CCP as an organization. As student C1 (a) said:

I think we should love country, because we live here. But it is not necessary to love the Party....like Christianity, the Party is more like a religion. Some believe in it, but
others do not. I am not against the Party and we do need to obey the Party’s orders.

For student C1 (a), loving the Party is a personal decision. Student C2 (b) also argued that individuals have right to love or not love:

*It is different. Country is the place you are living, and you need to rely on it. The Party represents certain political thoughts. If you agree with the thoughts, this means you love the Party….I think everyone is different, some people like these thoughts and others dislike them.*

The second reason is that from the perspective of students, the Party is always changing, but the country is constant. Some students mentioned that there exist many parties in the country, and not everyone is member of the CCP. So, not all of citizen should love party. Student C1(c) said that:

*Loving the country is different from loving the Party. There can be many parties in a country. It is possible that a Nationalist Party will become the ruling party in the future instead of the Communist Party…and not all of us are members of the Communist Party. Of course, if you are a member of the Party, you have to love the Party.*

Finally, loving the country was not seen to be the same as loving the government. Students seemed to have a clear understanding about the role of the government. They saw the need to obey and carry out government policy, but they didn’t think that meant they had to love the government as student C1 (a) said:

*I think the government is an organization. To be honest, I think we do not need to love it. Why should we love it? The government provides some benefits and protection for us, and we can respect or obey it but this does not mean love.*

Some students further proposed that the government and its staff may at times be involved in things like corruption. In this case you can still love the country while
disliking the government.

Yet ‘disliking’ the government and ‘fighting’ the government are two different things. In some students’ minds, if the government does wrong things, they will dislike it. But they do not like to fight the government and maintain their right. Passive tolerance and ‘let it go’ are their attitude. For example, C1 (e) said that:

*(If the government does some wrong things), my father and mother are certainly not fighting, because it is impossible to against government. And if we fight with the government, it will lead to big trouble for us.*

*Morality is considered as the most important approach to deal with the relationships*

The interviews moved away from these explicitly political topics to more personal ones and especially to issues of morality. Back to the issue of the characteristics of the ‘good citizen’, many students expressed the importance of morality, especially when it came to relationships. As student C1 (b) said:

*Our parents brought us up, and gave all love to us. So we need to love them and obey them. ...sometimes, I feel their decision is wrong, but I think they are older than me, and they always tell me they are more experienced and knowledgeable. So I think I need to follow them.*

This kind of morality should also be applied to friends to ensure a harmonious society. As Student C2 (b) said:

*I believe that it is necessary to be polite and honest since we live in a land of courtesy. And if we help others, in turn others will help us. It is an interactive relationship...we need to be polite and peaceful, and stop making conflict and trouble, and then we will have a harmonious society.*

Students also felt that the ‘good citizen’ should help others, but there was some slight
reservation. It seems that students had been influenced by “the Accident of Elderly Falls” 建老人摔倒事件 in which those who went to help someone were themselves attacked. This was expressed by Student C2 (b):

*If strangers need help, firstly I will to see what help they need, and then decide whether I should help them. The decision is context-based. But in the present, the society is so complex and one person is unable to make a difference with his/her capacity….Any stranger might lead us into a trap. But if the people are really in trouble, I shall help them.*

**A powerful psychology for adjusting to all difficulties**

This concern about insecurity or external threats when dealing with others was not always widely shared. Only three students argued that a ‘good citizen’ should have a strong mind to face challenges. These students felt that there is often bad news around them and they feel under pressure so they needed to be strong psychologically to deal with it. Student C1 (d) mentioned that:

*Recently I read a report of “internet mass hunting lead a man to crazy”….I felt if the man had a strong mind, this tragedy wouldn’t happen….I always see some bad news from the television, internet, and newspaper, such as official corruption, unsafe food and so on, which makes me worried that these strategies will happen to me and my family. So I think, as ordinary citizens, we must be psychologically strong to face the reality.*

As mentioned above, this view was not widely shared but it did offer a perspective on the possible impact of the external world on students’ conceptions of the world in which they live.
4.6.3 Where do Chinese Students Get the Conception of Citizen, ‘Good Citizen’?

The final part of the interview sought to understand the source of students’ conceptions of citizenship, values and ideas. Schools did not seem to play a very significant role as student C1 (b) pointed out:

“Citizens” or ‘good citizen’ were seldom mentioned in our ideological and moral education classes. The curriculum did not inform us of what it is. What I told you are just my own ideas.

Yet there were other sources of information available as student C2 (e) explained:

I often heard the term of citizen in the television advertisement, especially from our political leaders, such as the President who frequently mentioned this concept in his speeches. They always said that a citizen should do... what Chinese people should do... And I also saw the text on citizens on the Internet.

In other words, the main effects on students’ thinking about citizenship were more random than fixed. Or to put it another way, students attended to the things that they felt were important and did not attend to other things. The views expressed above, therefore, represent citizenship as understood by students rather than citizenship as viewed by the regime.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter was concerned with the conceptions of ‘good citizen’ in Mainland China. It found that the Chinese regime had a very clear definition of a ‘good citizen’ and attempted to promote this view in a top-down way. The authorities directly expressed their expectation about the ‘good citizen’ in official documents and always transformed it into a public slogan to call the masses to follow it. As a seriously controlled area, the purpose of civic education was to develop the ‘good citizen’ that the authoritarian regime
expected. Students’ perceptions of a ‘good citizen’ are basically consistent with the purpose of civic education and the regime’s expectation, although there are some important differences. The following chapter will focus on the ‘good citizen’ in Hong Kong’s hybrid regime.
CHAPTER 5

CIVIC EDUCATION AND THE ‘GOOD CITIZEN’ IN A HYBRID POLITICAL REGIME: THE CASE OF HONG KONG

5.1 Introduction

Until 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was a colony of Great Britain but after that date it became a hybrid political regime partly democratic (for example it possessed limited electoral democracy, an independent judiciary, a commitment to human rights expressed in legislative enactments) and at the same time it was a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its Chief Executive and senior officials are appointed by the Chinese government. This has created a tension in the city between proponents of democracy and supporters of the Chinese government. Each group has its own views about the kind of civic education necessary to provide ‘good citizens’ for Hong Kong. This tension between supporters of democracy and pro-Chinese government supporters shapes debates around civic education in Hong Kong.

The purpose of the present chapter is firstly to explore the formation of the hybrid regime in Hong Kong and describe its characteristics (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 examines the ‘good citizen’ reflected in civic education curriculum to identify the extent to which it reflects the requirements of the hybrid regime type and how this is reflected in civic education. Lastly, section 5.4 explores the perceptions of a sample of Hong Kong students’ towards being ‘good citizens’ to assess whether the expectations of the hybrid regime for its citizens are actually realized.
5.2 The Development of a Hybrid Regime in Hong Kong: The Debate between Democracy and Authoritarianism

Since the 1980s, Hong Kong has been “pushed” by pro-democracy forces demanding a fuller scope and faster pace of democratization, and “pulled” by pro-China forces that favored a slower pace of democratization and accepted the degree of autonomy that is allowed by the Central government (Sing, 2006; Oksanen, 2011; Chan, 2007). Many ex-colonies in Asia emerged from their colonial status to become independent national states; Hong Kong, on the other hand, emerged as a unique hybrid regime characterized by the “one country two systems” political arrangements (Bray & Lee, 1993; Tse, 2007; Lai & Byram, 2012) agreed by the British and Chinese governments. Hong Kong’s transition from colony to Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China will be discussed in the next section.

5.2.1 Regime Transition Period (1980s to 1997)

In 1842, Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain according to the Treaty of Nanking between China’s Qing dynasty and Great Britain. After the establishment of the PRC, the recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty became a significant mission for the Chinese government (Zhao, 2006). The British government, however, with significant interests to maintain in Hong Kong, did not give up its lease easily (Yahuda, 1996). After prolonged negotiations, The Joint Declaration was signed by the British and Chinese governments in 1984, in which Britain promised that “it will restore Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997”. Although the Chinese and the British reached a consensus on Hong Kong’s future sovereignty, they had completely opposite attitudes toward Hong Kong’s governance after resumption of sovereignty (Bray & Lee, 2001, p.12; Oksanen, 2011). British and Hong Kong’s democratic forces supported a more rapid pace and the maximum degree of democracy. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities and the pro-China supporters, attempted to restrict the pace and extent of introducing democracy into Hong Kong (Yahuda, 1996, p.66).
Democratic development prior to the handover

As Bray and Lee (1993) indicated, decolonization in Africa, Asia and the Pacific was usually marked by some form of democratization. That is only partially true in Hong Kong. Hong Kong had been a British colony since 1842, its long colonial history characterized by “an administrative-led polity, with the British government’s appointed governor and his appointed executive council making top-level decisions” (Tse, 2006, p.290). Its political power was concentrated in the hands of governor, career civil servants and a small group of co-opted elite. According to the data from a survey conducted in 1971 at Kwun Tong, “the political culture of the ordinary people is predominately a parochial one....the political culture of the leaders is predominately a subject political culture” (Ichilov, 2013, p.225). The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 marked the beginning of the decolonization process in Hong Kong (Lee, 2004; Bray & Lee, 1993) and heightened the tension between pro-democracy and pro-China supporters.

First, the British colonial authorities started a set of reforms to democratize the political system of Hong Kong, that “were perceived by the Hong Kong Chinese as belated and patronizing” after 1984 (Tsang, 1998, p.221). In July and November 1984 the first steps in the reform process were started with the issuing of the Green and White Papers respectively entitled “The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong”. These two documents, stipulated the creation of an electoral system and composition of the Legislative Council. It included the introduction of indirectly elected Councilors into the Legislative Council that had been dominated by governor-appointed councilors and government officials. By the 1986, the Legislative Council had seven official members, 22 appointed members, and 24 elected members (of the elected seats, 12 were filled through an Electoral College, and 12 through functional constituencies (Bray & Lee, 1993). Although the elected members were still the minority, this step was certainly an advance towards democracy (Ichilov, 2013). The second step was a Green Paper entitled “The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government”, and
subsequent White Paper entitled “The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward”. Their purpose was to introduce direct Legislative Council elections in 1989, and to introduction of 18 directly elected seats to legislature in 1991 (Cheung. 2009). The previous step was taken by the last British governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten. His electoral proposals sought to increase the pace of democratization for Hong Kong. It included two important points: the first was to separate the executive and legislative functions of government, the second was that all members of the Legislative Council would be directly or indirectly elected by the people of Hong Kong in 1995 (So, 1997, p.64).

The British colonial administration was not alone in trying to support democratic development. There was also support from democratic activists. In the 1960s and 1970s, Hong Kong Chinese were portrayed by Lau (1982) as utilitarian, materialistic and family-oriented. As Leung (1996, p.13) elaborated:

> As the refugees, mostly from pre-modern rural parts of China, who had arrived seeking a safe haven in a borrowed time and place, the population’s traditional apathy was reinforced by their quest for stability and quick material gains in the colony…It bred an attitude of indifference and aloofness to society, resulting in low civic consciousness and low social participation.

Facing the upcoming handover of sovereignty to the Chinese government, many Hong Kong citizens began to change their apoliticised attitude (Morris & Chan, 1997), and “the struggle for democracy became the major concern of the activists” (Lui & Chiu, 1999, p.112). According to a survey, in 1981 only a third called themselves “Hong Kongers” and a quarter admitted to roots in Britain. But in 1988 less than a third identified themselves as ‘Chinese’ and nearly two thirds professed a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong (Yahuda, 1996). As Yahuda (1996, p.52) indicated these significant changes “reflect the concern after 1984 to demarcate Hong Kong and its way of life from that of the Mainland to whose sovereignty it would soon revert”.

The 1989 Tiananmen Incident in China brought a widespread demand for faster
democratization in Hong Kong. A million people (or twenty percent of the total population) marched through the Centre of Hong Kong to protest against the Beijing government on May 21 (So, 1997). It was at that time political parties emerged in Hong Kong where they had not existed in the previous 150 years of British rule. The earliest and biggest grew out of the 1989 ‘anti-China’ Hong Kong Alliance in support of the Chinese Patriotic Pro-democracy Movement, which became “United Democrats of Hong Kong” whose members publicly declared that they were committed to promote democratization in Hong Kong (Yahuda, 1996, p.108; So, 1997).

Limitations for democratic development prior to the handover
Yet the forces supporting democracy were not the only ones seeking to influence Hong Kong’s future political development. The Chinese government attempted to impede Hong Kong’s progress towards direct elections, universal suffrage, and other democratizing reforms (Sing, 2009). As early as 1984, the intellectuals in Mainland China insisted that British authorities had not thought about introducing democracy into Hong Kong in the more as one hundred years of its colonial rule and always refused any reforms that impacted on the colonial political system. Yet just prior to the PRC’s resumption of sovereignty the British administration injected democratic elements into Hong Kong’s polity that had little do with democratic ideals (Zhou, 2006, p.166). Instead, it was “another conspiracy to perpetuate British rule in Hong Kong beyond 1997” (Poon, 2007, p.8). The Chinese authorities contended that representative government was being introduced by the British not for the purpose of preserving the framework needed for a capitalist system, but in order “to use democracy to resist Communism” (Yahuda, 1996, p.74). By 1992, the Patten reform proposal aroused outrage in Beijing with the Chinese government regarding “Patten’s proposal as a plot to prevent China from regaining full sovereignty of Hong Kong, to plant pro-British elements in the political establishment after 1997, and to spread the virus of democracy to the Mainland”(So, 1997, p.65). In September 1994, the National People’s Congress unanimously resolved to abolish the political structure based on Governor Chris Patten’s
electoral package (Yahuda, 1996, p.69), and the Chinese authorities began to design another system of governance for post-handover Hong Kong.

After the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration, Chinese authorities decided to “define Hong Kong’s future political system through a Law” (Zhou, 2006, p.125). In April 1985, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) established a committee to prepare the Basic Law for the Hong Kong SAR. Deng Xiaoping (2001, p.215-221) requested that “the Basic Law should not be too detailed, Hong Kong’s political system could not be completely westernized and not a copy of the western model. Hong Kong had done very well without British or American democracy in the past half century. So, I am afraid it would not be appropriate for its system to be a total copy of theirs with, for example, the separation of the three powers and a British or American parliamentary system”. He also indicated that “we never believed that Hong Kong’s affairs will be totally governed by Hong Kong people and the Central Government is not concern about that ….It is impossible and impractical...it is good for Hong Kong to have certain powers reserved for the Central Government”. On 4 April 1990, the Basic Law was passed by the NPC. It is “a mini-constitution for Hong Kong and sets out in detail the political system…used to regulate Hong Kong after its transition to Chinese rule and a special administrative region in 1997 (Henderson, 1994, p.98-99).

In the Basic Law, the Chinese authorities promised as a basic principle “one country, two systems” for the political system of Hong Kong after the handover of sovereignty, “guaranteeing that Hong Kong would be governed as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), with Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong while enjoying a high degree of autonomy with no change for 50 years” (So, 2011, p.99). First, under the principle of “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong’s sovereignty belongs to the PRC, but the Chinese socialist system and policies was not to be practiced in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong maintained its capitalist system. In the view of Chinese authorities, the capitalist system of Hong Kong is one of two systems within the boundary of the PRC. The
principle of ‘one China’ allows Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, but this autonomy is subject to the central authority of the nation (Sing, 2006; So, 2011). The central government has rights and obligations, as well as power, so it may attend to affairs related to Hong Kong. Second, the Hong Kong SAR can exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication in accordance with the provisions of this law (Article 2). But the Central Government shall be responsible for Hong Kong’s foreign and military affairs (Article 13 and 14). Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and the principal officials of the executive authorities shall be appointed by the Central Government (article 15). Last, “Hong Kong people’s self-rule” means Chinese citizens who are residents of the Hong Kong shall be entitled to participate in the management of state affairs (Article 21). There is a limitation for “Hong Kong people’s self-rule”, as Deng Xiaoping indicated that “Hong Kong should be ruled by the patriots among the Hong Kong people. And patriots are those who have respect for own nation, loyally supporting the sovereignty return to PRC, and maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong” (Zhou, 2006, p.13). Ian Scott (1995, p.202) remarked that “the Basic Law is a profoundly antidemocratic document.”

5.2.2 Hybrid Regime Consolidation Period (1997-2012)
After Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the polarization between supporters of democracy and pro-China supporters continued. Although Hong Kong’s autonomy and institutional system were defined in the Basic Law, it has been argued that Chinese authorities never intended to introduce genuine democracy into Hong Kong (Cheng, 2009). At the same time, they could not refrain from meddling in Hong Kong’s democratization and autonomy and attempted gradually to assimilate Hong Kong into a broader national context through its system by economic aid, cooperation and national and moral education (Hollliday, Ngok & Yep, 2004). By contrast, Hong Kong democratic forces continued to fight against China’s authority resisting any interference and integration, attempting to maintain Hong Kong’s democracy and autonomy.
Limitations for democratic development after the handover

Rezvani (2012) has pointed out that Mainland China has a history of not tolerating civil rights, press freedoms, rule of law and the separation of power jurisdiction that Hong Kong paradoxically represents and that are guaranteed in Basic Law. Although promising to maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy and democracy in the Basic Law (Leung & Ng, 2004), Chinese authorities worried that “the Hong Kong democratization issue has the greater externalities than the territory itself…if the CCP allowed democratization in Hong Kong without offering it on the Mainland China, it would be committing political suicide” (Zheng & Keat, 2007, p.37). At the same time, the Chinese government always believed that Hong Kong’s democratization was preparatory for independence which was clearly unacceptable (Yahuda, 1996, p.48). Therefore, the Chinese government has attempted to limit Hong Kong’s democratization using two approaches (Sing, 2006).

The first approach was using the NPC four times to interpret the Basic Law and the National Security Bill. The NPC Standing Committee first exercised its power of interpreting the Basic Law in 1999 with the right of abode case by overturning a decision of Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. The second NPC Standing Committee interpretation of the Basic Law took place in 2004 declaring that Hong Kong’s Chief Executive would not be directly elected in 2007 and would continue to be appointed by Chinese authorities following nomination by a Nominating Committee. The third came in 2005, which allowed the Territory’s second Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, to serve for two full terms in spite of the fact that he had already been a Chief Executive for two years after the March 2005 resignation of his predecessor, Tung Chee Hwa. The Basic Law says that the Chief Executive “may serve for not more than two consecutive terms” of “five years”. The fourth interpretation in December 2007, in which the NPC Standing Committee declared that Hong Kong could elect its Chief Executive in 2017 and elect the legislature by full universal suffrage in 2020 (Ho, Lee, Chan, Ng & Choy, 2010). These four interpretations of the Basic Law called into question the rule of law within Hong
Kong since it was China’s legislature rather than Hong Kong’s courts making judicial decisions. Zheng and Keat (2007, p.236) argued that this situation “should be seen as a temporary setback for Hong Kong’s democratization project”.

Chinese authorities also wished to introduce a National Security Law for Hong Kong. Rezvani (2012) argued that the result would have been to limit press freedom, civil liberties and rule of law in Hong Kong. In 1990, at China’s request, Article 23 was inserted into the Basic Law requiring that “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People Government”. In September 2002 the Hong Kong SAR government released a consultation document, Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law. In December 2002, after a three-month consultation period, which the government hoped would produce supporters, 500000 people demonstrated against the legislative proposal. On February 2003 the government attempted to fast-track the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, which intended to implement Article 23, with the goal of passing the legislation in early June (Holliday, Ngok & Yep, 2004). “A wide range of citizens and civil society groups expressed their concerns that any such legislation would lead to a reduction of press freedom, civil liberties and rule of law”(Rezvani, 2012, p.115).

The second approach used by Chinese authorities to limit Hong Kong’s democratic development was a ‘soft’ approach that used economic assistance and education to integrate Hong Kong more closely into Mainland China. In the first years after the handover Chinese authorities “did largely keep its promise of ‘one country, two systems’, adopted a position of non-interference towards Hong Kong affairs and allowed a high degree of autonomy” (So, 2011, p.108). But at the turn of the twenty-first century, Hong Kong faced two crises, the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic in 2003. These crises led to Hong Kong people’s high distrust toward the SAR government and Chinese authority (Holliday, Ngok & Yep,
After 2003, Chinese authorities decided to provide economic assistance to solve the economic and political crises in Hong Kong, including “Individual Traveler’s Scheme”, and the Closer Economic Participation Arrangement between Hong Kong and Guangdong governments. This assistance did promote the development of Hong Kong’s economy, but also made Hong Kong more dependent on political and economic support from Mainland China, damaging the autonomy of Hong Kong (Holliday, 2004).

Besides economic assistance, Chinese authorities promoted moral and national education in Hong Kong, attempting to facilitate Hong Kong people’s “spiritual return” to China and identify with the Chinese authoritarian system (Xu & Xing, 2013). In 2007, President Hu Jintao (2007) at the Hong Kong’s tenth anniversary celebration of returning to China pointed out in particular that “we are required to reinforce national education for young people, and enhance the communication between young people in Hong Kong and Mainland China, to inherit Hong Kong compatriots’ a glorious patriotic tradition”. Following this instruction, the Hong Kong SAR government decided to promote national education on “knowledge”, “feeling” and “practical” levels through “national conditions workshops” and “national conditions summer camps” attempting to help Hong Kong young people to know national history and current conditions, to understand the nation’s challenges and opportunities, to identify and be proud of Chinese citizenship identity (Liu, 2011). In 2010, the SAR government proposed to add national and moral education as a compulsory curriculum for primary and secondary school, and in 2012, it published an official curriculum guideline for national and moral education (Leung, 2014).

**Struggle for democracy after the handover**

The struggle between democratic and pro-China groups, including the Chinese government itself, characterized Hong Kong’s transition from colony to a hybrid regime within China. The first interpretation of the Basic Law referred to above was considered to “spell the end of Hong Kong’s final adjudication power” (Rezvani, 2012), and Ghai (2004) has even asserted that Hong Kong’s “autonomy experienced sudden death after
the NPC Standing Committee first decided to exercise its power of interpreting the Basic Law in 1999 and overruled the territory’s Final Court of Appeal”. The NPC Standing Committee’s second interpretation led to the accusation that Beijing was “trampling on the territory’s autonomy by not allowing the Chief Executive to be democratically elected” (Rezvani, 2012, p.111). The third and fourth interpretation led to the complaint that “such democratic elections are overdue and are evidence of Beijing trampling upon greater degree of universal suffrage, the central Government’s recognition of more democracy for the territory potentially represents not only an important step toward future autonomy powers, but arguably an indication of the flexible and co-operative outlook of the Chinese authorities” (Rezvani, 2012, p.112). Demonstrating their commitment to democracy, supporters participated in six marches from 2003 to 2006, to demonstrate for democratic reforms (Leung, 2014). In 2003, the Hong Kong SAR government’s National Security Bill led to over a half million Hong Kong residents marching in the street (Holliday, Ngok & Yep, 2004; Chan & Lee, 2007). As a result, “not only did the Article 23 legislation ultimately fail to pass, these efforts by China’s central government and China-appointed officials precipitated widespread alarm among the population, governmental disarray and political resignations” (Rezvani, 2012, p.115).

In addition to such direct confrontation there has also been a realization that China’s ‘soft’ approaches through such things as economic assistance are also problematic. Holliday (2004, p.254), for example, indicated that the increased economic dependence of Hong Kong on China “could lead to a qualitative change in Hong Kong’s autonomy, and underling the very basis of ‘one country, two systems’”. As a result, although Chinese economic assistance did help Hong Kong out of the economic crisis, “those expressing trust among Hong Kong people towards their government only stood at 34% in the late February 2004,…and they have shown greater doggedness with their demand for democratic reform than Beijing had assumed they would display”(Sing, 2006, p. 518). Based on four surveys with representative samples conducted between March 2003 and January 2004, between 70% and 80% of Hong Kong people have demonstrated
consistent support full democracy. “Faced with continuous and blistering attacks form Beijing since January 2004, support for full democracy by 2008 still remained at 58.5% among the public in early March 2004” (Sing, 2006, p.526).

When the Hong Kong SAR government attempted to introduce a new school subject, Moral and National Education, mass protests were held from mid-July to September 2012. The protest came about in response to teaching materials that had been published by a pro-China group to support the proposed curriculum. It was argued that these materials were really about “brainwashing” students to accept uncritically the Chinese political system including the Communist Party while at the same time being critical of Western political systems. There was no attempt in these materials to focus on the democratic aspects of Hong Kong’s system of government (Kennedy, 2012; Chen, 2012; Lau, 2013; Leung, 2014). Eventually the Hong Kong SAR government withdrew the proposed new subject allowing schools the freedom to adopt it or not.

As shown above, these tensions between pro-democracy supporters and pro-China supporters characterized political life in Hong Kong from the time of the signing of the Joint Sino-British Declaration. The context for these tensions after 1997 was a political system in Hong Kong that was partially democratic referred to by some researchers as an “illiberal autocracy” (Kuan & Lau, 2002, p.59), and by another as a “partially independent political entity” (Rezvani, 2012, p.93). Yet for many people in Hong Kong, the Basic Law seemed to hold out the promise of democracy since had its own executive, legislature, and independent judicial power. As one Mainland scholar said “it is a totally capitalistic democratic regime” (Zhou, 2006, p.134). It is important to understand Hong Kong’s push for democracy in this context – a partially democratic sub national state with the promise of further development. Yet it is also important to understand the limitations of this context.

According to Rao & Wang (2007, p.342) Hong Kong is “a non-sovereign state and non-
political entity. It is merely a regional administrative and economic entity, so the system of the separation of three-fold power (as in the United States) or the parliamentary system (as in Britain) is unsuitable for it”. And “irrespective as to how the Chief Executive is selected, including by means of universal suffrage ultimately, there can be no deviation from the constitutional requirement that a candidate winning an election must be appointed, in a substantive manner, by the Central People’s Government before assuming office” (Hong Kong Government, 2007, p. 8). Only half of the legislature is directly elected by the people, the other half belong to “functional constituencies,” that is, constituencies elected by members of particular professional, commercial and other interest groups( Ho, Lee, Chan, Ng & Choy, 2010). Moreover, the Chinese authorities have maintained a reluctance to support the democratization of Hong Kong. It has been argued that local autonomy could be better defended if both the Central People’s Government and the autonomous authorities were democratic (Lapidoth, 1997).

5.3 The ‘Good Citizen’ Required by Hong Kong’s Hybrid Regime

Based on the above analysis, it can be seen that Hong Kong became a battlefield between pro-democracy and pro-China forces. In the process of debate, pro-democratic and pro-China camps had two different requirements for being a ‘good citizen’, and proposed two different versions of civic education to develop their conceptions of the “good citizen” to support and achieve their political claims (see Table 6)

Table 6:

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<th>Democratic Civic Education</th>
<th>National and Moral Education</th>
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<td>1985</td>
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5.3.1 The Democratic Camp’s ‘Good Citizen’ and Civic Education

Before and after the handover, the democratic camp in Hong Kong supported the introduction and development of a representative democracy. Yet commentators have noted that Hong Kong citizens seemed ‘apolitical’, showing indifference and aloofness to social and political affairs, and with low civic participation (Morris & Chan, 1997; Leung & Ng, 2004; Leung & Yuen, 2009, p.37). It seemed unlikely that these kinds of citizen would support the running of democracy in Hong Kong. This situation meant that implementing civic education in school to educate Hong Kong people more effectively and comprehensively in political and constitutional matters became a priority. So that they will be able to understand better and adjust to the development of a democratic system in Hong Kong (Leung & Ng, 2004). Therefore, from 1985 to 2012, a number of Guidelines were produced to support civic education in schools. Some of them had a clear democratic stance, putting more emphasis on developing citizens’ political knowledge, critical thinking and civic participation.

The Foreword to the 1985 Guidelines on Civic Education in School (CDC, 1985, pi) stated that:

...the need for the public to be more educated and more effectively to cope with the implications arising from proposals for developing the local system of government...There is a special need at this time in Hong Kong’s political development to ensure that pupils understand the significance of the changes that are taking place.
Civic education in this document is understood as a form of political socialization, its purpose being to promote stability and responsibility. Hence, “the specific role of the schools…will be to develop in young people the sort of knowledge, attitudes and skills necessary for them to become rational, politically sensitive and responsible citizens who can contribute constructively to the process of political and social change” (CDC, 1985, p.10). As Bray and Lee (1993, p.556) argued “the Guidelines are not that different from those of the previous civic education and economic & public affairs curricula, which, at the most, raised the students’ social awareness and concern about social services rather than politics”. Leung (1995, p.287-292) remarked that the Guidelines revealed only “the lukewarm attitude towards promoting civic education, and the emphasis of civic education for transitional Hong Kong is neither on the development of democratic personality who may urge for further democratization nor on the development of national feeling which may further atrophy the declining authority of the British rule, but on the preservation of the status quo which at least ensures the glorious retreat of the colonial regime.” It might be said that this document accepted by the British colonial government was more in the name of democracy but actually there were few specific contents related to democracy. The Guidelines 1985 were soon confirmed the insufficient by the Education Department’s two evaluations in 1986 and 1987, and another set of guidelines were developed to instead of it.

In 1996, just one year before the handover, new Guidelines on Civic Education in School (CDC, 1996) were issued. In contrast to the Guidelines 1985, the purpose of civic education in the new Guidelines was to equip students with “understanding, positive attitudes and values related to the development a sense of belonging to Hong Kong and China, the importance of democracy, liberty, human right and rule of law; and skills of critical thinking and problem solving” (CDC, 1996, p.5-6). The student was expected to be nurtured to be a ‘good citizen’ who actively participates the in community at different levels with a critical and reflective mind (Leung, Chai-Yip & Ng, 2000). In this sense, the Guidelines 1996 were considered more liberal and democratic, reflecting the values
of the Hong Kong democratic camp.

In 2012, the *Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide* announced by the Hong Kong SAR government suffered strong opposition from Hong Kong’s people as and consequently, the government was forced to shelve the guidelines and promised not to introduce it again. Schools were then left alone to continue developing their based civic education curriculum as before. In that situation, some scholars in Hong Kong actively proposed a private curriculum proposal—*Civic Education Guidelines from Civil Society*. Some of its authors indicated that “the shelving of the mandatory subject and reversion to depoliticized school based civic education is inadequate to address HK’s democratic development”. Therefore, they proposed “a type of civic education aiming at cultivating politically literature, critical-thinking and actively-participating citizens with particular reference to the Civic Education Guidelines from Civic Society” (Chong, Yuen & Leung, 2015). In the preface, it has indicated that political education will be the core of civic education, and the civic mission of schools is to make student recognize the positive values of politic, to develop future citizen with civic awareness, knowledge, and positive participation, and to make contribute to Hong Kong’s democratization (Leung, et al, 2012).

These three *Guidelines* for civic education were both proposed by pro-democracy forces and were characterized by “ politicization” and democratization (Leung & Ng, 2004, p.46). The common aim of these three guidelines was to develop a ‘good citizen’ for supporting and promoting Hong Kong’s democratization. Details about this ‘good citizen’ will be discussed in the next section.

**5.3.2 The Pro-China Camp’s ‘Good Citizen’ and National and Moral Education**

Before the 1997, the Chinese authorities did not clearly propose their expectations of a ‘good citizen’. Instead, the Basic Law promised that after the handover, “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong”, Chinese citizens who are residents of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be entitled to participate in the manage state affairs according to law” (Article 21). Although the Basic Law promised and encouraged Hong Kong citizens to participate in political affairs, Deng Xiaoping had clearly indicated that “Hong Kong would be governed by the patriots who respected their own nation, sincerely supporting the sovereignty of China, and not damaging Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability” (Zhou, 2006, p.13). As Ghai (2001) claimed, the Basic Law laid down a political structure with a restricted franchise, hindering the development of active and participatory citizens.

This minimally participative and patriotic citizen was continually emphasized, yet after 1997 citizens’ national identity became the most important aspect of being a ‘good citizen’ in Hong Kong. Morris & Chan (1997) argued that this was because it was assumed that Hong Kong citizens had a low level of loyalty to the state, and lacked a clear national identity. Hence, an important role for civic education was to develop young people’s sense of national identity, loyalty to the nation state and patriotism, as well as making a contribution to the Chinese nation. In the ceremony to celebrate the establishment of the HKSAR on 1 July 1997, the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong SRA, Tung Chee Hwa (1997), put the argument clearly on behalf of the pro-China camp:

> Every society has to have its own values to provide a common purpose and a sense of unity. Most of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese, some are not. For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the eastern and western cultures. We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese values, including filial piety, love for the family, modesty and integrity and the desire for continuous improvement. We value plurality but discourage open confrontation; we strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority views but also should collective responsibilities. I hope these values will provide the foundation for unity in our society.

On several similar occasions, “Tung repeatedly emphasized the need to be patriotic, display a love for the motherland, traditional Chinese culture, values like filial piety, love for the family, modesty and integrity and the desire for continuous improvement and collective responsibilities, and avoid sensitive topics” (Leung & Ng, 2004, p.54). In
2007, Hu Jintao came to Hong Kong for the 10th Anniversary of the Hong Kong’s return to China. He made clear that he and senior officials of the PRC were concerned about the loyalty of Hong Kong citizens to Mainland China, and he suggested that young people in Hong Kong learn more about “national education” so they could identify with their Chinese citizenship (Hu, 2007).

In order to directly achieve the pro-China camp’s requirement for being a ‘good citizen’, a set of education reforms was implemented to strengthen Hong Kong’s national and moral education in school. The reforms initiated in 1991 do not talk about national education although “national identity was identified as a priority but pursued in what might be called ‘soft’ manner” (Kennedy & Kuang, 2014, p.107). In 2000, the Education Commission issued *Learning for Life—Learning through Life* subtitled, *Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong* and captioned it as an *Education Blueprint for the 21st Century*. This education reform proposal was “to acknowledge the importance of moral education” (Education Commission, 2000, p.5), and confirmed national identity for Mainland China as a particular aspiration for students (Education Commission, 2000, p.46):

Have a deeper understanding of the history, culture, natural and human environment of China, strengthen their national identity, and will develop a social and humanistic perspective for making sound judgments about issues concerning the local community, the nation and the world.

By 2001, a curriculum reform document *The Way Forward in Curriculum Development: Learning to Learn* was issued by Curriculum Development Council, in which five essential learning experiences were defined. The first of these was elaborated under the heading of “moral and civic education”: developing (a) personal character and interpersonal skills, (b) respect for others, (c) perseverance, and (d) national identity (CDC 2001, p.20). This integrated Moral and Civic education “covering various issues related to value development such as sex education, environmental protection, media education, religious education, ethics and healthy living” (CDC, 2001, p.8), and it has brought together fragmented areas of the school curriculum within a common framework
and around five common values (Kennedy, 2005): National identity, a positive spirit, perseverance, respect for others and commitment to society and nation. In 2008, “care and concern” and “integrity” were added to the list of paramount values (Education Department, 2008). As Kennedy (2005, p.133) indicated “this particular curriculum approach attempts to create coherence yet in the process it redefines civic education to consist of two broad dimensions: the personal and the national”, and the national dimension in civic education focuses on the individual’s identity for Mainland China, the personal dimension focuses on the moral characteristics of the individual”. Since then, moral and national education has become a focus for civic education in Hong Kong. But Kennedy & Kuang (2014, p. 108-109) noted that “the official policy was to move carefully on the issue of promoting national identity, ensuring that it had a role in the curriculum but avoiding any mandatory requirements”. This all changed in October 2010 when the then Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, announced the government’ intention to introduce a new school subject, Moral and National Education”.

In May 2011 the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong SAR commenced a consultation on the Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide. After one year of public consultation, in April 2012 a revised Guide was published representing the Hong Kong SAR government’s intention to implement a compulsory and independent subject, Moral and National Education, to replace the previous cross-curriculum Moral and Civic Education (CDC, 2012). This document noted that “since the return of sovereignty, promoting national education and enhancing students’ understanding of their country and national identity have become a common goal of primary and secondary schools” (CDC, 2012, p.i). The new subject that had survived the consultations faced stronger opposition from the Hong Kong community. But as Kennedy and Kuang (2014, 109) argued “the trigger for the community disaffection was not so much the Curriculum Guide itself, which did represent some accommodation between the original proposal and the feedback from consultation. It was a set of resource material popularly known as the ‘China Model’, produced by the National Education Services Centre that caused the
major problem”. In the teaching material, the Chinese Communist Party was described as “progressive, altruistic and united” and multi-party systems were described as “malignant”. This was not only criticized by Hong Kong’s scholars as “authoritative and biased nature of the form of national education” (Leung, 2014, p.6), and “indoctrination of communist ideology”, and it lead to a series of social movements including mass gathering, street demonstrations, petitions and hunger strikes to against the introduction of Moral and National Education (Lin, 2013). As a result, the government “relented and ‘shelved’ the Guide…and thus abandoning the September 2012 implementation” (Kennedy & Kuang, 2014, p.110).

Both the pro-democracy and pro-China camps have sought to use civic education for their own purposes. Even in the colonial period Chris Patten was preparing for the introduction of democratic civic education changing its direction from earlier colonial times. After the handover, the Hong Kong SRA government and pro-China forces actively reformed the colonial education system to strength moral and national identity education. As a result of this contest between pro-democracy and pro-China camps there are currently no standard civics curriculum Guidelines in Hong Kong schools that are left to develop their school-based civics curriculum (Chong, Yuen & Leung, 2015). Although the 1985 and 1996 Guidelines were issued before the handover of sovereignty, its core ideas and contents are still widely accepted and used by the most schools in Hong Kong. The 2001 reforms continue to be implemented in schools. The Guide 2012 was suspended following the protest although the Hong Kong SAR government has not changed its intention to implement it. The Civic Education Guidelines from Civil Society represents the private expectations of civic education in Hong Kong. It can be said that civics curriculum in Hong Kong is formed by these five curriculum guidelines, and these five guidelines provide more options for schools to develop their civics curriculum. Therefore, there are different forms and subjects supporting civic education. In Hong Kong’s junior high schools, there are several subjects: Economic and Public Affairs, and Government and Public Affairs, Social Studies and so on (Lai & Byram, 2012; Bradsher,
2012). The next section will provide more details concerning these five Guidelines and their conceptions of being a ‘good citizen’ under Hong Kong’s hybrid regime.

5.4 The ‘Good Citizen’ Reflected in Hong Kong Civics Curriculum

The above analysis has indicated that two different versions of civic education were proposed by the pro-democracy and pro-China camps to develop their conceptions of the required ‘good citizen’. This section further examines the conceptions of a ‘good citizen’ as reflected in the different civic education guidelines.

5.4.1 Social, Communal Identity vs National Identity and Patriotism

The democratic version of civic education put more emphasis on citizen’s social and communal identity and belonging and was more concerned with promoting greater participation in community social communal affairs as well as critical thinking. National identity and patriotism, however, was stressed by the pro-China version of civic education. It argued that a good citizen should understand the nation, its history, culture and political conditions, have a strong sense of belonging and national identity, and be willing to make a contribution to society and nation.

The Guidelines1985 especially focused on citizens’ identifying and belonging to Hong Kong society and community. Even part of teaching objective, indicated that the aims of civic education in secondary school were to nurture student to be a ‘good citizen’ by identifying and belonging to community, and Hong Kong’s society, being able to analyze and participate in social affairs with critical consciousness and understand of the structure and working of the Hong Kong government. Citizens’ social and communal identity and belonging are specifically reflect in concern about the issue in the community, appreciation of the democratic values and principles underpin Hong Kong society, and love and heritage the Hong Kong’ culture (CDC, 1985, p.12). In the suggested framework for the junior secondary civics curriculum the citizen’s sense of belonging and identity to Hong Kong is emphasized in the relationship between the
individual and Hong Kong society. It includes knowing Hong Kong’s basic conditions (its history, geographical setting, people, industrial, commercial, financial, social and cultural development), the structure and working of Hong Kong government, citizens’ rights and responsibilities, appreciating the cultural heritage and core values of Hong Kong, developing a sense of duty to Hong Kong, co-operating with government, respecting law and order, discussing current issues, and actively participating in community service and political affairs (CDC, 1985, p.19). The Guidelines 1985 clearly stipulated that the subject of Economic and Public Affairs and Political and Public Affairs for secondary school should be implemented around a main theme: sense of belonging and identity with Hong Kong. From secondary 1 to 6, students were respectively required to learn about Hong Kong’s natural condition, political and law system, social welfare system, economic and industry situation. Chinese political and economic systems were only mentioned in the last chapter of Political and Public Affairs for senior 3 (CDC, 1985, p.29-30).

The 1996 Guidelines continued to stress the citizen’s identity and belonging to the community and Hong Kong society, but references to national identity were increased. In summary, civic education curriculum in secondary level has two teaching objectives: one is to cultivate in students’ sense of communal and social identity and belonging. Students are expected to understand and have concern for local conditions, the rights and duties of citizens, the functioning of the government, concern for matters related to Hong Kong, appreciation for Hong Kong’s core values, to play a responsible and decision-making role in the Hong Kong society, and to have a open-mindedness and objectivity toward different people, cultures, values, and ways of life. The other is to help student understand the Chinese culture, concern for the nation and the life of is people, and then to identify with China (CDC, 1996, p.8-9). In the suggested framework for civics curriculum in the junior school, at the local community level, students are expected to know Hong Kong’s basic conditions, citizens’ rights and responsibilities, Hong Kong spirit, political system, and issues in relation to a just society. At the national level,
student is expected to know more about Chinese cultural tradition, political system and the current social and political issue (CDC, 1996, p.37).

Compared to social and communal identity and belonging emphasized in the Guidelines 1985, 1996, citizen’s national identity is the greatest concern for the pro-China version of civics curriculum. Although the suggestion to form a ninth key learning area of “National History and Guoqing Jiaoyu (National Identity Education)” was refused by the Curriculum Development Council (CDC, 2001). “Guoqing Jiaoyu” (National Identity Education) in the 2001 Curriculum Guidelines became the core component of moral and civic education, and “Guoqing Jiao (National Identity Education) and moral and civic education involve values such as national identity, responsibility and commitment to improving society and our nation. While a sense of national identity is cultivated through understanding elements of Chinese history and culture (e.g. History, arts, scientific and technological development, achievements of outstanding Chinese), which permeate all Key Learning Areas (CDC, 2001, p.23). The teaching objectives of the Personal, Social and Humanities Education in Secondary 1 to 3 are especially designed to help students “have a deeper understanding of the history, culture, natural and human environments of China, and strengthen their national identity” (CDC, 2001, p.46). It should be noted that while this Curriculum Guideline put more emphasis on citizens’ national identity, it emphasized cultural identity and geographical identity but did not mention political identity.

In the 2012 Curriculum Guide for Moral and National Education, national identity received unprecedented attention. To nurture student’s character and national identity two aims of civic education were proposed. National identity was an obvious priority linked to character and national identity began with and was based on the personal identity (CDC, 2012, p.10). In the sense, the purpose of this Guide was to develop national education to improve student’s national identity and belonging. In part of the curriculum framework, students were required to understand Chinese natural conditions,
to appreciate Chinese history and culture, and to know the Chinese constitution and governmental agency, and then to be a citizen who having with a strong sense of belonging and identity with China, and willing to commit to social and national development (CDC, 2012, p.17).

5.4.2 Morality is the First Principle to Deal with in Relation to Others
When it comes to the relationship between citizens and others, morality is considered as the first principle by both the pro-democratic and pro-China versions of civic education.

Although the democratic version of civic education centered on political education, the relationship between citizens and others is mentioned. In the suggested curriculum framework of the Guidelines 1985, filial piety is promoted for secondary students along with respect the elders, concern for other members in the family, respect for the school head, teachers and non-teaching staff in the school, and respect for people from different walks of life, and maintain a good relationship with neighborhood. The Guidelines 1996 also intended students to have respect and concern for parents and other members in the family, but it also expects students to understand the role, functions, rights and responsibilities of family members, and actively participate in the neighboring community (CDC, 1985, p.19; CDC, 1996, p.27-29)

After 2000, obedience and the morality became the first principles often mentioned for being a good citizen in dealing with the relationship to others. In the 2001 Curriculum Guidelines and 2008 Revised Moral and Civic Education Framework, perseverance, responsibility, respect for other, care for and concern, integrity, national identity, and commitment were confirmed as seven priority values and attitudes developed by moral and civic education (CDC, 2001; Education Department, 2008). In these seven priority values, respect for others, responsibility, care for and concern, and integrity are the basic principles for a good citizen. Respect means a good citizen should have communication skills, to maintain respect for others so as to appreciate and tolerate views and beliefs.
different from their own. Being responsible means a ‘good citizen’ should be equipped with a sense of responsibility with regard to themselves, their families, their society, their national, and human-kind (CDC, 2002, p.3).

This moral perspective was maintained in the 2012 Guide. Ten moral values and attitudes for a ‘good citizen’ were proposed: respect for others, care for and concern others, acceptance, integrity, filial piety, trust, tolerance, altruistic, service, and appreciate (CDC, 2012, p.9). In the family context, the students in the Secondary 1 to 3 were expected to take family responsibility actively, care for and concern elders and those younger, maintain an harmonious relationship with family members, and be positive towards the changes and challenges in the family; in the school context, students were expected to get along very well with friends and classmate, to build a good relation with teachers; and in the social context to communicate actively with the people from different backgrounds, and keep an harmonious relationship with colleagues and others (CDC, 2012, p.16).

5.4.3 The Quality Related to Individual Participation vs Positive and Moral Qualities

The purpose of the democratic version of civic education is to develop young people to be rational, responsible, and participative citizens. The internal qualities to enhance citizens’ participation such as rationality, self-understanding, decision-making, open-mind, and critical and creative thinking are highlighted. For the ‘good citizen’ desired by the pro-China camp, individual qualities such as perseverance, positive, and aggregative mind are emphasized (CDC, 2002; p.2; CDC, 2012, p.19).

In the 1985 Guidelines the individual self is the first level in the suggested civics curriculum framework (the five levels of civics curriculum framework being: the individual, the individual and social groups, the individual and society (Hong Kong), the individual and nation (China), the individual and world). Yet there is very little mention of specific curriculum content. In the suggested curriculum framework for junior
secondary school, students are intended to be rational individuals: First, they should understand themselves, to identify themselves, and identify their strengths and weakness; second, they are expected to have proper self-esteem, honesty towards themselves, a better sense of person worth; finally, the students are expected to have an inquiring mind, and to exercise self-control, determination and moral courage (CDC, 1985, p.26)

The ultimate purpose of civic education in the Guidelines 1996 is to develop a participative citizen, therefore, the qualities required for ‘good citizens’ is to prepare for becoming a participative citizen. This requires citizens to be self-regulated, reflective, open-minded, self-cultivating, creative and rational. For civic attitudes students first need to develop civic and social concern, which is a prime factor for one to become a participative citizen. Moreover, to be a participative citizen, students need to hold such attitudes as being positive, empathetic, able to respect and appreciate different views, and being optimistic in believing that one’s participation could make a certain contribution to improve the society and nation (CDC, 1996, p.13). For civic beliefs, a ‘good citizens’ need to believe an “individual can make a difference, action can make a difference, group effort can make a difference, values can make a difference, and education can make a difference”(CDC, 1996, p.15). Last, a ‘good citizen’ needs to develop certain civic competences such as critical and creative thinking, independent judgment, acquire and use information for being a participative citizen (CDC, 1996, p.18)

In the Guide 2012, perseverance is one of seven positive values and attitudes confirmed as a priority order to be a ‘good citizen’. Perseverance is considered a strength of Hong Kong People and is an important quality that they should embrace to help them face life-changes and cope with adversities. An associated value is resilience, the ability to recover from difficulties and downturns (CDC, 2002, p.2). The Guide further proposed eleven positive values and attitudes at the individual level such as perseverance, self-discipline, optimism, enterprise, active, open-minded, rationality, honesty, observing the law and regulations and participation. In the secondary school level, students are expected to have
an active life attitude to face difficulties and challenges and to make the right choice when facing values conflict.

Through above analysis, it can be found that the democratic version put more emphasis on social and communal identity, but national identity was considered as the priority quality for being a ‘good citizen’ by the pro-China version. Participation is emphasized by democratic civics curriculum, but positive and moral qualities are often mentioned by the pro-China civics curriculum. Morality is considered as the basic principle for a ‘good citizen’ to deal with the relation with others by both of democratic and pro-China civics curriculum. It is also found that some pro-China’s concept of ‘good citizen’ appeared in the democratic version of civic education, while some democratic conceptions of the ‘good citizen’ existed in pro-China’s moral and national education. These intersections and crossovers are a direct reflection for the debate and compromise between pro-democracy and pro-China force in Hong Kong.

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 have shown that as a hybrid regime, Hong Kong has been characterized by the continual debate between the pro-democracy and pro-China camp each requiring different kinds of ‘good citizens’ to support their political claims. Hence each camp has proposed a version of civic education to develop their required ‘good citizen’. The pro-democracy version of civic education is characterized by “politicization” and democratization (Leung & Ng, 2004). The democratic aim of civic education is to develop a critical, rational, and participatory citizen to support and promote Hong Kong’s democratization. On the other hand, the pro-China camp depoliticizes and highlights moral values in civic education. The purpose is to enhance young people’s morality and their sense of belonging to and identity with China. The next section will analyze students’ experiences of being a ‘good citizen’ to assess whether these two different versions of civic education are reflected in students’ own perceptions.
5.5 Hong Kong Students’ Perceptions of a ‘Good Citizen’

The above sections have indicated that there exist two different views about ‘good citizens’, and two different versions of civic education under Hong Kong’s hybrid regime. The democratic version of civic education expects students to be a critical, rational, and participatory citizen, but the pro-China version attempts to develop students’ morality and sense of belonging and identity to Mainland China. This section reports the results from student interviews.

5.5.1 The Meaning of “Citizen”?  
Most Hong Kong students had a clear definition of “citizen”. They believed that “citizen” refers to a person who has one national identity and reached the legal age for being entitled to vote.

In the interview, most students said they often heard the term of “citizen”, especially that “citizens vote”. So they felt a citizen is someone who has the right to participate in voting and elections. This kind of person must have a Hong Kong identity card, should have reached a certain age, and have knowledge and social status. One student H1(c) in the Hong Kong’s first focus group said that:

In Hong Kong, we can often hear the term ‘citizen’, but it is rarely referred to in Mainland China. ...I always heard about citizen, election and voting. So, I think a citizen should be eighteen years old, and be a Hong Konger.

Student H1 (d) added that:

I feel a citizen is educated, they can participate in voting, and elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong....They were born in Hong Kong, or have Hong Kong identity card...

Because they had a clear definition of “citizen”, Hong Kong students agreed on the difference between the “citizen”, “nationals” and “people”. They considered that the “people” are all persons in the world, “nationals” are members of the country and
“citizens’ are those members of the country, reaching a certain age, and have the right to participate in voting. Take student H1 (b) for example, she said that:

As we know, nationals are the person belonging to different country, such as American nationals, Chinese nationals. The person is all the persons in the world. And citizen is person who has reached eighteen years old.”

Some students indicated that “nationals” are always linked with Mainland China but “citizen” is close linking with the Hong Kong Special Administration Region. Student H2 (c) proposed that :

As a Hong Kong citizen, we do not need to obey some Chinese polices. But as a Chinese national, we must follow Chinese policy.

5.5.2 What Does It Mean to Be a ‘Good Citizen’?

As Kennedy (2010) and Leung & Yuen (2011) indicated, Hong Kong young people have an inclusive and multidimensional understanding of “good citizen”. This study has shown the similar results. Hong Kong students’ perceptions of a ‘good citizen’ showed characteristics of both the pro-democracy and pro-China camps. On the one hand, they considered that ‘good citizens’ should obey the laws, vote and make rational suggestions for the government. This suggests they tend to have social and communal identities, rather a national identity along supported by patriotism. On the other hand, they proposed the importance of social and family moral responsibilities such as donations, helping others, and respecting and caring for family members and friends.

Obeying laws, voting and rationally proposed suggestions for government

The IEA Civic Education Study found that obeying the laws(89.6%) and voting in election (81.4%) were considered by Hong Kong students as the most important traits of a ‘good citizen’ (Lee, Grossman, Kennedy & Fairbrother, 2004, p.73). This qualitative study has a similar finding. When asked what ‘good citizen’ means, obeying the laws (10 students) and voting (7 students) were mentioned first by Hong Kong students. But
differing from IEA finding, three students mentioned rational political participation as the first quality for being a good citizen.

In the current study, a majority of Hong Kong students considered a ‘good citizen’ should obey the law. The reason given was that obeying law can maintain social peace and harmony and protect citizens from being hurt. Student H1 (b) said that:

As a ‘good citizen’, you should obey laws firstly. That is because by obeying laws, we cannot hurt others, as well, others cannot rob our things and hurt us, all of us can live together peacefully. If we do not obey law, the order of society and government will be broken…..”

Secondly, voting was frequently mentioned by Hong Kong students, especially in the second focus group. They believed that voting can help citizens to express their opinions about Hong Kong’s political and social issues, to elect worthwhile people to govern Hong Kong, and to prevent political corruption, which will promote Hong Kong’s political and social development. Student H2 (a) said that:

I think voting is very important. It can prevent some leaders from shielding their relatives... voting is an important opportunity for us to express our ideas that is help social and political development. And it can help us to elect some competent people to govern the Hong Kong...

Thirdly, some students also mentioned that a ‘good citizen’ should participate rationally in political affairs. Yet their political participation was of a limited kind, such as actively providing suggestions for government, rather than violent protest and demonstrations. As Lee (2003) indicated, Hong Kong students have a good understanding of politics, but they also “tend to avoid political activity”. In Hong Kong students’ eyes, making suggestions for government is the best way for political participation. Student H1(c) for example, said that:

Besides voting, I think we should provide some suggestions for government, to tell
them our opinion about the policy. …when we experience unfair matters or bad things; we should propose it immediately, no matter what response government has. …Of course, we need to wait for a week or a month, and then if they have no answer for our suggestions, we need to think of protest.”

Hong Kong students considered that it was very important to make suggestions for government, but they also mentioned that a ‘good citizen’ should propose suggestions in a rational and non-violent way, and protest and demonstration is the last and worst way. Student H2 (e) proposed that:

*I feel participation is very important, but do not participate in some bad activities, such as some violent and extreme demonstration. We should think deeply, and then negotiate with the government and deal with the problem, which is good for Hong Kong society.*

When asked their opinion of the latest protest and demonstration in Hong Kong, most students expressed that they would not like to participate in violent demonstrations. Student H2 (f), for example, said that:

*I think it is not good. They destroy some facilities and construction, and hurt themselves. You can live without eating for a few days, but if you are not eating for a long time, that is not good for your health, and maybe you cannot get the good result you expected. I feel we should use a peaceful way to negotiate with government to encourage government accept our suggestion. The violent or extreme approach will enhance the conflict.*

**Positively and actively taking social and family moral responsibilities**

Morality is considered by Hong Kong students as the second important quality for being a ‘good citizen’. They argued that as a Hong Kong ‘good citizen’, they should positively and actively take up social and family moral responsibilities.
Firstly, a ‘good citizen’ should positively help others in the society, such as making a donation, social service, volunteer, or do some little things that are well within their grasp. In the second focus group, almost all of students mentioned that a ‘good citizen’ needs to actively help others. Student H2 (c) said that:

*The gap between rich and poor is very high in Hong Kong, some is very rich, and others are very poor. So, I think the rich should help the poor, and making contribution to society.*

Student H2 (e) added that:

*I think there is no relationship between money and morality. The rich should help others, and the poor also should help others. I feel helping others is responsibility for all of us.*

Besides donation and doing social service, Hong Kong students believed that ‘good citizens’ can help others do some little things within their grasp, such as help the old, look after children, or help others to open or close the door. Student H2 (e), for example, argued that:

*We should help them when they are in trouble, which is very common. Such as when I see someone’s hands are full, and he needs to open a door or press the button for the elevator, I would immediately help him to do it. I think it is easy for us, but is very helpful for others.*

Secondly, a ‘good citizen’ should practice filial piety, respect brothers and sisters, and care for the youngest in the family. Hong Kong students believed that a ‘good citizen’ should show filial piety towards parents, obey parents’ guidance, not stand against parents, respect the old brothers and care about the younger. These reflect a common characteristic of Chinese society: putting an emphasis on family morality and ethical behavior.

Third, a ‘good citizen’ should respect others and treat friends honestly and fairly. Hong
Kong students argued for respect, honesty and fairness as important principles for dealing with the relationship with others. Student H2 (c) said that:

We need to respect for each other, and treat our friends in an honest and fair way. If you honest and fairly treat others, others will treat you like that, and we will have a peaceful and beautiful world.

**Hong Kong social identity vs Chinese national identity and patriotism**

National identity and patriotism received an unprecedented focus from Hong Kong authorities and were reflected in moral and civic education after the handover. Yet the interviews showed that Hong Kong students’ perceptions were not as authorities might have expected. Students seemed to lack understanding and love of Mainland China and tended more to identify with Hong Kong society while appreciating their Hong Kong “citizenship”.

Hong Kong students viewed the relationship between Mainland China and Hong Kong as one of interdependence. They recognized that Hong Kong cannot live very well without the Mainland. At the same time, because they often heard bad news about the Mainland and also had very little experience of it they showed a lack of national identity and patriotism. Students believed patriotism was dispensable for being a ‘good citizen’ in Hong Kong. Student H1 (b) said that:

Loving the country is about the raising of the national flag and singing the national anthem. I think it is just a ceremony, and every school does not need to do it….I do not have enough knowledge about the Mainland and I am always hearing some bad news about the Mainland from television. And my father told me it is very dangerous on the Mainland, because he went back Mainland and was robbed by someone in the street. So, I do not love and do not like country. I have no feeling about country.

Besides there is too much bad news about Mainland China, Hong Kong students also mentioned that they did not receive enough knowledge about the Mainland in school, and the curriculum did not refer to patriotism. Student H1 (a) argued that:
Actually there is no significant relation between us and the country. Only when someone asks you ‘where are you from?’ I will think about ‘China’. China or Chinese is just a name for me...in our school, patriotism is a sensitive topic. Our teachers do not like to talk about it, and we just got some knowledge about China before the late Qing Dynasty from our General Studies and History subjects.

Compared to their lack of national identity and patriotism, Hong Kong students tended to identify with Hong Kong society and their Hong Kong “citizenship”. When asked that “are you Hong Konger, Chinese, or Chinese Hong Konger?” all students answered that they are “Hong Konger”, because they are more familiar with Hong Kong, and feel Hong Kong is safer and freer than the Mainland. Student H2 (c) proposed that:

I am very proud to be a Hong Konger because we have freedom of speech, and have freedom to decide what we want to believe and what we do like to believe. We can freely decide to love or not love country...Hong Kongers are more polite, clean, obeying the laws and regulation. Now many Chinese people came to Hong Kong, I found that they often throw garbage everywhere, our Hong Konger does not do it.

5.5.3 Where Do Hong Kong Students Get Their Conception of The ‘Good Citizen’?

The above two sections analyzed Hong Kong students’ perceptions of citizens and ‘good citizens’. This section will identify the sources of these conceptions and directly examine the influence of civic education curriculum on students.

During the interview, Hong Kong students indicated that their conception of citizens, and ‘good citizens’ came from three main sources. First was the media such as website, television and newspapers. Student H1(c) for example, said that:

I often saw or heard the term of citizen, or ‘good citizen’ in the website, especially some political and social issue website....in Hong Kong, you can often hear about citizens’ voting from the television. Because Hong Kong TV program always reported some news about the Chief Executive Election, and mentioned citizen
The second source is their parents. Hong Kong students argued that they learned some ideas about citizens and ‘good citizens’ from their parents. Student H2 (d) indicated that:

My parents often discussed some political and social issue in the family. In their talking, sometimes, I can hear the term of citizen. And I often joined their discussion and told them my opinion, although I think they are right.

Last, civic education curriculum had little influence on them. The two schools in which the interviews were conducted used general and social education to implement civic education. But students said that they received very little knowledge about citizens from the school curriculum. Rather, civic education seemed to be concerned with the political, economic, and geographic conditions in Hong Kong.

5.6 Conclusion
This chapter first explored the formation of Hong Kong’s hybrid regime and found that the debate and compromise between pro-democracy and pro-China forces before and after the handover led to Hong Kong’s becoming a unique hybrid regime. During the debate, pro-democracy and pro-China forces respectively proposed two different versions of civic education to develop future citizens who would support their political claims. As the result, although civic education had little influence on students’ perceptions, Hong Kong students still formed a mixed conception of the ‘good citizen’. On the one hand, they considered that ‘good citizens’ should obey laws, participate in voting and make rational suggestions for the government. They tended to reveal a Hong Kong social identity rather a national identity based on patriotism. On the other hand, they proposed ‘good citizens’ should positively take on social and family moral responsibilities, such as making donations, helping others, and respecting and caring about family members and friends. The following chapter will focus on the ‘good citizen’ in democratic Taiwan from the perspectives of policy, curriculum and students.
CHAPTER 6

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE ‘GOOD CITIZEN’
AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN DEMOCRATIC TAIWAN

6.1 Introduction
Taiwan has been gradually democratized since the 1980s. Differing from other democratic countries, Taiwan’s democratization not only involved a regime transition from authoritarian to democratic but a continuing debate about its sovereignty as an independent nation. Both Taiwan’s regime transition and independence required a dual concept of citizen: no longer exclusive focus on a “pride in being Chinese”, or “new Taiwanese” (Chun, 2004; Hung, 2014).

This chapter is divided in to six sections. Section 6.2 explores the formation of a democratic regime in Taiwan and its characteristics. Section 6.3 identifies the ‘good citizen’ required by Taiwan’s democratic regime. Section 6.4 examines how the idea of Taiwan’s ‘good citizen’ is reflected in civic education curriculum in order to identify the extent to which the requirement of democracy and its characteristics are reflected in civic education. Lastly, Section 6.5 explores students’ perceptions of becoming a ‘good citizen’ in Taiwan in order to understand the lived experience of citizenship.

6.2 The Development of Democracy in Taiwan
In the past three decades Taiwan has been changed steadily and peacefully from a one-party authoritarian regime to a multiple-party competitive democracy (Law, 2002). Differing from other democratic countries, the course of democratization in Taiwan has been always entangled with the state sovereignty issue, namely, the debate about “unification and independence” (Tien & Chu, 1996; Chu & Lin, 2001; Wong, 2001). In
the authoritarian period, the “One China Principle” and “recovery of the Mainland” were fundamental goals. After 1987, “One China Principle” was gradually discarded, instead, and an independent political entity was constructed. Under this entity Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-hui conducted a set of democratic reforms initially to form a Western-style multiple-party democracy in Taiwan (Copper, 2003). This was followed by a democratic consolidation with multiple-party competition working around a consensus of an independent Taiwanese state.

6.2.1 Authoritarian Regime Period (1949-1987)
In 1949, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan. The KMT leader, Chiang Kai-shek insisted on the “One China Principle” (Republic of China (ROC) as the sole legitimate regime of all China, and Taiwan as a province of China) with the “recovery of Mainland” as fundamental goal (Lee, 2005; Chang & Chu, 2008). Using this as an excuse, the KMT published a set of bans and proclaimed martial law to continue its one-party authoritarian ruling in Taiwan (Liu, 1999; Fell, 2005, p.7; Liu, 2006).

This authoritarian regime was monopolized by minority Mainland elites and chartered by “Three Noes”–no obey the constitution, no separation of power, and no adapt public opinion (Chu & Lin, 2001; Copper, 2003; Chu, 2004; Fell, 2005). Firstly, martial law exceeded the constitution. Martial law gave the President additional powers, including the establishment of the National Security Council, a major decision-making organ not accountable to an elected body. And civil liberties and human rights, including speech, press, assembly, and association were limited. Secondly, the party controlled all of society. Prior to the 1980s, the KMT party-state enjoyed tremendous administrative and coercive power in Taiwan and was thus able to defuse any attempts at the formation of a viable opposition. That is because the KMT created a network of party cells throughout the government, military and society (Dickson, 1998). Thirdly, a centralized governmental system before 1949 continued to be applied in Taiwan, while a controlled
electoral pluralism was implemented at the local level. The centralized government in the authoritarian period included six-power branches--National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, Executive Yuan, Legislative and Judicial Yuan, Control Yuan and Examination Yuan. The members of these six power branches were not directly elected and mainly dominated by the Mainland elite and KMT. While starting in 1950, gradual steps were taken to implement local self-rule at the provincial and lower levels. In 1954 for the first time the provincial assemblymen were directly elected (Chou & Nathan, 1987; Leng & Lin, 1993; Chu & Lin, 2001).

6.2.2 Democratic Transition Period (1987-2000)

During the 1980s, Taiwan’s status as the Republic of China and the KMT’s one-party authoritarian rule encountered crisis as the PRC became broadly accepted by the international community. In this geopolitical context it became clear that “Against Communism and Recovery of Mainland China” an unattainable national goal (Winckler, 1984). At the same time the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the first oppositional party on December 1986 (Tien & Chu, 1996; Chou & Nathan, 1987). The formation of DPP did not by itself make Taiwan a pluralist democracy, but it did challenged KMT’s one-party monopoly (Chou & Nathan, 1987).

Against this background, President Chiang Ching-Kuo decided to launch a process of democratization within the KMT and government to maintain the legitimacy of KMT. He lifted the martial law in 1987 to allow a free press to flourish, permitted opposition political parties to compete in elections, and expanded elections to replace an older generation of leaders who had been elected in Mainland China in 1947 (Chou & Nathan, 1987; Leng & Lin, 1993; Chao & Myers, 1994; Chu & Lin, 2001). While Chiang Ching-kuo launched a process of “Taiwanization” within the KMT to promote younger Taiwanese politicians. Unlike the authoritarian period, these Taiwanese politicians did not come from the KMT’s Central Standing Committee. This signaled the end of Mainlander domination of the KMT and the “One China Principle” gradually become a
future vision with an expectation of peaceful resolution for Taiwan’s sovereignty issue (Lee, 2005; Fell, 2005, p.12).

In the 1990s, with Taiwan’s status of independent political entity gradually confirmed, democratization in Taiwan was accelerated by the first Taiwanese president: Lee Teng-Hui (Lin, 2002; Lee 2005). Rustow (1999) indicated national unity is single background condition for developing a country to successful democratic transformation. Lee Teng-hui’s regime proposed the formula of “one China, two political entities” to serve as the conceptual basis for Taiwan’s sovereignty, which means that China and Taiwan should coexist as two legal entities in the international arena, and that “one China” was to be understood as the historical, geographical, cultural and familial China (Wachman, 1994; Chu & Lin, 2001; Lin, 2002). Since then, Taiwan has been transformed from a province of China to an independent political entity guaranteeing the continuation of democratic reform. The first full elections for the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan were held in 1991 and 1992 respectively. In 1992 the Legislative Yuan election brought about a new parliament wholly elected for the first time by the people of Taiwan. It was also the first time the KMT surrendered its governing position to a democratic contest since the installation of its one-party authoritarian rule on the island immediately after the war (Tien & Chu, 1996). By 1996, the first popular and direct presidential election was held, a concussive end to the process of regime transition from the authoritarianism to democracy in Taiwan (Chu & Diamond, 1999).

6.2.3 Democratic Consolidation Period (2000 to present)
As Cooper (2003) argued a transformation of political power to an opposition party marks the consolidation of a country’s democracy. In Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian won the presidency and the DPP) became the ‘ruling party’ in 2000, bringing to an end to the KMT’s 55 years of rule and signifying the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy (Cooper, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2008; Copper, 2009).
As the successor of Lee Teng-hui, Chen continued to focus on localization and the independence of Taiwan, but made little effort to promote democracy (Copper, 2009). In his inauguration in 2000, Chen promised that he would not declare independence during his presidency (Sheng, 2001; Fell, 2005, p.109). However, after two years, he announced that Taiwan and Mainland are “the two countries on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”. He attempted to change the name of Taiwan “Republic of China” to “Republic of China on Taiwan”, put the “two states theory” into the constitution, hold a referendum on unification and independence, and abolish the National Unification Council and Guidelines. Chen Shui-bian emphasized that the purpose of these policies was to further promote democratization in Taiwan, but most scholars argued that Taiwan witnessed stagnation or backsliding of democracy during the Chen era (Copper, 2009; Zhou & Xie, 2011). By the 2008, the DPP suffered huge losses in both a legislative election and a presidential election. As a result, the KMT gained a two-thirds majority in the lawmaking branch of government and Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT won the presidential election, which marked multiple-party democracy in Taiwan was completely consolidated (Zhou & Xie, 2011; Fell, 2011).

Under Chen and Ma’s rule, multiple-party competition worked with a consensus that a Taiwanese state already exists. Yet the multi-party system in Taiwan is different from that in the many Western country. Taiwan’s political parties, KMT, DDP, New Party (NP), Taiwan’ People First Party (PFP), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), formed two broad coalitions: the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green coalitions (Lin, 2002; Dittmer, 2004). The Pan-Green coalition, comprises DPP and TSU, prefers an independent and sovereign Taiwan, and eventually a republic of Taiwan. KMT, PFP, and NP constituted the Pan-Blue coalition to insist on the “1992 consensus”: “One China”, with each side of the Taiwan Straits making its own interpretation. An extension of the 1992 consensus is a possibility of accepting of “one China, two systems” with a possible reunification of Taiwan and China in the future (Lee, 2005). At the surface level, the confrontation between the “Blue” and “Green” camps suggests the existence of competing and irreconcilable views.
about the Taiwan’s state sovereignty. Yet there has been gradually developing an overarching consensus between all political parties that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state (Lin, 2002; Wang, 2007). None of the parties advocated strongly the “One China Principle”, and they also refused to accept China’s “one country, two systems” formula for reunification (Sheng, 2001), and this view is gradually accepted by most of people in Taiwan (Lin & Yu, 2010). Under the consensus, the “green camp” and “blue camp” positively participate in local and central elections to promote the working of democracy in Taiwan.

In summary, Chiang Ching-Kuo started democratic reform in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui finished the democratic transition of Taiwan as an independent political entity. Chen Shui-bian emphasized more independence and democracy in Taiwan, while the Ma Ying-jou’s rule has been in the context of Taiwan’s democracy under a de-facto state sovereignty (Zhou & Xie, 2011). Now Taiwan is a democracy in which citizens elect the heads of government, from president to local chiefs, along with members of the legislative Yuan and councils at other levels. According to the democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2008, 2010, 2011, Taiwan’s average score for five categories (electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; and political culture; civil liberties) is always above 6 (2008:7.82; 2010:5.52; and 2011:7.45), which means Taiwan as a democracy (score of 6-10), ranked between 32th to 37th among 167 independent countries and societies (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, 2010, 2011)

6.3 The ‘Good Citizen’ Required by Democratic Taiwan

Section 6.2 showed that the course of democratization in Taiwan can be divided into three periods and has always been entangled with the state sovereignty issue. This section further explores the concept of ‘good citizen’ under Taiwan’s different regimes and found that the ‘good citizen’ required by both the authoritarian and different democratic regimes changed in relation to the progress of democratization and attitudes to the state
sovereignty issue. In the KMT’s authoritarian period, KMT tried to transform Taiwan into a Chinese society and cultivate all people in Taiwan to be Chinese to legitimize its authoritarian regime dominated by a minority Mainland elite (Chun, 1994; Fell, 2011). As shown above, the development of democracy and the development of the idea of an independent state, “pride in being Chinese” was challenged by the previously suppressed, but increasingly accepted “new Taiwanese” (Chu, 2004; Lee, 2005). Currently, under multi-party competition, the exclusive concept of citizenship, “Chinese” or “Taiwanese” has gradually replaced by a new dual concept of citizenship: Taiwanese with Chinese cultural identity.

6.3.1 “Pride of being Chinese” in the Authoritarian Period

After 1949 the KMT built an authoritarian regime in Taiwan dominated by a minority Mainland’ elite who confirmed the “recovery of the Mainland” as a fundamental national goal. The KMT brought two million Mainlander refugees into Taiwan between 1948 and 1950, making up approximately 15 percent of the Taiwan’s population. At that time, however, 85 percent of population in Taiwan was Taiwanese who had lived through Japanese rule (Lin, 2002, p.199; Fell, 2004, p. 9). The KMT regime was an authoritarian and “alien” regime for these Taiwanese. Yet the KMT and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, tried to transform Taiwan into a Chinese society and cultivate all people in Taiwan to have “pride in being Chinese” to legitimize and maintain the KMT’s authoritarian rule (Hung, 2014)

On the one hand, the KMT attempted to enhance people’s Chinese cultural identity and strengthen their determination to return to the Mainland through a large-scale “Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement” and Mandarin language policy (Hung, 2014; Fell, 2011; Chun, 1994). The Culture Renaissance movement firstly included a range of programs to promote traditional Chinese cultural expressions, such as traditional painting, Peking Opera (national opera), classic Chinese literature and Confucian philosophy. While local cultural practices such as Taiwanese opera, folk arts and local religions, did not receive
state funding and were viewed as being of lower status. Within the school, the Cultural Renaissance was an important part of curriculum and extra-curriculum programs. At the high school level, Introduction to Chinese Culture, Military Education, and Thought became a part of curriculum. Students were surrounded by ROC nationalist symbols, such as statues and portraits of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, and the national ROC maps on the classroom wall showed Taiwan as just one tiny province within the vast country of China (Fell, 2011). Outside the classroom, essay and oratory contests on topics pertaining to Chinese culture were regularly held as well as study sessions to discuss current speeches and writing (Chun, 1994, p.55). Along with the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, from 1950, Mandarin became the sole language in the education sector and within official settings. The 1976 Broadcasting and Television Law was to limit non-Mandarin broadcasting (Chou & Nathan, 1987; Chun, 1994; Wong, 2001).

In addition, the KMT emphasized Chinese Confucian values. As Chun (1994) argued, the KMT opted to view national unity as an extension of primary family ties, and Confucian filial piety was the strongest tool to strengthen family ties. Therefore, Confucianism was introduced into school curriculum. At the primary-school level, the classic text Ershisi Xiao (Twenty-Four Stories of Filial Piety) emphasized social etiquette and personal health. At a higher education level, the study of Confucian ethics was taught using selected classical works. And the highest moral standard of “Ren” [人] and the Confucian vision of life were taught in schools to be followed by students with limited room for questions or criticism (Chun, 1994; Fell, 2011).

6.3.2 “New Taiwanese” in the Democratic Transitional Period
From 1987 to 2008, with the progress of democratization and the development of an independent state “pride in being Chinese” advocated by KMT’s authoritarian regime was challenged by the previously suppressed, but now increasingly accepted “new Taiwanese”.
In the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the emphasis on the “pride in being Chinese” began to decline, and Taiwanese consciousness and identity were unleashed by the democratic opening (Chun, 2004). Realizing the difficulty and impossibility of “recovery of Mainland”, Chiang Ching-kuo launched the processes of democratization and “Taiwanization” to maintain the legitimacy of KMT, which led to the number of Taiwanese politicians rising in the KMT Central Standing Committee and government. A committee for Cultural Reconstruction was established in 1981, its work was meant to coordinate with the Cultural Renaissance movement and focused predominantly on the “fine arts”, such as music, art, theatre, expressive culture and heritage conservation. But differing from the Cultural Renaissance, it was responsible not only to cultivate a broader view of Chinese cultural tradition, but also to promote interest in and preservation of Taiwanese local cultural tradition (Chun, 1994; Lee, 2005).

Lee Teng-hui, the first Taiwanese president, pushed a movement of indigenization of Taiwan to improve people’s Taiwan identity, and directly proposed the concept of “New Taiwanese” (Chu & Diamond, 1999; Fell, 2005). That is because, with the transition to democracy, Taiwan’s status as an independent entity was gradually confirmed. In the Lee’s view, people in Taiwan were no longer Chinese, but were “New Taiwanese” in an independent entity. “New Taiwanese” was defined by Lee as “no matter if you came 400 or 500 years ago, or 40 or 50 years ago from the Mainland, or if an aboriginal, we are all Taiwanese, so long as we all work hard for Taiwan and the ROC, then we are New Taiwanese” (Fell, 2005, p.116). All “New Taiwanese” should love Taiwan, be willing to struggle for Taiwan, identify with Taiwan’s history, economic and political achievements, and its liberal constitutional state (Chun & Diamond, 1999; Lin, 2002).

In order to promote the “New Taiwanese” concept, the party- and state-owned mass media was overhauled, native literature and performing arts were emphatically promoted and subsidized, and a series of educational reforms was implemented to sweep away the KMT’s China-central curriculum and replace it with a Taiwan-focused curriculum.
(Lynch, 2004). In particular, there was the introduction of a set of junior high school texts known as *Understanding Taiwan*. There were to be used for geography, society and history courses and were designed to rectify the severe lack of coverage of Taiwan in the school curriculum (Chun, 2004; Fell, 2011). These approaches had the intended result: the percent of people seeing themselves as only Taiwanese has risen steadily, from 27.1% in 1993 to 38% in 2002. While only 7.9% people considered themselves as Chinese, but in 1993 nearly 33.4% people viewed themselves only Chinese (Lin, 2002; Chu, 2004).

6.3.3 A Dual Concept of Citizen in the Democratic Consolidation Period

After 2000, under multi-party competition, the exclusive concept of “Chinese” or “Taiwanese” was gradually replaced with a new dual concept of citizen: Taiwanese with Chinese cultural identity.

The Pan-Green coalition, with the DPP Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian as the core, further continued Lee Teng-hui’s process of indigenization and pushed the idea of the “new Taiwanese” to an extreme. They preferred de-facto independent state sovereignty, and “would not reject their Chinese cultural heritage and roots, and their insistence on a specific Taiwanese national identity based mainly on the island’s long separation from Mainland China and the gradual formation of a new historic-political community” (Lin, 2002, p.211). In line with Lee’s advocacy of “new Taiwanese” to cajole those who believed that “Taiwan is ours, and we should love Taiwan wholeheartedly devote ourselves to its cause”, Chen used “new Taiwanese” as an electioneering strategy to brand his opponents “betrayers of Taiwanese consciousness” or “people possessing the ‘Great China sentiment’, and believed they were not worthy to be the members of the “new Taiwanese” (Lee, 2005). He redefined “new Taiwanese” as those who “love Taiwan” and support Taiwan’s independence, and have an unfriendly attitude toward Mainlander immigrants (Lee, 2005).
In particular, between 2000 and 2008, the Chen Shui-bian regime launched a series of education reforms focused on Taiwanese consciousness, including the promotion of previously suppressed dialects (under the KMT only Mandarin had been allowed in schools) and the indigenous history of Taiwan (Hung, 2014). As the result, according to the series survey by Taiwan's National Chengchi University, the percentage of people holding exclusive Taiwanese identify reached 46.1% to 50% in June 2008 from 36.9% in June 2000. On the contrary, in June 2000, 13.1% people considered themselves as Chinese, and the percentage dropped to only 3.4% in June 2008 (Lin, 2008; Chu, 2004). To the contrary, the Pan-Blue Coalition with KMT as the core insisted a possible reunification of Taiwan and China in the future, and advocated the concept of “Chinese”. But this concept of “Chinese” was different from the authoritarian regime’s “Chinese” that identified Chinese culture with a strong determination to return to the Mainland. The more recent emphasis focused on a cultural identity, namely people need only to have a sense of belonging to historical, geographical, cultural and familial China (Lin, 2002; Lee, 2005).

Currently, a centrist view has appeared in the debate about national sovereignty and concepts of citizenship. This view supports continuing these status quo of neither independence nor unification and suggests another dual citizenship identity: both “Chinese” and “Taiwanese”. This view has a broad support from the public and President Ma Yingjou. In the early 1998 Taipei mayoral election, Ma Ying-jou as the representative of the KMT said that “I was brought up in Taiwan and raised on the nourishing food of Taiwan. I love Taiwan, I am a new Taiwanese” (Jacobs & Ben, 2007). In his Presidential inaugural address in 2008 president he suggested that “to sustain the status quo of neither independence, unification, or force for the Taiwan Strait relationship under the framework of the constitution of Republic of China” (Zhou & Xie, 2011). While a survey carried by the Election Study Central (National Chengchi University) in December 2005 indicated that 42 percent of the total population in Taiwan regarded themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese, and around 38 percent of the people in
Taiwan preferred to maintain the status quo and decide the independent and unification issue later (Yu & Kwan, 2008). It is obvious that either dual concept of citizenship is not simple: either “Chinese” and Taiwanese or Taiwanese with Chinese cultural identity. Citizens should love Taiwan, identify with Taiwan’s sovereignty, history, economic achievement, politics and law system, be willing to struggle for Taiwan, and active participate to support the working of Taiwan’ democracy, but on the aspect of cultural identity, they should identity with Chinese culture and traditional Confucian values.

The above analysis indicated that the ‘good citizen’ required by Taiwan’s democracy has changed with democratization and the development of an independent state in Taiwan. In the authoritarian regime era (1949-1980s), all people in Taiwan were expected to have “pride in being Chinese”. With the democratic transition and consolidation in Taiwan, the “pride of being Chinese” was challenged and “new Taiwanese” was gradually accepted and advocated by Taiwan authorities. Currently, the dual concept of citizenship seems to represent the mainstream in the Taiwan. The next section will further examine which and concepts of ‘good citizen’ are presented in the Taiwanese current civic education curriculum.

### 6.4 The ‘Good Citizen’ as Reflected in Taiwanese Civics Curriculum

In the above section, it was shown that the concept of ‘good citizen’ changed with the transition of regime type. The authoritarian regime expected people in Taiwan to have “pride in being Chinese”. In the democratic transitional period, “new Taiwanese” was to be the focus of the Lee and Chen’s regime. Currently, a dual concept of citizenship is supported by the authorities. This section firstly reviews the development of civic education curriculum for junior high school in Taiwan, and then analyses the characteristics required of ‘good citizens” as reflected in civics curriculum.

#### 6.4.1 A Brief Overview of Civics Curriculum in Taiwan at Junior High School Level

Civics curriculum in Taiwan has directly responded to been influenced by the
development of democracy, for which three main periods also can be distinguished: China-centered civics curriculum in the authoritarian regime period (1949-1980s), Taiwan-centered civics curriculum in the democratic transition (1980s-2000), and the integrated civics curriculum in the democratic consolidation period (2000 to present) (see Table 7).

Table 7:
The Development of Civics Curriculum in Taiwan at Junior High School Level (MOE, 1968, 1983; 1994; 2008)

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>Civics are Morality</td>
<td>Civics and Morality Understanding Taiwan</td>
<td>Social Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes</td>
<td>To develop “Chinese” who were law-abiding,</td>
<td>To develop the “new Taiwanese” who were</td>
<td>To develop a participatory and responsible citizen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patriotic, respected the government’s</td>
<td>identified with Taiwan, believed in</td>
<td>(1) local concern, national identity, and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>authority, and identify with China</td>
<td>democracy and could think critically.</td>
<td>global views; (2) fostering democratic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>tradition and moral values</td>
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<td>minds, rule of law, and responsibility; and (3) enhance the ability of critical thinking, social participation, communication and cooperation</td>
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**China-centered civic education under the authoritarian regime**

Under the KMT’s authoritarian regime, a very rigid and centralized educational system was developed in Taiwan to control education processes and practice. “Civics and Morality” as the civic education related subject for junior high school was seriously controlled and decided by the KMT and central government. Its purpose was to develop “Chinese” who were law-abiding, patriotic, respected the government’s authority, and identifying with China tradition. Its content represents a strong China-centered orientation (Liu, 2000; Lee, 2004; Law, 2004; Doong, 2008).

In 1953, Chiang Kai-shek published *The Supplementary Statements on Education and Recreation for the Principle of Livelihood* in which he defined and analyzed the goals, scope and contents of civic education (Huang & Chiu, 1991). Chiang argued that education was responsible for the KMT government’s being defeated by the Chinese communists. The failure of education on the Mainland was especially related to the fact that young people lacked national spirit and did not truly understand traditional Chinese moral virtues and the Three Principles of the People. From this point of view, he indicated that civic education should focus on cultivating students’ national spirit and moral values, based upon the teaching of Sun Yat-sen and Chinese culture heritage. Chiang Kai-Shek further explained that 1968 (Chen, 1983, p.41):

The purpose of “Civics and Morality” is, first, to develop students as human beings and good students. Second, to cultivate students as good Chinese who love their country and fellows, work cooperatively and responsibly, and appreciate Chinese morality and culture.

Under the direction of Chiang, Curriculum *Standards* for junior high school was issued by Ministry of Education in 1968 and 1983 and provided detailed specifications about the aims, objective, themes and contents of “civics and morality”. The content of “civics and morality” included civic knowledge regarding education, society, politics, economics, law, and culture, along with Code of Daily Life Behavior (TMOE, 1968, 1983). The official and unified textbooks of “Civics and Morality” intended to transmit to students “eight virtues of traditional Confucianism”: filial piety, patriotism, academic
achievement, aesthetic appreciation of nature, and a sense of propriety in international relations (Lee, 2004).

**Taiwan-centered civic curriculum in the democratic transition period**

From 1980s to 2000, Taiwan experienced a regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Correspondingly, civics curriculum in Taiwan was changed to Taiwan-centered from “China-centered”, and its overall purpose was also shifted to develop the “new Taiwanese” who identified with Taiwan, believing in democracy and with the ability to think critically.

The new *Curriculum Standard* for junior high school was published in 1994. In which a new subject related civic education “understanding of Taiwan” was created for grade 7, and the learning period of “Civics and Morality” was shortened from three years to two (TMOE, 1994). “Understanding Taiwan” is an excellent example of civic education focusing on Taiwan (Liu, 1999; Liu, 2002). Its goals included following: (1) Increasing understanding of the social environment of Taiwan; (2) Developing multicultural perspectives and the sentiment of loving one’s community and nation; (3) Cultivating open-minded humanism and the sense of community; (4) Developing the ability to live according to social norms. The content of “Understanding Taiwan” around three themes: Taiwan’s society, history, and geography. And there are 10 sub-themes: people and language, family and relatives, festivals and customs, historical sites and cultural crafts, education, economics, politics, leisure, religions, and social issues (TMOE, 1994).

*Civics and Morality* was a required subject for grade 8 and 9 students. It was composed of two main domains: Civic knowledge and Civic virtues. The curriculum is divided into: school and social life, law and political life, economic life, and cultural life. 12 civic virtues were embedded in the curriculum: honesty, patriotism, law-abidingness, benevolence, filial piety, etiquette, industry and frugality, justice, public virtue, responsibility, cooperation, and respect (TMOE, 1994). Although Confucian moral
values were still emphasized by the *Civics and Morality*, an increasing emphasis was put on the Western, democratic, and local ideas rather than the propaganda-like love for China and Chinese culture that had previously been the mainstay (Liu, 2000; Hung, 2014).

**Integrated civics curriculum in the democratic consolidation period**

After 2000, a significant education reform took place in Taiwan. The Ministry of Education decentralized the control of the education system, the national curriculum standard was replaced by the non-prescriptive curriculum, and the previously separated subjects were replaced by seven learning areas (Liu & Doong, 2002; Doong, 2008). The subjects related to civic education, “Civics and Morality”, “Geography”, “History”, and “Understanding Taiwan” at elementary and junior high levels were all integrated as “social studies” (TMOE, 2003).

The new curriculum guidelines indicated that the purpose of new civic education is to develop a participatory and responsible citizen. It specifically includes: (1) developing students’ local concern, national identity, and global views; (2) fostering democratic minds, rule of law, and responsibility; and (3) enhance the ability of critical thinking, social participation, communication and cooperation (TMOE, 2008). Around these three goals, the civic education part of social studies at junior high school level general contains three main themes: individual and community, society (Grade 7); politics and law (Grade 8), economy and globalization (Grade 9). The first theme main involves individual community and social life. The second theme includes four sub-themes: national political system, party and election, law, responsibilities and rights. The last theme concerns about the relationship between individual and globalization. It is obvious that the new civics curriculum is to adjust further Taiwan’s democracy.

**6.4.2 The ‘Good Citizen’ Reflected in Taiwan’s Current Civics Curriculum**

The brief review above showed that the development of civics curriculum and especially
the extent to which changes have been made in response to regime transitions within Taiwan. In the period of authoritarian regime and democratic transition, the purpose of civic education are closely link with the nature of the regimes requiring at different time, a focus on “Chinese” and then “new Taiwanese”. Currently, the new integrated civics curriculum, is differing from other countries in East Asia that focus on morality (Lee, 2009; Leung & Yuen, 2011), Emphasis is now on politics, law and nationality, and its main purpose is to develop a participatory and responsible citizen: Firstly, it puts emphases on developing students’ Taiwan national identity and Chinese cultural identity. In addition, effective and active democratic participation are emphasized. There is now less emphasis on obeying moral rules.

*Taiwan’s national identity and local concern are first emphasised*

Different from the previous civics curriculum emphasizing “Chinese” or “Taiwanese”, the new integrated civic curriculum attempts to balance the “Chinese” and “Taiwanese”. The balance is not to develop “Chinese” and “Taiwanese”, but to develop a Taiwanese good citizen who should identify with Taiwan’s geography, history and political and law system first but also having a Chinese cultural identity.

In the new civics curriculum, nearly half of the contents relate to Taiwan’s national identity and local concerns. The content of Grade 7 mainly around Taiwan’s geography, history, and community, and in the Grade 8, one of main topics is to help students understand Taiwan’s current democratic and law system (TMOE, 2008). The study of geography and history can help students understand Taiwan’s basic national condition and as consequence to develop students’ geographical and historical identity with Taiwan: love Taiwan’s natural conditions, pride of Taiwan’s local culture, and forming a deep sense of belonging to Taiwan. The understanding about Taiwan’s current democratic system can help students understand the advantages of democracy and its role in the national political system, thus to promote them to construct political identify with Taiwan. Chinese history and geography is the other topic in the Grade 8, and the main
purpose is to develop students’ Chinese cultural identity. Chinese cultural identity is just one dimension of Taiwan citizens’ national identity; it has nothing to do with the national sovereignty issue and Mainland China. Chinese culture is advocated by Taiwan similar to the way other countries such as Singapore promote Chinese culture.

Besides emphasizing national identity, local and community concerns are also emphasized. That is because Taiwan is a classic Confucian society putting special emphasis on family and community. Family and community is the basic link for each citizen and the function for the national unity and stable. This point is directly reflected in the new civic curriculum. The relationship between individual and community is one of three topics. It includes providing suggestions for the construction of hometown, concerning about the community, help each other in the community, active participate in communities activities, and respect the diversity of communities (TMOE, 2008; Doong, 2008).

**Effective democratic participation and obeying the law**

In the new Civic Curriculum Guidelines (TMOE, 2008), civic education in Grade 8 mainly involves Taiwan’s state, government, democratic politics, and law system. An important purpose is to help students to understand and identify with Taiwan’s democratic political and law system, and thus to promote them to participate in political affairs and obey the law to support the well-working of democracy.

Democratic values and participation were mentioned in the authoritarian regime period as a means to distinguish Taiwan from totalitarian Communist China. In the democratic transitional period, its purpose is to promote student to understand and adjust the changing of political system (Liu, 2001). The new civic curriculum on the one hand increases the content of political and democratic education. On the other hand, it concentrates more on the essence of democracy, such as participation in voting, the right of dissent, reasoned argument checks and balance, and democratic decision-making. In
order to promote effective and active democratic participation, the new civic curriculum firstly details the function and organization of Taiwan to help students understand their roles in the country; and then it put more emphasis on citizens’ right in the democratic society such as freedom of expression, right of privacy, political participation, to provide a safeguard for citizen’s democratic participation. Finally, the new civics curriculum expects students to understand Taiwan’s law system to know how to protect their rights. In general, civic education in Grade 8 tells students how to live well in the democratic regime.

*Moral education and morality*

Compared to political and law education are, moral education is less involved in the new civics curriculum. But the promotion of students’ individual morality family ethics, and public virtues and are still the important goals (Hung, 2014).

The first theme in the Grade 7 is to recognize the self, the purpose of which is to help students recognize their own physical and mental development, affirm self-worth, respect life, and improve self-cultivation. The second theme is how to deal with the relationship between individual and others such as family members, friends, teachers, classmates and strangers. In the relationship between individual and family members, the new civics curriculum on the one hand emphases the traditional family ethics, namely family members should mutual trust, respect and responsible for each other. On the other hand, it proposes that the relationship between parents and children is mutual support and equal. An equal and high quality relationship between teachers and students is recommended, expecting teachers not to misuse their authority, and stressing that students are teachable. Classmates are told to respect for other each. Four civic virtues are proposed by the new civics curriculum to deal with relationship with strangers: Respect for each other, obeying public virtues, promoting public welfare, and maintaining law and order. It is obvious that the moralities promoted by the new civic education are different from the traditional Confucian morality emphasized by previous
civic education. Traditional Confucian morality stresses obedience, loyalty, filial piety and benevolence, but the morality promoted by new civic education advocates an equal respect and responsible relationship which is more closely related to western democratic morality (Chun, 1994; Liu; 2000; Hung, 2014).

To sum up, the purposes of civic education in Taiwan’s are related to Taiwanese national identity, local concerns, active and effective democratic participation, and the promotion of new civic virtues. These are the basic qualities for being a ‘good citizen’. The next section will examine students’ perceptions of the ‘good citizen’ under Taiwan’s democratic regime to explore whether and to what extent the requirement and expectation of the current regime and civics curriculum are achieved.

6.5. Students’ Perceptions of Being a Good Citizen in Taiwan Democracy

The above two sections have indicated that Taiwan’s democracy promotes the concept of a dual citizen and this concept is the reflected in current civics curriculum. In the following section the results from student interviews in which they were asked about the qualities of a ‘good citizen’ are presented. The purpose of the student interviews was to explore the relationship between regime values, civic curriculum and the way students view the idea of the ‘good citizen’.

6.5.1 What is meant by “Citizen”? 

The Taiwan students who were interviewed did not have a clear definition of what it meant to be a citizen, they recognized some essential characteristics of being a citizen: links with law and politics; local citizen, national citizen, and global citizen; usually appearing democratic society.

Firstly, most of the students (7 students) believed that “citizen” is related to law and politics and this can often be seen in newspaper articles. This link to politics and law is
also emphasized by the current civic education. Take student T1 (d) for example, he said that:

> When you mentioned the term of citizen, I immediately think of law. It is difficult to explain the reason. I feel citizen is related with law and politics. More specifically, citizen is Taiwanese who living in the land, having Taiwan household registration, and obeying Taiwan’s law.

Student T1 (b) added that

> Excepting obeying Taiwan’s law, citizen is person born in Taiwan, reaching twenty years old, and having right to voting.

Secondly, differing to students in Mainland and Hong Kong, Taiwan students considered that there was no significant difference between the meaning of “citizen”, “people”, and “the nationals”. The term of citizen is more usually saw in Taiwan and other democratic societies, and the “people” and “the national” are often mentioned in Mainland China. Such as student T2 (e) believed that:

> I feel that the “citizen”, “nationals” and “people” have no differences. You can use any one of it. It maybe distinct in some profession areas. ...I know “nationals” and “people” are usually mentioned and used in Mainland China, but in Taiwan we often use citizen like other democratic countries. Such as in America, they usually say citizen right, citizen voting, and so on. So, I feel very surprised.

Lastly, Taiwan students seemed to begin to have a concept of the ‘global citizen’. In the interview, some students mentioned that “citizen” can be divided into three levels based on geographical scope: local, national and global citizen, and they saw themselves as “global citizens”.

6.5.2 What Does It Mean to Be a Good Citizen?

Taiwan students’ perceptions of the ‘good citizen’ are basically contrary to the purpose
and civic education. Most of students considered morality is the most important aspect for being a ‘good citizen’. This is contrary to the civic curriculum that stresses Taiwan national identity, political participation and obeying the law. They also see that have a good understanding about democracy is important, but most of them do want to vote or be involved in protest. Finally, students are proud of being Taiwanese and they felt a deep belonging to Taiwan.

**Morality is the first principle for being a ‘good Citizen’**

Contrary to the focus of the new civics curriculum, most of students in the interview considered that morality is the first principle for being a good citizen. The examples of good citizen showed by the students general are common people with high morality. They gave the example of Chen Shuju [陳樹菊] or their parents. Most of the students did not like political actors.

First, they believed that morality is prior to obeying the law. That is because morality is basis of law: if you act with morality, you would obey the law. Morality can also limit some behaviors that would not be punished by the law, such as giving seats to others, supporting elderly, help others. Take student T (a) for example:

> I think morality is the most important, and lay-obeying is basic. Law can punished my unlawful action, but cannot ask me to do good things, such as help others. If you have morality, you can know what you should do or not do.

Second, students proposed that morality starts with small good things in the daily life, such as giving seating, help other, time keeping, and so on. Giving seat is frequently mentioned by the students in the interview. Student T1 (d) said that:

> We know giving seats to the elders since we were children. If seeing an elder on the bus or train, we would consider giving seats to him. For example, remember once I saw a grandma is standing in the train, I guess she did not take the seating tickets. Although I had to stand for one hour, I still give our seat to her. I told this
thing to my mother, she said it is right. Actually, I was afraid that others consider me as a bad child. Giving seats has become a habit in Taiwan, we think we should do it.

Third, morality means getting along very well with others, including respect, empathy, tolerance, and helping and caring for each other. As a ‘good citizen’, we should act filially towards parents, treat classmates in a friendly way, and help strangers. An important difference is that the new civic education in Taiwan emphasizes equal relations between teachers and students, but students still believe they should respect their teachers, and there is no equal relationship. This is because respecting teachers is a Chinese tradition.

**Good democratic knowledge, low political participation**

The results of this qualitative study is consistent with the results of other quantitative research: knowledge of civic and political processes and concepts by itself is insufficient to ensure young students’ participation (Torney-Purta, Losito & Mintrop, 2001).

Like other democracies, there is currently a strong tendency to value popular participation of citizens in the political process in Taiwan. The new civic education puts an important emphasis on the students’ understanding about democratic concept and values, and democratic government, election system, multi-parties to promote students’ civic participation. As civic education intended, Taiwan students really have good understanding about democracy knowledge. They know the advantages of democracy compared to authoritarian regimes, and how it to work, and the importance of individual participation for democratic working. However, most of them do not like political issues, and are not interested in political participation, such as student T1(c):

*Our civic education teacher always talks about election, voting, and my parents in home often discuss Pan-green and Pan-blue coalition….I think I will not participate voting or protest. If I participate the election, I will only consider their*
political claims and plans rather their party. The purpose of election is to choose our favorite government to serve us.

This is a very surprising answer. Like student T1(c), most of the students knew the essence of democratic election, but they still do like to be involved in political participation when they enter adulthood. Further interviews indicated that students considered political participation has little interest for them, and they have no time to participate in political affairs. A most direct reason is that there exist some irrational and violence participation in Taiwan, such as abusing each other, fighting, and hampering traffic. Therefore, we have to think that civic participation would depend only on individual reason but also on the developmental situation of democracy. If democracy is not perfected and there exists too much irrational political participation in a society, the young people would not like to involve in political affair.

Pride of being Taiwanese and having a deep sense of belonging to Taiwan

While the results of the interviews indicated that although Taiwanese students often complain and dislike government, they have a strong sense of belonging and honor for Taiwan. They believe that Taiwan is an independent country, its political system is more advanced than the Mainland, and its society is more humane. Student T1 (d) said that:

*I was born in Taiwan. It is a small place and very difficult to find on the global map. But there are many good things and good people you and you can feel a strong human connection in here. I am proud of living in the land... Although our government has many problems, we are still proud of being Taiwanese. When we are abroad, we are very happy to say we are Taiwanese.... I read in a book that the author always criticized Taiwan government and leaders. But when he was abroad he said Taiwan and its leaders are very wonderful!*

The concept of Taiwan as an independent country is deeply ingrained into every student. During the interviews, Taiwan was always referred to as a country and they saw
themselves as Taiwanese citizens. The difference between the “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” is obscured by the authorities, and Chinese culture is advocated by civic education. Yet the concept of “Chinese” has been abandoned by Taiwanese students. Although Chinese Confucian culture was mentioned occasionally, they considered the Chinese culture was totally distinct from Mainland culture.

6.5.3 Where Do Students Get Their Conception of Citizen and ‘Good Citizen’?

The above section has indicated that Taiwanese students’ perceptions of ‘good citizen’ are basically different from the expectation and goals of civic education. This raises the question of where students gain their understandings of the ‘good citizen’. This is the question to be explored in this section.

Parents are considered by the students as the first source for forming ideas about citizenship. In the interviews, most of students mentioned that their parents told them what they should do and what they should not do from the time they were very young. Also, parents and people around them provided a good example for them.  Student T2 (a) said that:

When I was a young boy, my mother always told me should respect others, give seat for elders, and so on. And in the daily life, everyone around you always did these things. If you do not do, you will be criticized or looked down.

Second, teachers have an important influence on students’ concept of a ‘good citizen’. But students did not nominate all teachers as influences on their views of the ‘good citizen’ - mainly they referred to civic education teachers with good teaching skills and whom students liked. As in focus group T1, the students said that civic education had an important influence on them due to a special civic education teacher:

Civic education has influence on us, because we have a good civic education teacher. She is very nice and charming. Especially, she not only tells us some political and law knowledge but also reads some recent political news for us, and
always discuss political issues with us. Our civic teacher in Grade 7 just teaches us the knowledge of textbook, and always said we should remember the important content for the exam.

Finally, students believed civic education have little influence on their concept of citizen and ‘good citizen’. Mainly under the influence of family and social habit, students formed a concept about good and bad, and attitude towards politics. Civic education taught them some fundamental political and legal knowledge. Most students indicated they have not a deep understanding of this knowledge, because it had no especially when some teachers just repeated what the civics textbook says.

6.6 Conclusion

Although there is an expected ‘good citizen’ proposed by the authorities under Taiwan’s democracy, it acts as an orientation rather than as defined and regulated knowledge to be learnt and understood. The concept of a ‘good citizen’ is reflected in civics curriculum as basically consistent with the expectations of Taiwan’s democracy: students should identify with Taiwan, be concerned with the local community, be active and effectively participate in political affairs, and be obedient and moral. Students’ perception of a ‘good citizen’, however, is beyond to the expectations of the civics curriculum. Morality is considered by students as the first priority, and democratic knowledge does not lead them to have high expectations about political participation. Therefore, it can be said that civic education in Taiwan does not cultivate the ‘good citizen required by the democratic regime required, and appears to have has little influence on students. The next chapter will provide a cross cases analysis of the influence of regime type on civic education in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China.
CHAPTER 7

CROSS CASES ANALYSIS OF REGIME “TYPE” AND THEIR CAPACITY TO CREATE THEIR REQUIRED ‘GOOD CITIZEN’

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapters identified the ‘good citizen’ in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan respectively. The results within each regime were mostly consistent but in all regimes there was some variation at the student level. Across regime “types”, however, ‘good citizens’ were pictured differently suggesting the importance of regime “type” in determining the kind of citizen needed for regime consolidation.

Mainland China, characterized in this study as an authoritarian regime, developed a very clear conception of what was meant by ‘good citizen’ and from the top levels of the regime promoted this concept in both policy and the civics curriculum. Student perceptions of a ‘good citizen’ were basically consistent with the regime’s purposes and the civic education they experienced. Yet some students indicated that they would not fully meet regime expectations. Nevertheless, civic education, regime expectations and students’ experiences in Mainland China can be described as generally fixed and aligned across levels.

Hong Kong, characterized in this study as a hybrid regime. Democratic and authoritarian forces have competed and struggled to gain public support even under Chinese sovereignty. This has resulted in different versions of civic education to develop their expected citizen to support different political claims. As a result, Hong Kong students did not share a common conception of a ‘good citizen’ since there was not a common civic
education experience reflecting multiple views within the broader society. Civic education, regime expectations and student experiences can be best described as mixed or multiple conceptions of a ‘good citizen’ reflecting the hybrid nature of the regime itself.

Taiwan, characterized in this study as a democratic regime, witnessed changing conceptions of its ‘good citizen’ directly related to the progress of democratization and attitudes to state sovereignty. Moving through phases there was an initial emphasis highlighting Chinese citizenship that eventually was replaced with Taiwanese citizenship and finally a dual concept of Taiwanese citizenship with Chinese cultural identity. These phases were also reflected in Taiwan’s civic education that changed from a China-centered curriculum to a Taiwan-centered curriculum to an integrated curriculum. As a result, students formed their independent concept of citizenship differing from the civic education and regime’s expectations. Civic education, regime expectations and student experiences can be best described as changing.

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the concept of ‘good citizen’ across authoritarian, hybrid and democratic regime, civics curriculum and student experiences to explore the influence of regime “types” on civic education. Section 7.2 compares the kinds of ‘good citizen’ at regime level to identify the relationship between regime type and its capacity to directly create ‘good citizen’. Section 7.3 compares the kinds of civics curriculum under different regime “types” to examine civic education which is shown to be controlled by regime “type”, and the extent of control varies with the regime “type” which will actually influence whether civic education can cultivate the ‘good citizen’ required by the regime. Section 7.4 compares students’ perception of ‘good citizen’ to examine the influence of regime “type” on the recipient of civic education.
7.2 Different Regime “Types” Require Different Kinds of ‘Good Citizen’ and Extent of Control Varies with the Regime “Type”

As Galston (2001, p.1) argued, “A well-ordered polity requires the citizen with appropriate knowledge, skills, and traits of character” to support its rule. Any regime, of course, does not have a neutral position concerning the ‘good citizen’ it requires (Thomas, 1998). In this study, the three Chinese cases add weight to this view. All regimes need different kinds of ‘good citizens’, but the extent of control and the influence of regime have important effects on how regimes go about their role of developing ‘good citizen’.

7.2.1 Three Kinds of ‘Good Citizen’

Each regime studied had a different conception of a ‘good citizen’ as shown in Table 8. In the Mainland China case, the ‘good citizen’ is self-contradictory characterized by market orientation but politically and morally obedient. In Hong Kong, the regime is still in transition, there is no agreement on the required ‘good citizen’ need for a regime characterized by ‘one country, two systems”. Even where the government has a view, it must compete with alternative views in civil society. Hence, the Hong Kong ‘good citizen’ in this is study can best be understood as a contested ‘good citizen’. In Taiwan, there is agreement on the need for a democratic citizenry but within a pluralistic context. This has meant a lack of specificity about the characteristics of Taiwan’s democratic yet pluralistic ‘good citizen’.

Table 8:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Hybrid regime</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Three kinds of ‘good citizen’ in authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic regimes
These results indicate that while different regime “types” undoubtedly reflect different conceptions of the ‘good citizen’ they do not do so unambiguously. Certain regime “types” are characterized by predispositions that render the idea of the ‘good citizen’ to some extent problematic. Mainland China, as an authoritarian regime, has a clear and unique definition about its required ‘good citizen’. ‘Good citizens’ are expected to, on the one hand, be loyal to the state, support the ruling party and take moral responsibilities for
others. On the other hand, some qualities related to the liberal market system are also highlighted. Hong Kong is a typical case of a hybrid regime in which authoritarian and democratic forces debate with each other and respectively proposed their authoritarian and democratic views of the ‘good citizen’. The former proposed it is necessary to develop young people’s sense of national identity and morality, but the opponents emphasize the development of critical, rational, and participatory citizen to support the democratization of Hong Kong. These two views compete with each other to dominate the whole of Hong Kong society. While in democratic Taiwan, the previous exclusive concept of citizenship, “pride of being Chinese” or “Taiwanese”, was replaced by a new dual concept of citizenship: Taiwanese with Chinese cultural identity. Specifically, the new ‘good citizens’ are expected to appreciate Taiwan’s democratic values, such as identify with Taiwan, obey the law, and actively participate to support the working of Taiwan’ democracy. Meanwhile, they are expected to identity with Chinese culture and traditional Confucian values (Lien, 2013; Hung, 2014).

7.2.2 The Relationship between Regime “Type” and Regime Capacity: Theories of the State

The above results reflect Galston’s (2001) view that all regimes require citizens with appropriate knowledge, skills, and traits of character that preserve its own power and political system. Yet the results further found that different regimes have different capacities to create ‘good citizen’ as shown in Table 9. This idea of regime capacity to create ‘good citizens’ challenges the importance of “regime type” or “regime transition” in the creation of ‘good citizens’ as suggested by many scholars (Bray & Lee, 1993; Shively, 2011; Fok, 1997). It is important to understand, therefore, how the concept of regime capacity can be best understood and how it extends one of the main concepts underlying this thesis, “regime type”. This issue will be discussed below with particular reference to the role of the state in building regime capacity.
### Table 9:
The relationship between regime type and its capacity to create ‘good citizens’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>The capacity to create ‘good citizens’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian regime</td>
<td>Unique view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mainland China)</td>
<td>Top-down approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>Co-existence of two different views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>Strong civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Pluralistic view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>non-intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slater and Fenner (2011) indicated that while “regime” and “state” are analytically distinct, they are also empirically intertwined. Robinson (2008) agreed with this view but argued that it is nevertheless important to appreciate the distinction between the two. He sees regimes as the outcome of competition between elites so that regime building is simply about keeping elites in power. He described the differences between “regime” and “state” this way:

The essential difference between state and regime therefore, is that state formation is not just a matter of elite competition whereas in the short-term regime formation may be just that, a matter of elite struggle during which elites may or may not, according to circumstance, respond to or ignore state-building pressures. States as functional (albeit unconscious) structures have some interest autonomous of elites, in particular they have an interest in international competition and domestic order, and this makes them, in Skocpol’s classic formulation, an ‘autonomous structure - a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity’ (p.7).
In terms of this thesis, therefore, regime capacity, as discussed above, might be better understood as the capacity of the state. As Robinson (2008, p.8) said, “a regime in a state with high capacity has more resources to deploy, better chances of extracting extra resources to deal with problems, and potentially more and broader reserves of political loyalty to fall back on because it is able to deliver a wider range of public goods through the state”.

Despite the generic concept of the state described above, Greenberg (1990) has argued that there are different models of the state that have the potential to influence state capacity. These seem to be relevant to the three regime types identified in this study: democratic Taiwan, hybrid Hong Kong, and authoritarian Mainland China. The first model is “The Citizen-Responsive State Model”. It basically sees “the sources of state action in the articulated demands of popular majorities or intense minorities, and in the need for public officials to respond to such demands as the price for their retention of power or office” (Greenberg, 1990, p.18). In this model, the bureaucratic apparatus is often fragmented, split into different coalitions with various interest groups and political groups. This first model as Sorensen (1993, p.8) argued that this model “builds primary on the pluralist and voter-centred literature concerning politics in liberal democracy. The second is the “The Capitalist State Model” that “spring from the Marxist tradition, where the state is basically an integrated part of society as a whole. It considers the economic basis and the social structure of society determines the structure and policies of the state” (Sorensen, 1993, p.9). Hong Kong’s hybrid regime fits “The Capitalist State Model” due to Hong Kong’s primarily interest in business and therefore needs stable environment so gives in to civil society. The third model is called “The State-Centric Model”. “In this model the state is a much more autonomous entity defining its own interests and goals” (Sorensen, 1993, p.9). The links between these different views of the state and the regime “types”
identified in this thesis are shown in Table 10 below:

Table 10:

*The relationship between the models of state and regime “type”*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The mode of state</th>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Citizen Responsive State Model</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Capitalist State Model</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State-Centric Model.</td>
<td>Authoritarian regime</td>
<td>Mainland China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the perspective of the three models shown in Table 3, “state” varies according to regime “type”. In democratic state, any policy of state is a response to the demand of demands of popular majorities or intense minorities, the autonomy of state is limited and minimized to guarantee the individual freedom is enhanced (Hay, Lister, & Marsh, 2006). Democratic theorists have indicated democracy largely depends on its “democratic procedure” to create its required citizen, in which all the citizens are encourage “to participate in selecting their leaders and perhaps also in determining the state’s policies.” (Shively, 2011, p.114). In Hong Kong’s hybrid regime, any action of the state must balance and gain the most economic interest so that the “state capacity” is limited and weakened under the debate of different interest groups. In an authoritarian state, as Sorensen(1993, p.9) argued “in the view of at least some working within the state-centric perspective, even more autonomy is possible; not only can it be possible for the state to fend off, insulate itself from powerful forces, it can lead the way and impose its own vision and goals on them”. In other word, authoritarian states have strong capacity to define and propose its goals, such as its required ‘good citizen’.
Thus it is not just a focus on state building to develop regime capacity as argued by Robinson (2008). It is an issue of the kind of state building as shown by Sorenson (1993). Democratic institutions require more negotiation and persuasion and therefore less certain outcomes – this is the case of Taiwan as shown in this study. To some extent this is also true of Hong Kong’s hybrid regime that can be seen as a semi-democracy. Yet there is an additional issue in Hong Kong since as a regime it is so strongly committed to business interests. As shown in 2012, it was willing to give up its version of national education in order to return the city to stability that is so much emphasized by business interests (Lin, 2013; Kennedy & Kuang, 2014; Leung, 2014). For China, the distinction between the “regime” and the “state” is less clear since the regime controls the state with very few challenges. This allows the regime to use the state to pursue its objectives without having to negotiate with or persuade anyone of the rightness of its actions. It can be argued, therefore, that it is the capacity of the state to support the regime’s objectives that is the most significant influence on the ability of the regime to achieve those objectives.

7. 3 Different Regime “Types” Lead to Different Kinds of Civic Education Programs but Their Effectiveness Depends on the Capacity of the State

The above section indicated that different regimes have different capacities to create different kinds of ‘good citizen’ they require to support the regime. The ‘good citizen’ required by regimes is made, not born (Galston, 2001). The studies reported here support the view that civic education is regarded as “a key tool of political socialization” (Lien, 2013, p.1) and is usually used by regimes to cultivate young people to form the “right” values, knowledge and behavior supportive of their political system (Kerr, 1999; Liu, 2000; Migdal, 2001; Slater & Fenner, 2011). This study has further found that the form civic education takes differs across regime “type”. Yet, as shown above, the effectiveness of regimes to secure their purposes depends to a large extent on their capability to control
desired outcomes. It may be that the form of civic education is not as important as the state apparatus controlled by the respective regimes to facilitate both the development and implementation of civic education.

Table 11:

Three kinds of civic education program in authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Authoritarian regime</th>
<th>Hybrid regime</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinds of civic education</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Competing</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>1. ideological patriotism and obligatory law-abiding;</td>
<td>2. national and moral education vs democratic civic education;</td>
<td>3. national identity and local concern are first emphasized;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. moral education is emphasized;</td>
<td>2. the former emphasis on national identity, pride and loyalty, morality and obeying the law;</td>
<td>2. Effective democratic participation and obeying the law;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Mental health education is a core</td>
<td>3. the latter insists to cultivate critical thinking and active participation</td>
<td>3. Moral education and morality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different forms civic education took in the three societies studied in this thesis are shown in Table 11. In Mainland China, civic education is fixed and seriously controlled...
by the regime to develop its required self-contradictory ‘good citizen’. In Hong Kong, there exists two different version of civic education: pro-China national and moral education and democratic civic education. They compete with each other and create conflicting and uncertain contexts that cannot be controlled by the government. It has been shown that the Hong Kong SAR Government has its own pro-China view of civic education but cannot enforce this view because of community pressure. If this is true in relation to Hong Kong and the Mainland, it may be even truer when it comes to Taiwan and Mainland China. Taiwan’s civic education has been in transition as it emerged from authoritarianism to democracy. Civic education ceased to create ‘Chinese citizens’ but instead focused on ‘Taiwanese citizens’ thus distancing itself from Mainland China in the same way as Hong Kong’s ‘democratic’ emphasis does. Yet as Taiwan democratizes its capacity to enforce its ‘new Taiwanese citizen’ diminishes. Also, as it seeks to discard Chinese identity altogether, it faces resistance (Lien, 2013; Doong, 2008, Liu, 2000). Currently, the previous national curriculum standard was replaced by the non-prescriptive curriculum, and the separated subjects related civic education, were all integrated as “social studies”. Its purpose is to develop a democratic and pluralistic citizen: it puts emphases on developing students’ Chinese cultural identity and Taiwan local identity. In addition, effective and active democratic participation are emphasized. But there is now less emphasis on obeying morality (MOE, 2008; Doong, 2008).

As pointed out by Sorensen (1990), the autonomy of the state together with its bureaucratic capacity will affect its ability to implement its objectives. In the authoritarian Mainland China, the state is controlled by a single party, there is little or no regard for rule of law or individual rights of any kind in authoritarian state (Macridis, 1986; Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 1999; Borejsza & Ziemer, 2006). The state plays a much more exclusive and authoritative role in determining state action and policy than is the case in democratic states (Macridis, 1986; Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 1999; Borejsza & Ziemer, 2006; Foster, 2001). And while some supporters insisted that Chinese authoritarian state have an efficient bureaucratic capacity to promoting
economic development (Ding, 2006). The high degree of state autonomy and efficient bureaucratic machinery determines Chinese authoritarian could seriously control all education system and publish unique and prescriptive curriculum standard to cultivate its required ‘good citizen’. Hong Kong is a hybrid regime, as above indicated that state’s autonomy and effectiveness are limited and weakened under the debate of different interest groups, which determined Hong Kong has to adapt a neutral or tolerance view to allow multiple versions of civic education program to co-exist. In democratic Taiwan, as Sorensen (1993, p.15) argued “democracy would thus appear to sharply reduce the autonomy of the state by opening it up to the influence of non-developmental elites and short-term demands of the population. State capacity could be hurt when politicians get involved in ruling; bureaucracies become politicized and there is less bureaucratic cohesion and coordination across levels and sections”, which lead to Education in democratic Taiwan is decentralized. And although democracy needs a democratic citizen to support the working of democracy, it could not to precisely prescribe it and compulsively implement in the civic education.

7.4 Comparison of Student Perceptions of being a “Good Citizen”

Sections 7.2 and 7.3 have indicated that all regimes require different kinds of ‘good citizen’, and this requirement is directly reflected in civic education that differs from regime to regime. Yet the impact of civic education on students was not always in line with regime expectations.

Students in different regimes have different perceptions about ‘good citizen’, as shown in Table 12. In Mainland China case, students share a unique conception of ‘good citizen’: ‘good citizen’ should be loyal, moral and law-abiding, and which basically fulfilled the expectations of authoritarian regime and its civic education. Yet a few students indicated that they would not fully meet regime expectations. In Hong Kong, students formed a mixed conception of ‘good citizen’ under the debate of democracy and authoritarianism. While in democratic Taiwan, students’ perception of ‘good citizen’ was changing and did
not conform to the expectations of the regime in every aspect.

Table 12:

*Three kinds of ‘good citizen’ perceived by the students across three regime types*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Hybrid regime</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinds of ‘good citizen’</td>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Patriotism is the First Principle, But love county does not mean love party, socialism and government;</td>
<td>Obey the laws, participate voting and rational make suggestions for government, and identify local community;</td>
<td>Morality is the first; Good democratic knowledge, low political participation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morality is important;</td>
<td>While positively take moral responsibilities in family, society</td>
<td>a deep sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A powerful psychology for adjusting to all difficulties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result is similar to that of Fairbrother (2003a, 2003b) who found that a majority of university students in Mainland China and Hong Kong held attitudes in line with what the respective states desired, but there were some students who did not always accept the hegemony of state, less so in Mainland China than in Hong Kong. Fairbrother (2003b, p.608) proposed that resistance theory is “a valid explanation for national attitudes that
appear contrary to what schools and the state might desire in the Hong Kong and Mainland contexts”. He reconceptualised students’ resistance in relation to the hegemonic efforts of the state in the Chinese context.

To reconceptualize resistance to the hegemonic efforts of the state as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state’s efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes (Fairbrother, 2003a, p.180).

Yet in the current study, junior high school students’ resistance as shown can be considered to be in its first stages since dominant in their thinking was the perceived hegemony of the dominant class. It maybe that the university students in Fairbrother’s sample had reached a higher level of resistance or at least they were more capable of resisting the processes of domination (Fairbrother, 2003a, p.30).

Fairbrother’s resistance theory can explain students’ oppositional attitude toward the state’ desire but it does not very well explain why the majority of students endorsed the regimes’ desires in Mainland China and Hong, and why Taiwan’s students’ perception is beyond to regime’s expectation in a liberal and pluralist context. Perhaps it is related to the capacity of the regime supported by the respective states as discussed earlier. China’s junior secondary students exert minimal resistance because the regime’s capacity is so strong while Taiwan’s students resist because the state will not force them to conform. Hong Kong students are also free to adopt alternative views to those of the business oriented government so there are no consequences for resistance. Building on Fairbrother’s (2003) findings, an interesting question might be how resistance develops in both democratic and non-democratic regimes and how civic education might moderate or accelerate such development.
7.5 Summary

Comparing the concept of ‘good citizen’ across Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China this chapter showed the regimes need different kinds of ‘good citizens’ to support and legitimate themselves. A self-contradictory ‘good citizen’ was desired by the authoritarian regime in this study, politically obedient but economically liberal. Hong Kong’s hybrid regime was a regime in transition in which democratic and authoritarian forces debated thus creating a contested concept of ‘good citizen’. While there is agreement on the need for a democratic citizenry in the democratic regime studied in this thesis, but it is lack of specificity about the characteristics of a democratic yet pluralistic ‘good citizen’.

These difference requirements were directly reflected in civic education to form three different kinds of civic education and in Hong Kong’s hybrid regime there were two competing versions of civic education. These different approaches to civic education were designed to create different ‘good citizens’. This process appeared to be more effective in Mainland China and least effective in Taiwan. In Hong Kong students often reflected the views of either the pro-democracy or pro-China camp. Students displayed levels of resistance to regime objectives in each of the three regimes with least resistance from Mainland students and the most obvious resistance from Taiwanese students at least according to the perspectives of students.

Finally, this chapter proposed that state capacity within each regime mediated the effect of civic education on the regime’s effectiveness at creating its desired version of the ‘good citizen’. Where the state is strong, resistance is weak and where the state must negotiate its objectives, resistance is stronger. The next chapter will draw the thesis to a conclusion.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided a cross case analysis and highlighted some important theoretical issues. These represent the main findings of the study. The purpose of this chapter is to bring the study to a conclusion. This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 8.2 provides a summary of the thesis. Section 8.3 describes the contributions of the study for civic education theory, practice and comparative civic education research. Section 8.4 delineates the limitations of the study, and section 8.5 indicates the implications for the future research. Section 8.7 draws the study to a close.

8.2 Summary of the Thesis
Chapter 1 introduced the focus of the study, research questions, research design, values of the study, and organization of the thesis.

Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on cross-country studies of civic education in the past two decades, and concluded that the current five forms of studies within the field put an important focus on cultural contexts in either single countries or within regions. Comparisons of Western and Asian approaches to civic education have received a great deal of attention. It often seemed that the political system has been ignored with a lack of attention to the case studies of civic education across different regime types. It is this gap that the present study aimed to fill.

The key terms of the study—regime “type”, civic education, and ‘good citizen’ were defined to provide a clear conceptual basis for the study. This study combined Freedom
House and Economist Intelligence Unit’s indexes of democracy to divide countries into three types: democratic regime, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2012; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Civic education in the study was defined as a specific component of the school curriculum and its purpose is to prepare young people in the essential areas of knowledge, values and skill to be a ‘good citizen’ of their respective communities. ‘Good citizen’ is a contested and debated concept, and interpreted and defined differently in Western democratic and Eastern non-democratic societies (Kennelly, 2009). In Western democracy, virtues, obligations for community, and actively political participation are usually mentioned as the important qualities for being a good citizen. While in Eastern societies, the ‘good citizen’ is always linked with state, morality, and relationships.

This chapter constructed a hypothetical relationship between regime type, civic education and the “production” of ‘good citizens’. Democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes require expect different kinds of ‘good citizen’ to support their rule and legitimacy, and these different requirements and interpretations may have implications for defining the goals of civic education and for formulating education programs, and final to develop a regime required ‘good citizen’. It was suggested that civic education may be the mediator between regime “types” and the production of ‘good citizen’. Three related research questions were the focus of this thesis:

RQ1: Do theories of the state embedded in specific regime “type” articulate specific roles for citizens and do they indicate conceptions of a ‘good citizen’?

RQ2: To what extent are regime “type” theories and characteristics reflected in education policies and the school curriculum?

RQ3: What is the personal experience of students as citizens under different regime types?
Chapter 3 outlined the research methodology and the methods used in this study. Based on the research purposes and research questions, the study adopted a comparative qualitative methodology for the study. Within the comparative framework, multi-site qualitative case studies were developed for Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Literature review was used to identify the concept of ‘good citizen’ constructed by the theories underlying democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Document analysis identified the extent to which roles for citizens identified by different theories of the state influenced policy and practice related to civic education in the different regime types. Finally, focus group interviews were used to explore students’ individual lived experiences as potential citizens under different regime “type”.

Chapter 4 presented the results for the case of Mainland China. After three generations of leadership a typical authoritarian regime was gradually built but it displayed a self-contradictory characteristic: the liberal market economic system and one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (Cabestan, 2004; Kuan, 2013). This self-contradictory regime determined a patriotic, moral and market oriented ‘good citizen’ was finally supported by Chinese authorities. This kind of ‘good citizen’ was directly reflected in the current civics curriculum: ideological patriotism and obligatory law-abidingness were the most important themes. And students’ perceptions of the ‘good citizen’ were basically consistent with the purpose of civic education and authoritarian regime’s expectation, although there were some important student reflection on what this meant for them personally.

Chapter 5 presented the case of Hong Kong. From the 1980s, Hong Kong was gradually turned into to a hybrid regime having been a colonial regime since the 1840s. This newly emerging hybrid regime was characterized from the beginning by the debates between
advocates of democracy and those who supported the Chinese government. During the
debate, pro-democracy and pro-China forces held different views about the Hong Kong’s
regime type and advocated different kinds of ‘good citizen’ to support their political
declaration. The pro-democracy forces supported the introduction and development of
representative democracy and insisted on implementing civic education in school to
develop critical, rational, and participatory citizens to understand better and adjust to the
development of the democracy system in Hong Kong. The democratic civic education
curriculum put more emphasis on social and community identity and participation. By
contrast, the pro-China force favored a slower pace of the democratization and always
supported the gradual assimilation of Hong Kong into Mainland China’s political system
though national and moral education. In their national and moral education curriculum,
national identity and morality were considered as the priority quality for being a ‘good
citizen’. As a result, although civic education has a little influence on students’
perceptions, Hong Kong students held mixed conceptions of a ‘good citizen’. On the one
hand, they considered that ‘good citizens’ should obey laws, participate in voting and
rationally make suggestions for the government. They also tended to adopt a Hong Kong
social identity, rather than a national identity based on patriotism. On the other hand,
they proposed ‘good citizens’ should positively take social and family moral
responsibilities, make donations, help others and respect and care about family members
and friends.

Chapter 6 presented the Taiwan case. Since the 1980s, Taiwan’s democratization not
only involved a regime transition from authoritarian to democratic but a continuing
debate about its sovereignty as an independent nation. Both Taiwan’s regime transition
and independence required a dual concept of citizen: no longer an exclusive focus on a
“pride in being Chinese”, or simply a “new Taiwanese”. As a response, civic education
curriculum in Taiwan was reformed from “China-centered” in the authoritarian regime
period (1949-1980s), “Taiwan-centered” in the democratic transition (1980s-2000), to
today’s integrated civics curriculum. Differing from the previous exclusive focus to
cultivate “Chinese” and then “new Taiwanese”, the purposes of new civic education in Taiwan are related to Taiwanese national identity, local concerns, active and effective democratic participation and the promotion of new civic virtues. Students’ perception of a ‘good citizen’, however, was beyond to the expectations of the civics curriculum and regime’s requirement: Morality was considered by students as the first priority and democratic knowledge did not lead them to have high expectations about political participation. Therefore, it can be said that civic education in Taiwan does not cultivate the ‘good citizen’ required by the democratic regime required, and appears to have had little influence on students.

Chapter 7 compared the result of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China cases to conclude the three main findings as response for the research questions in the study. The first finding is related to Research question 1: Do theories of the state embedded in specific regime “type” articulate specific roles for citizens and do they indicate conceptions of a ‘good citizen’? Democratic or non-democratic states need ‘good citizens’ who can support the values of the regime. In the authoritarian regime, a self-contradictory citizen characterized by market orientation but politically and morally obedient was clearly proposed and advocated in a top-down approach. In the hybrid regime, there existed a contested concept of ‘good citizen’ as the regime was ‘in transition’ so that democratic and authoritarian forces competed with each other. Even where the government has a view, it must compete with alternative views in civil society. In a democracy, there is agreement on the need for a democratic citizenry but within a pluralistic context. This has meant a lack of specificity about the characteristics of Taiwan’s democratic yet pluralistic ‘good citizen’.

The second finding related to Research question 2: To what extent are regime type theories and characteristics reflected in education policies and the school curriculum? Authoritarian, hybrid, or democratic regime, their requirements about ‘good citizen’ and
regime characteristics are directly reflected in civics curriculum and formed different kinds of civic education: fixed civic education in authoritarian regime, competing civic education in hybrid regime, and changing civic education in democracy. While the effectiveness of civic education to cultivate ‘good citizen’ are largely depend on not so much on its form but rather the extent of control capable of being exercised by the regime. It was argued that regime capacity was the key element in whether a regime could be assured of producing its required ‘good citizen’. This capacity was seen to be linked to the capacity of the state. When Sorensen’s (1993) models of the state were analyzed as it could be seen that state capacity varied among democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Thus it seems that while regime type strongly influences forms of civic education and the attributes of a ‘good citizen’ it is a state’s capacity to support regime objectives that determines the effectiveness of a regime’s efforts to mould and shape the kind of citizens it requires.

The third finding related to Research Question 3: What is the personal experience of students as citizens under different regime types?

*What is the personal experience of students as citizens under different regime types?*

Under different regime “type” and civic education programs, students formed different concepts of the ‘good citizen’. The study further found that a regime’s ideal aspiration for the “good citizen” could not always be achieved. State capacity supporting regimes most likely accounts for the level of resistance by students to adopting the qualities of a regime’s desired “good citizen”. This resistance appeared less in Mainland China where the state’s capacity supporting the regime was strongest. Student attitudes in Hong Kong reflected the hybrid nature of the regime despite the state’s capacity supporting the pro-China view. In democratic Taiwan students appeared much more resistant to the regime’s views and the state’s capacity to moderate this resistance was limited.
8.3 Contributions of the Study

This section highlights the contributions of the study, with emphasis on civic education theory, civic education practice, and research methods on comparative civic education research.

8.3.1 Contribution for Civic Education Theory

The initial purpose of the study was to explore the influence of different regime “type” on civic education and assess the extent to which regime “type” exerted a macro influence on civic education. Across regimes it has been shown that civic education is regarded as important tool and that regime type and ideology play an important role in the form that civic education takes. What this suggests is that while much of the research on civic education has been conducted in Western democratic context more needs to be known about civic education in different contexts. Conflicting conceptions of ‘good citizens’ embedded in civic education curriculum driven by regime priorities deserve more study than is currently the case.

This link between civic education and regime priorities as shown in this thesis leads naturally to questioning called ‘regime transition thesis’. The result of the study showed that there is a closely continuity and congruence between regime “type” and civic education, especially in non-democratic societies, such as authoritarian and hybrid regimes. The ‘good citizen’ required by regimes is directly reflected in civics curriculum and broadly accepted by most students. In the democratic society in this study, students’ perceptions of being a ‘good citizen’ were beyond what the regime and civic education expected. It seems to suggest that civic education is powerless in face of powerful regime, and always controlled by the regime, no matter authoritarianism, hybrid regime, or democracy. The more powerful and authoritarian regime type, the stronger control and influence on civic education, and the more possible the students can be developed its required ‘good citizen’. Yet democracy has a little influence and control on the outcomes.
of civic education. As result, it is more difficult to develop its expected ‘good citizen’
through civic education. It is obvious civic education in non-democratic societies is
different from that in a democracy’s, and the relationship with the regime is also different.
This suggests that the democratic theory of civic education is not the best way to
understand civic education in non-democratic societies. Reference needs to be made to
the context in which the regime exists, the characteristics of the regime “type” and the
extent of state building by the regime to consolidate its purposes. These points of
departure from democratic theory might contribute to a better understanding of civic
education in contexts characterized by other than liberal democratic views of civic
education.

8.3.2 Contribution for Civic Education Practice

The study took Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China as study case, its finding
provides some insights for the civic education practice in these three Chinese societies.

*The way forward for the development of civic education*

In the study, the results showed that civic education in Mainland China is in the form of
ideological, political and moral education, and has become “a vehicle for demonstrating
its paternalistic legitimacy claims” (Kennedy, Fairbrother & Zhao, 2013, p.222). The
democratic and civic elements are rarely mentioned in the civic curriculum. Therefore,
the study suggests that civics curriculum in Mainland China could benefit from greater
attention to broader aims and purposes including an understanding democracy and
political participation and with a greater emphasis on critical thinking. These added
elements would complement the growth of China’s liberal economy and move away
from the self-contradictions in the current provisions of civic education.
In Hong Kong the contested concepts of ‘good citizen’ and civic education could promote the development of civic education theory. Yet it might also leads to a “no civic education” phenomenon in schools: too much debate about civic education in Hong Kong and its ongoing politicization might deter schools from taking a stand on what they see as best for their students. Schools do not want to be denounced by either pro-democracy or pro-China groups. Therefore, this study suggests that it is time to end the debate and for the community to reach a consensus on what civic education should be in Hong Kong schools. This would be in the best interests of students and the future.

Compared to Mainland China and Hong Kong, Taiwan’s civic education seems a better reflection of its growing democracy. Yet the results of the study have indicated that civic education in Taiwan does not cultivate the ‘good citizen’ required by its democracy. This is largely because democracy must use democratic procedures but in doing so loses its grip on shaping the future citizen. Essentially, civic education is democratic civic education, closely linked to and supporting democracy. Yet democracy requires critical thinkers who can make judgements for themselves. In this case, Taiwan students seem more conservative in terms of valuing their Chinese heritage and values rather than uncritically embracing the regime’s more integrated view aligned to Western values. Civic educators in Taiwan need to be aware of this tension for students and develop learning processes that help them become aware of the decisions they are making. In this way democratic procedures can still be used to support democratic civic education.

**Teachers’ civic teaching**

The study suggests that it is necessary to provide more civic teacher education for teachers in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and that the way civic education is taught should be reviewed. Students in this study expressed a broad range of views about being a citizen and understanding what their responsibilities involved. Yet very often
their views were shaped by their peers or their families or even the media. Most students rarely mentioned what they had learnt as part of their civic education. Yet some students did refer to the way their teachers made political and social issues interesting and this helped them to understand the importance of such issues. Therefore this study suggests that teachers should adopt a teaching approach that guides students in active discussions and critical thinking about the social and political problems.

**Students’ civic learning**

The study suggests that Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan’ students’ civic learning needs to be improved. That is because the study showed that students in these three societies both have a low interest in political participation and lack of critical thinking. In Mainland China, political participation was rarely mentioned by students, perhaps because they considered individual citizen powers to be relevant to government policy-making and current so-called elections are usefully ineffective. Chinese students believed that a ‘good citizen’ should not criticize the country and county leaders, and or participate in petitioning and protest. Taiwan students have good democratic knowledge, they know the advantages of democracy compared to students in authoritarian regimes. They know how it to works and are aware of the importance of individual participation for democratic working. Yet most of them do not like political issues and are not interested in political participation. Across the three societies there are issues here that can be used to improve the way civic education is developed, what needs to be included in the curriculum, and how teaching should take place. Hopefully all of this can help to improve students’ civic learning.

**8.3.2 Contribution for Comparative Civic Education Studies**

Hahn (2010) called for greater attention to be paid to comparative civic education and the current study has been a response to that call. This study demonstrated a multilevel
research method for comparing civic education in Chinese societies. Existing studies on civic education in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Mainland China have an exclusive focus on one level of education, such as ideology, intended curriculum, or implemented curriculum (Kwong, 1985; Liu, 2001; Lee & Ho, 2005; Law, 2006; Tse, 2007). These kind of studies can help to understand civic education on one level, but it usually ignores the continuity and divergence between policy, ideal curriculum, formal curriculum, teachers’ perceived curriculum, operation curriculum and students’ experiential curriculum (Goodlad, 1979).

The current study has focused on three levels of comparison to ensure that all relevant issues related to ‘good citizen’ and civic education to be identified: Level 1: Regime type; Level 2: Curriculum and policy formulations; Level 3: Student personal experience. These three levels are linked with each other and form a continuous process of civic education implementation. The results of the study demonstrated that all regimes attempt to develop its required ‘good citizen’ through civic education, but not all regime types can achieve their expectations. Therefore, the study suggests that a multilevel comparative research methodology has an important role to play in the study of civic education. This study has also shown that this kind of comparison can be carried out with a range of qualitative research tools including multi-site interviews, in-depth literature view and document analysis. These have worked together to enable deep analysis and the development of comparative insights.

8.4 Limitations of the Study
This section summarizes the limitations of the present study.

8.4.1 Limited Sample of Students for Interview
In the study, interview data were collected in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Beijing from 30 Grade 8 students whose average age was 14 years. The sample size was small and non-
representative. As Peterson (2009) indicated, at this age the majority of students may not fully understand what the government and civil society are, as well as their rights and duties as a citizen in their society. Nevertheless, all students participated in the interviews using the knowledge and experience they had and they provided the data that formed the basis of description and analysis in earlier chapters. Their views are not generalizable and as they themselves develop these views expressed as young adolescents may well change. Yet a start has been made on recognizing the importance of student voice and hopefully more can be done in the future to improve the generalizability of student views.

8.4.2 Limited Literature Regarding Regime theory as Data Sources
Regime “type” was a key concept in the study but there is further work to be done to reach a fuller understanding of the concept. Firstly, this study chose just three types, authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic regime, as representative of all types. Although these three regime types have the highest recognition and numbers, it cannot include all types of regime in today’s world, such as totalitarian regimes or even the diversity of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, there is a lack of literature regarding regimes, especially authoritarian and hybrid regimes. The relationship between regime “type” and civic education is a very new research topic, and there were there are a very few studies relating to it. Therefore, the theoretical basis of the study should be regarded as at an early development stage.

8.4.3 Limited Range of Societies Studied
The study chose three Chinese societies, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China as cases of each regime type within a particular geographic and cultural area of Asia. Although its finding can provide a deep understanding and some insight about civic education in Chinese societies, the finding could not be generalizable outside of the specific contexts in which the data is collected. This thesis has deliberately chosen to focus narrowly but it has been at the expense of a broader geographic and political reach.
8.5 Implications for Future Research

This study developed a new research topic: the relationship between regime ‘type’ and civic education, and found regime “type” and regime capacity play important roles in forming the concept of ‘good citizen’ and in shaping civic education programs. Two issues are worth pursuing in the future.

8.5.1 Need for Quantitative Study for Relationship between Regime “Type” and Civic Education

The study used a qualitative methodology to explore how regime “type” influence civic education. Through a comparison across Chinese authoritarianism, Hong Kong’ hybrid regime and Taiwan’s democracy, the study concluded three different kinds of ‘good citizen’ are respectively proposed by authoritarian, hybrid and democratic regime: self-contradictory, contested and democratic ‘good citizen’. These different requirements were directly reflected in civic education to form three different civic education programs: fixed civic education in authoritarian regime, competing civic education in hybrid regime, and changing civic education in democracy. The three kinds of ‘good citizen’ and civic education have been derived from just three regime types. Large scale quantitative studies are now needed to see how generalizable are the student views outlined in this study. First, such studies need to be conducted in the three regimes used in this research. Subsequently, the different views of ‘good citizens’ need to be tested outside these regimes to see whether they are generalizable.

8.5.2 More Studies on Civic Education in Non-democratic Society

The study found that the authoritarian regime had a unique concept of ‘good citizen’ and fixed civic education, as result, the majority of students’ perception of ‘good citizen’ was lined with the regime’s desire. While in democratic Taiwan, under a pluralistic concept
of ‘good citizen’ and changing civic education, students did not become the citizen as democracy expected. Does this mean we have to consider authoritarian regime and its fixed civic education as a necessary condition for creating and developing ‘good citizen’ as regime desired? If not, which kind of regime type and civic education programs is best to cultivate a real good citizen? Although the study had found the ‘good citizen’ developed by civic education in authoritarian regime is obedient and moral, they lack of democratic values, interesting in participation and awareness and critical thinking. It is unlikely that such a model should be generalized but it may be important to find out more about such a model and its effectiveness. Some students, for example demonstrated a minimal level of resistance so more should be known about how this process works in an authoritarian regime. More studies in non-democratic regimes should be carried out to see if there are other characteristics of non-democratic education not identified in this study. Further comparisons of civic education in democratic and non-democratic societies should be conducted to gain a fuller understanding of similarities and differences and in particular how non-democratic civic education might provide the basis for transitioning to democratic civic education.

8.6 Conclusion

This study has taken a small step by identifying multiple purposes for civic education closely related to the political conditions reflected in different regime “types”. The purpose has not been to question democratic civic education or democracy but rather to be more aware of other contexts that have an equal commitment to civic education and the moulding of future citizens.

Three Chinese societies, Taiwan Hong Kong, and Mainland China, were purposively selected as the specific case of democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. The concept of ‘good citizen’ in these three regime context and how these notions are reflected in civic education and perceived by the students were investigated in the study to explore
how civic education is influenced by the regime “type”. The results showed that there is a close continuity and congruence between regime “type” and civic education, especially in non-democratic societies such as authoritarian and hybrid regimes. The ‘good citizen’ required by regimes is directly reflected in civics curriculum and broadly accepted by most students. In the democratic society in this study, students’ perceptions of being a ‘good citizen’ were beyond to what the regime and civic education expected. It seems to suggest that the more powerful and authoritarian regime type, the stronger control and influence on civic education, and the more possible the students can be developed as its required ‘good citizen’. Yet democracy has a little influence to control the outcomes of civic education.

The three regime types focused in the study were linked with Sorensen’s three models of state, the models of state were analyzed here as it could be seen that state capacity varied among democratic, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Thus it seems that while regime “type” strongly influences forms of civic education and the attributes of a ‘good citizen’, it is a state’s capacity to support regime objectives that determines the effectiveness of a regime’s efforts to mould and shape the kind of citizens it requires. Students can resist a regime’s efforts and in this study it was students in democratic Taiwan that showed they were the most resistant. This tension between state capacity and resistance is an important one to acknowledge and highlights the significance of this study in exploring civic education in a broad range of political contexts. The groundwork has now been laid for further such studies designed to deepen and enrich our understanding of civic education in contexts other than those characterized by Western liberal democracy.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Part I: Personal Background (filled by interviewer)

Number: ______  Gender:  Male / Female

Age: ______  School Type: governmental/private

Part II: Interview questions

A  Basic Perception of Citizen

1. What comes to your mind when someone mentions the term of “citizen”? What is citizen in your opinion?

2. What is different between the term “citizen”, “people”, and “nationals”?

B  Perception of “Good” Citizen

1. The Quality Related to Individual-self

   (1) What is ‘good citizen’ in your opinion?
   (2) What quality a ‘good citizen’ should have? Which one is the most necessary (obeying the law, participation, morality, or patriotism)?
   (3) What mental and individual quality a ‘good citizen’ should have?

2. The Relationship between Individual and Others

   (1) As a ‘good citizen’, in your opinion, how to get along with other? With your parents, neighbors, teachers, classmates, friends, and a strangers?
   (2) What do you do when your interest is conflict with others? Would you like to give me a detail case?
(3) Will you help others (friend, stranger) when he or she was in trouble?

3. The Relationship between Individual and Society, State.

(1) What is the relationship between you and your country/government?
(2) Is patriotism important for being a ‘good citizen’? How do you think about patriotism? What is different between love country, love party, and love government?
(3) Which one is the most important when your interests conflict with country’s? Why?
(4) If country or government make a wrong decision, as a ‘good citizen’, what will you do?

C The sources of their perception of citizenship and ‘good citizen’.

1. Where do you get this information about citizen, in your civic education, course, your parents, or media? Which one is the most important for you?
訪談提綱

第一部分：個人基本資訊（由訪談者填寫）

編號：________ 性別：男 / 女

年齡：________ 所在學校類型：公立 / 私立

第二部分：訪談問題

A 請您簡單談一下對“公民”一詞的認識

1. 當聽到“公民”這個詞時，你會想到什麼？你覺得公民是什麼？
2. 你覺得“公民”、“國民”、“人民”所表達的意思一樣嗎？如果不一樣，它們有什麼區別？

B 何謂“好公民”？

1. 與個體有關的素質
   (1) 你認為什麼樣的人才是“好公民”？
   (2) 你覺得好公民應該具備哪些基本素質？那種素質最為重要（比如守法、參與、道德，或愛國）？
   (3) 你覺得“好公民”應該具備什麼樣的心理素質？

2. 個體與他人的關係
   (1) 作為好公民，你覺得應該如何和他人相處，如何和父母、鄰居、老師、同學、朋友和陌生人相處？
   (2) 當你的利益與其他人相衝突時，你會怎麼辦？請舉出一個例子？
(3)當別人有困難的時候，你會怎麼辦，會伸出援助之手嗎？ (“老太太倒地事件”)

3. 個體與國家、社會的關係

(4)你覺得公民個體與國家、政府是一種什麼關係？

(5)你覺得你如何看待愛國的？你覺得作為好公民應該怎樣愛國？（愛國、愛黨、愛政府有區別嗎？）

(6)當國家利益和你自己的利益發生衝突的時候，你覺得那個更重要？為什麼？

(7)你認為國家政府會不會犯錯誤？如果會犯錯，作為好公民該怎麼做？

C 公民與好公民觀念的來源

1. 你是從哪裡獲得這些公民、“好公民”的觀念的(課本、父母、電視報紙網路媒體)？你覺得那種途徑最影響你的這些公民觀念。
APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Title of Project:
The Relationship between Regime “Types” and Civic Education: The Cases of Three Chinese Societies

Principal Investigators:
LI Hui, Department of Curriculum and Instruction
The Hong Kong Institute of Education, +852-29488463

Dear Participant:

I would like to invite you to participate in my dissertation research project about the relationship between regime “types” and civic education. The purpose of the project is to explore how civic education is influenced by regime “types” and students’ individual experiences under different regime types. Please take whatever time you need to discuss the study with your family and friends, or anyone else you wish to. The decision to join, or not to join, is up to you.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to finish an interview concerning your perception of citizen, good citizen, and civic education. This interview will take your one hour.

The study has a potential risk, for example, you may be identified by someone who is determined to do so. In order to protect your personal privacy, you name, school, grade and address will not directly or indirectly mentioned in the interview, and your samples collected for research purpose will be labeled with a code number. Your research records will be reviewed, stored, and analyzed at the Hong Kong Institute of Education and will
be kept in a secured area for research purpose.

Also, you may feel a little bit difficult when you’re sharing your individual experiences about citizen, good citizen, because of these themes always link with political issue. There is no obligation for you to answer all of questions, you can stop the interview immediately or skip the question if you find too difficult or uncomfortable.

I appreciate your giving time to this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me 29488463. You may also contact my supervisor, Prof. Kennedy, Kerry John at 2948 85258.

And if you have any concerns about the conduct of this research study, please do not hesitate to contact the Human Research Ethics Committee by email at hrec@ied.edu.hk or by mail to Research and Development Office, The Hong Kong Institute of Education.

Thank you,

LI Hui

Please sign below if you are willing to participate in the dissertation research project outlined above.

Name of participant_____________________
Signature of participant___________________
Signature of researcher____________________
Date___________________________________
敬爱的参与者：

本人诚意邀请您参与我的博士论文研究项目“政体‘类型’与公民教育的关系：以三个中国社会为例”。本研究旨在研究公民教育及学生的个体是如何被政体“类型”所影响的。你可以与你的家人、朋友或任何人讨论这个研究，并自行决定是否参与。

如果你同意参与，你将被要求完成一个访谈，在访谈中，我们将询问你对公民、‘好公民’，以及公民教育的看法。这个访谈大概需要进行一个小时。

本研究会存在一些潜在的危险。例如，你也许被某些故意为之的人认出。为了保护你的个人隐私，在访谈中，将不会直接或间接地提及你的名字、学校、班级以及住址。而且为了研究的目标，你作为一个样本将被编码。访谈记录的分析和存储将在香港教育学院进行，而且将被保存在一个安全的地方。

你可能会感到分享你个人关于公民、好公民的体验有一点困难，因为这些主题总是和政治问题联系在一起。你没有任何责任必须去回答这些问题，你可以立刻终止访谈或跳过让你觉得困难或不舒服的问题。

感谢你的参与。如果有任何问题，请联络本人（电邮：huier@s.ied.edu.hk；电
话 2948-8463）。或本人的导师 Prof. Kennedy, Kerry John（电邮：Kerryk@ied.edu.hk）

关于这项研究，你也可以通过电邮（hrec@ied.edu.hk）或邮件联系香港教育学院
人类研究伦理委员会。

非常感谢！

李惠

如果你同意参与本研究，请在下面签名：

参与者的姓名________________
签名________________________
研究者签名__________________
日期________________________